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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF IDAHO

PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,

v.
CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA NICKERSON,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third Party
Complainant-Appellant,
v.

COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE,
and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents

Appealed from the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for Clearwater County
Honorable GREGORY FITZMAURICE, District Judge

ELISA S. MAGNUSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
BENJAMIN C. RITCHIE
Attorney for Third Party Defendants-Respondents
PRO SE
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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Date: 7/6/2017

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 03:58 PM

ROA Report

Page 20 of 21

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2011-0000028 Current Judge: Gregory FitzMaurice
PHH Mortgage vs. Charles Nickerson, etal.

Date

Code

User

10/6/2015

DCHH

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion to Stay scheduled on
Gregory FitzMaurice
10/06/2015 02:45 PM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Keith Evans
Number of Transcript Pages for hearing
estimated:
LESS THAN 100 Set Up Meet Me

CMIN

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion to Stay scheduled on
10/06/2015 02:45 PM: Court Minutes Set Up
Meet Me

Gregory FitzMaurice

ADVS

CHRISTY

Hearing result for Motion to Stay scheduled on
10/06/2015 02:45 PM: Case Taken Under
Advisement Set Up Meet Me

Gregory FitzMaurice

10/15/2015

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order Granting Stay

Gregory FitzMaurice

4/27/2016

OPIN

BARBIE

2016 Opinion No. 51, Filed By The Supreme
Court April 27, 2016

Gregory FitzMaurice

5/18/2016

PETN

BARBIE

Petition For Rehearing - Filed By Nickerson's,
Filed By The Supreme Court 5/18/16

Gregory FitzMaurice

7/19/2016

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Denying Petition For Rehearing

Gregory FitzMaurice

7/22/2016

REMT

BARBIE

Remittitur

Gregory FitzMaurice

2/28/2017

AFFD

KPROFFITT

Affidavit and Application in Support of Issuance
of: ( 1) Writ of Execution on Judgment of
Foreclosure; And (2) Order of Sale on
Foreclosure

Gregory FitzMaurice

MOTN

KPROFFITT

Motion to Set Aside Stay and For Issuance of: ( 1) Gregory FitzMaurice
Writ of Execution on Judgment of Foreclosure;
And (2) Order of Sale Foreclosure

CHRISTY

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Gregory FitzMaurice
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Nickerson, Donna Receipt number: 0001129
Dated: 4/11/2017 Amount: $8.00 (Cash)

CHRISTY

Miscellaneous Payment: Fax Fee Paid by:
Nickerson, Donna Receipt number: 0001129
Dated: 4/11/2017 Amount: $1.00 (Cash)

Gregory FitzMaurice

MISC

BARBIE

Response In Opposition To Motion To Set Aside
Stay And Issuance Of Writ Of Execution And
Order Of Sale

Gregory FitzMaurice

MOTN

BARBIE

Motion For Sanctions

Gregory FitzMaurice

MOTN

BARBIE

Motion To Quash Execution And Judgment

Gregory FitzMaurice

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and
Judgment and Motion for Sanctions

Gregory FitzMaurice

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order Lifting Stay

Gregory FitzMaurice

ORDR

CHRISTY

Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure

Gregory FitzMaurice

SCAN

CHRISTY

Scanned: 4/18/2017

Gregory FitzMaurice

4/11/2017

4/13/2017

Judge
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Date: 7/6/2017

Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County

Time: 03:58 PM

ROA Report

Page 21 of 21

User: BARBIE

Case: CV-2011-0000028 Current Judge: Gregory FitzMaurice
PHH Mortgage vs. Charles Nickerson, etal.

Date

Code

User

4/13/2017

CDIS

CHRISTY

Gregory FitzMaurice
Civil Disposition entered for: Coldwell Banker
Mortgage,, Defendant; J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., Defendant; Knowlton & Miles PIie,,
Defendant; Nickerson, Charles, Defendant;
Nickerson, Donna, Defendant; Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., Defendant; PHH Mortgage,, Plaintiff. Filing
date: 4/13/2017

CHRISTY

Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Gregory FitzMaurice
by: Aldridge Pite LLP Receipt number: 0001354
Dated: 5/3/2017 Amount: $2.00 (Cashiers
Check)

WRIT

CHRISTY

Writ of Execution on Judgment Foreclosure

Gregory FitzMaurice

MOTN

KJOHNSON

Motion To Vacate Or Amend Order Of Sale And
Decree Of Foreclosure

Gregory FitzMaurice

MOTN

KJOHNSON

Motion To Reconsider Order Denying Motion To
Quash Execution And Judgment And Motion For
Sanctions

Gregory FitzMaurice

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Denying Motion To Vacate Or Amend
Order Of Sale And Decree Of Foreclosure

Gregory FitzMaurice

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Denying Motion To Reconsider Order
Denying Motion To Quash Execution And
Judgment

Gregory FitzMaurice

SMCCOLLUM

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory FitzMaurice
Supreme Court Paid by: Lorene Wright Receipt
number: 0001599 Dated: 5/25/2017 Amount:
$129.00 (Cash) For: Nickerson, Charles
(defendant) and Nickerson, Donna (defendant)

NOTC

SMCCOLLUM

Notice Of Issues

Gregory FitzMaurice

NOTA

SMCCOLLUM

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Gregory FitzMaurice

APSC

BARBIE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Gregory FitzMaurice

6/5/2017

CCOA

BARBIE

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Gregory FitzMaurice

6/19/2017

ORDR

BARBIE

Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal

Gregory FitzMaurice

6/21/2017

MISC

BARBIE

Notice of Change of Address and Substitution of
Counsel - Filed by the Supreme Court 6/21/17

Gregory FitzMaurice

APER

BARBIE

Defendant: J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
Appearance Benjamin C Ritchie

Gregory FitzMaurice

6/28/2017

BNDC

ALUSTIG

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1953 Dated
6/28/2017 for 100.00)

Gregory FitzMaurice

7/6/2017

ORDR

BARBIE

Order To Withdraw Conditional Dismissal And
Augment Prior Appeal

Gregory FitzMaurice

4/25/2017

4/27/2017

5/16/2017

5/25/2017

Judge
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FILED
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BY_ _ _ _ __

2

0

AT
OFINO , IG,\HO

_,UU.__,,1-_

CHARLES )l"ICKERSON AND DONNA NICKERSON
3165 NeffRd
Orofino, ID 83544

3

4

Defendants Pro Se

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TK
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TUE COUNTY OF CLEARW ATtr.R

8

9

PHH MORTGAGE,

10

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

ll

vs .
12
I]
]4

15

Case No.: CV 2011-28

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NTCKERSON, husband and wife;
Kl\OWLT01' & MILES PLLC~ WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., AND JOHN DOES I
thru X

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
.M OTION TO SET ASIDE STAY AND
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION
AND ORDER OF SALE

lG
Defendant,

17
]8
19

COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a/d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N .A.

20

Third Part -Defendants.

21

22

COMES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, request PHH' s Motion to Set

23

Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ and Order of Sale be denied. As this Court has found

24

previously, proceeding with a premature execution of judgment perpetuates unnecessary and

25

unwarranted additional harm and damage against our family, our reputation, and the security of

26

our property. It also places Cleruwater County and the world at large at unnecessary risk and

27

jeopardy.

28
29

30

As a general rule, a person who causes a writ of execution to issue upon judgment which
is later vacated is liable for the damages caused by the v.irnngful execution. 3D Am. Jur.
2d, Executions, Etc. § 525 Persons liable; officers and assistants

31

This is especially true in light of the extraordinary circumstances that have surrounded this case

32

in regards to the denial of equal access to justice for our family, the evidences of fraud and

Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside S\ay and Issuance of Writ
Pagel of 7
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I

1

misrepresentations that have been presented., and the abuse of process suffered. Further, the facts

2

and true merits of this case support that the final resolution of this case will require the quashing

3

of any execution of judgment against us and demand a complete reversal of judgment in favor oft

4

PHH or Chase. It is therefore inappropriate to move forward with an improper execution based

5

on irregular and fraudulent premises. The appeal is still ongoing as we have an unopposed

6

Objection to Costs and Fees and Motion for Sanctions before the Supreme Court requesting

7

Chase be sanctioned in accordance with I.R.C.P. 1 l(c) and I.AR. I 1.2(a) for "signing and

8

certifying documents to the Court 'that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and

9

belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact.' The admissions, interrogatories, briefs

10

and affidavits of Chase presented to the Supreme Court in the record contain statements that are

II

false, not supported by any evidence and conflict with the facts the Court deemed to be

12

undisputed and relied upon to rule against us." See O~jection to Costs and Fees and Motion for

13

Sanctions submitted to this Court in conjunction with our Motion for Sanctions and Motion to

14

Quash Execution and Judgment. By affirming District Court Judge Griffin, the Supreme Court

15

has, in effect and by judgment, found Chase lied. Chase obtained summary judgment in its favor

16

by fraud, and thus, it must be vacated and cannot be relied upon. Because PHH committed fraud

17'

in conjunction with Chase, PHH's case is jeopardized, their standing is fatally flawed, and thus,

18

their entire complaint is based upon false premises. Genuine issues of material facts remain that

19

must be resolved prior to judgment being rendered in favor of PHH and in order to prevent future

20

claims and forthcoming litigation. Therefore, justice and judicial economy require the stay

21

remain in force pending the resolution of the appeal.

22

In addition to the facts and argument submitted below, we request the Court to consider

23

the facts and argument contained in our Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Quash Execution

24

and Judgment submitted in conjunction with this response.

25

ARGUMENT

26

As detailed in our argument regarding our motion to stay and incorporated herein, there

27

are numerous inconsistencies, contradictions and falsehoods District Court Judge Griffin relied

28

upon and perpetrated that, as a matter of law, require the summary judgments in favor of PHH

29

and Chase to be reversed. Our due process and right to a defense has been violated and

30

obstructed by the willful and malicious actions and inactions of PIDI, Chase, and those acting on

31

their behalf. Therefore, prior to executing the false and fraudulently obtained judgment and in

32

order to avoid future claims, suffering, and damages, we request this Court recognize PHH and

Response in Opposition to Molion to Sel Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ
Page 2 of7
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Chase must, at a minimum, provide irrefutable proof and documentation regarding the following
genuine issues of material fact.

2

1. The true chain of title and holder of the note. Chase, throughout this litigation, has

3
4

declared they never owned the note (R. I 09 - Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's

5

AmendedAnswer, Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint and Demand.for Jury Trial-p. 3, L.

6

11; R. p. 128 -JPJdmgan Chase Bank, NA 's Answer to Third Party Complahit- p. 3; R. pp.

7

747-751, 759, 760-.!PMorgan Chase Bank's Answers and Responses lo Defendants Charles

8

Iand Donna Nickerson 's First set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production, pp. 2-6, 14,
I

15). PHH claims Coldwell Banker Mortgage initiated the note, sold it to Fannie Mae in 2002 and

9
10
11

.

Fannie Mae transferred it back to PHH in 2010 (R. 882 -Plaintiff's Response to Defendant

INickersom· 'First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production - p. 2). Judge Griffin
I

12

found, contradicting and disputing his own undisputed facts, Coldwell Banker Mortgage initiated

L3

the note, sold it to Chase in 2007 and Chase sold it to PHH in 2010. The facts the )fickersons

L4

presented through documentation provided by Chase and Fannie Mae demonstrate Coldwell

L5

Banker lvfortgage sold the note to Fannie Mae in 2002, Fannie Mae sold the note to Chase in

16

2009 (R. 1112, 1139-1140 - Affidavit of Charles Nickerson in Support of]Vfotion for Summary

17

Judgment - Exhibits 6 and 9) and that as of January 2014 Chase had the note in their possession

18

and was the investor on the loan (R. 1232 - Notice ~fSupplemental r,-vidence -Exhibit A). Only

19

the holder of the note has the authority to foreclose, and based on the evidence before the Court,

20

PHH was not the holder of the Note when they initiated this action in 2011. Further, the copies o

2.l

the notes PHH and Chase provided are different (SAR. 30-}vfotionfor Rel;effrom Judgment-

22

p. l 0, L. 23-31). Therefore, this Court must recognize PHH and Chase have not proven with

23

admissible evidence that PHH held the note when they filed this complaint, their complaint must

24

be dismissed with prejudice, and they must be held accountable for fraud and liable for the

25

significant and substantial abuse, suffering and damages inflicted upon our family, our ranch, our

26

reputation, and our entire financial portfolio. Allowing them to proceed with this wrongful

27

foreclosure endorses their malicious actions, encourages their mortgage fraud and abusive debt

28

collection practices, and demonstrates willful and malicious negligence and abuse in these

29

proceedings.

30

I

2. Default and default amount. PHH prevented our performance by refusing to accept

31

our payments, refusing to validate their claimed default amount even after we provided proof of

32

payments made, failing to provide proper and accurate notifications, and pushing foreclosure

Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Stay and Issuance of Wr1t
Page 3 of7
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1

based on an inaccurate and non-existent default amount. State and federal laws governing

2

mortgages and debt collection require PHH and Chase to provide a strict accounting, using the

3

account records submitted in evidence, in order to prove default and accurately prove the

4

claimed default. PHH should have been and must be required to prove up the exact default which

5

they originally claimed and relied on. Anything else is an admission their records were and are

6

inaccurate, cannot be relied upon, constitutes a breach of contract, implicates fraud, and prevents

7

any lawful execution of judgment against any alleged or existing debt. PHH now claims and the

8

Supreme Court affirmed we allegedly missed 9 payments which contradict PHH's previous

9

claims of 13 and 14 missed payments and. in effect, voids their complaint. In addition, PHH did

lO

not reduce the principal amount allegedly owed ($261,170.62) when they reduced the number of

11

payments missed (R. 561 -Affidavit in Support of SummW)' Judgment - p. 2; R. 103 7, 1038 -

12

Second Affidavit ofRonald E. Casperite in Support of PHH 's Second lvfotion for Summary

13

Judgment - p. 2-3). Obviously, if additional payments are applied to the account the principal

14

amount must be reduced. Further, according to the account records submitted by Chase, the

15

principal balance on the account went to $0.00 in November 2009 and went negative, -

16

$1,186.90, at the time servicing allegedly transferred in February 2010 (R. 441-453 -Affidavit of]

17

Jon A. Stenquist in Support of Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment - Exhibit F.). There is

18

extreme discrepancy between what Chase claims as the principal balance and what PHH claims,

19

and according to Chase's account records, the records PHH relied upon to claim default, we paid

20

off the loan in November 2009 and were due a refund in January 2010. Therefore, based on the

21

inaccurate evidence in the record, PHH has fatally failed to provide a strict accounting of their

22

claimed default amount and principal balance which was required by law to be verified by the

23

appropriate Chase personnel with personal knowledge of this account (1.R.C.P. 56; 12 C.F.R §

24

24.38; R. 1419-1423 - Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer,

25

Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial - pp. 29-33, Eighth

26

Affirmative Defense). Failure to provide an accurate default dismisses PHH's complaint. Failing

27

to require an accurate default prevents genuine issues of material fact from being justly litigated

2&

in this action, dissolves and thwarts our rights to find relief and final resolution based on the

29

merits in this action, and forces future claims and actions for justice to be pursued.

I

JO

3. Notice of Default and opportunity to cure. It is critical the alleged default be

31

accurate because it changes the circumstances and basis for the complaint. By contract the note

32

holder must provide notice of defauh and opportunity to cure. Iftbe default amount changes, as it

Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ
Page 4 of7
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I

1

has in this case, then the notice of default is invalidated or void, but the contractuaJ obligation to

2

j provide notice is not erased. Codified and common law clearly establish accuracy in record

3

keeping is necessary for collection enforcement. Therefore, since PHH has fatally failed to

4

establish an accurate default amount, Pl-IT.I's complaint must be dismissed as we were never

5

served with a proper and accurate notice of default or provided with an opportunity to cure any

6

aileged default. The difference in the amount, over $11,000.00, could have undoubtedly made a

7

difference in the contractual right and option to cure. Furthermore, we questioned the alleged

8

default amount and the existence of any default whatsoever at that time, provided proof of

9

payments, and requested PHH provide an accounting of our payments. Under RE SPA, PHH was

LO

required by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(B) "after conducting an investigation, provide the borrower

l1

with a written explanation or clarificatjon." PHH refused to conduct any investigation and

12

refused to provide us with a written explanation or clarification regarding the disputed default

13

(R. 1419-1423 - Chm·les Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim,

14

Third Party Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial - pp. 29-33, Eighth Affirmative Defense). As

15

a result, PHH is in violation ofRESPA and their complaint should now be considered moot

16

because it is not accurate and the provisions in the contract regarding notice of default have not

17

been satisfied. Therefore, PHH has no right or cause of action.

18

The responsibility of this Court and the Idaho judicial system is to ensure equal access to

19

justice is available to both parties. We have been denied this right from the outset of this case

20

due to the fraudulent representation of PHH, Chase and their attorneys of record. As the record

21

shows, the fraud against us, this property, this Court, Clearwater County, and the World at Large

22

extends back to the closing table (SAR. 36-38 -Motionjor Relieffrom Judgment-p. 16, L. 14 -

23

p. 18, L. 11). ln addition to the 3 points above, we have included a condensed review of this

24

horrific nightmare as summarized in our brief in support of rehearing submitted to the Supreme

25

Court to aid this Court in determining how substantially PHH and Chase's actions and inactions

26

have adversely affected the judgments rendered in this case and the ability of the Supreme Court

27

to find and ofter any relief to us because of the record created by Judge Griffin (See Exhibit 1).

28

We also direc1 the Court's attention to our Mo6on for Relief from Judgment or Order dated

29

October 3, 20 J 4. This document was filed in the District Court record to find justice and

30

immediate relief from the ongoing assault on our family in Clearwater County. It too

31

demonstrates the extreme prejudice we have experienced.

32

CONCLUSION

Response in Opposition to Motion to Sel Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ
Page 5 of?
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I

This Court issued a stay for good cause. PHH's case has significant genuine issues of
2

material fact. These issues have not gone away. If anything, PHH's position lost any and all

3

potential merit when the Supreme Court, based on their ruling, declared Chase lied. However,

4

due to the biased, sabotaged and prejudiced record produced by Judge Griffin ("The Nickersons

5

submitted additional documents and statements after the hearing ... The court will not consider

6

those documents ... "), the Supreme Court did not consider documents in which Chase claims to

7

be the holder of the note, have the note in its possession, and to be the investor on the loan.

8

Further, the Supreme Court did not address the assignment of error regarding the ignoring of

9

these documents. Thus, the prejudiced record thwarted a remand at the Supreme Court level.

10

This victimization of our family without cause or right has gone on long enough. Therefore, we

11

call on this Court to stay execution and allow this litigation to proceed on its merits so justice

12

may have the opportunity to remedy the prejudice and injustice suffered; Chase and PHH can be

L3

required to admit the truths of this matter; and PHH, Chase and their accomplices can be held
accountable for this malicious and unwarranted assault on our family. This District Court has the

15

power and obligation to watch over its judgments and to ensure justice, not injustice, is served

16

within its jurisdictions.

17

·wherefore, we request PHH's motion to set aside stay and for issuance of writ and order

l8

of sale be denied and that the stay against execution of judgment remain in full force for all of

l9

the same reasons it was originally granted and so justice may be served. Chase and PHH must

20

irrefutably prove the chain of title, the default and the claimed default amount and our Objection

21

to Costs and Fees and Motion for Sanctions must be resolved completely prior to any lawful

22

execution of judgment in their favor. A premature execution of judgment irreparably prejudices
and damages our rights in this matter, further slanders and defames our character and financial

24

reputation, and increases the exposure and liability for the opposing parties and those involved in

25

enforcing the execution of judgment.

26

Oral argument requested.

27
28

DATED this

JJ.!:._ day of.,,,,.~~--ff'l)~;~_.,,__,
1

('-. _ _ _ _ _,

2017

29
30
3J

32

Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ
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2
3

4
5

6
7
8

9

10

11
12

p.7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the tf.fl. day of ~ ,~) /
, 2017, I
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the RESPONSE IN~POSITION TO
MOTION TO SET ASIDE STAY AND ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION AND
ORDER OF SA1.LE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge P-ite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

( c:) U.S. Mail

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

(..-,) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

13

(--A7,,~
. . .7 vl.4:,..___-·
'
CharlesNicerson

l4

l5
16

**Please note: Mr. Stenquist and Ms. Magnuson already have copies of the documents listed
below and in the interest of saving resources we are not serving them again.

L7
18

19

•
•

•

Objection to Costs and Fees and Motion for Sanctions
Affidavit of Charles Nickerson in Support of Objection to Costs and Fees and Motion for
Sanctions
Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing

20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27
28
29

30
31

32

Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Stay and lssuancc of Writ
Page 7 of7
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I ll8IHX3:

PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,
V.

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA NICKERSON
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,
and
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE and JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, NA,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents.

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Clearwater County.
Supreme Court Docket No. 42163-2014
Clearwater County No. 2011-28
Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge, presiding.
Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Rd
Orofino, ID 83544
Appellants-Pro Se

Amelia Sheets
Just Law
PO Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
For Respondents - PHH Mortgage and
Coldwell Banker Mortgage
Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
For Respondent-JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA
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PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefondant-Respondent,
V.

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA NICKERSON
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,
and
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE and JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, NA,
Third Paiiy Defendants-Respondents.

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Clearwater County.
Supreme Court Docket No. 42163-2014
Clearwater County No. 2011-28
Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge, presiding.
Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Rd
Orofino, ID 83544
Appellants-Pro Se

Amelia Sheets
Just Law
PO Box 50271
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
For Respondents -PHH Mortgage and
Coldwell Banker Mortgage
Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
For Respondent JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA
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Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
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COMES NOW, Charles and Donna Nickerson, Appellants, submit the following Briefto
this Idaho Supreme Court in Support of our Petition for Rehearing.
"There may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a
reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions
of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency
below. See Blair v. Oesterlein 1i1achine Co., 275 U.S. 220, 225.
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat
them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review
would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had
not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly
rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.
while recognizing the desirability and existence of a general practice under which
appellate courts confine themselves to the issues raised below, neve1iheless do not lose
sight of the fact that such appellate practice should not be applied where the obvious
result would be a plain miscarriage of justice." Hormel v. Helvering, 312 US 552 at 557,
558 (1941)
"To begin, it is a well-established general rule that an appellate comi ,,vill not consider an
issue raised for the first time on appeal. (citations omitted). This rule is not an absolute
bar to raising new issues on appeal; the general rule is disregarded "vhen we think it
necessary to remedy an obvious injustice. See Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp.,
900 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 132, 112 L.Ed.2d 100
(1990). We will also sometimes entertain arguments not raised in the trial court if the
elements of the claim were fully set fmih and there is no need for additional fact finding.
See Vintero Co17J. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515 (2d
Cir.1982). Ente1iaining issues raised for the first time on 1peal is discretionary with the
panel hearing the appeal." Greene v. US, 13 F. 3d 577 (2° Cir. 1994).

PHH abused the Idaho judicial foreclosure action procedure to wrongfully and
maliciously steal our family and ministry ranch in Clearwater County without cause or right.
Crimes against real prope1iy, mortgage fraud, and financial frauds occurred without consequence
because Idaho Second Judicial District Judge Michael Griffin refused to hear, consider or allow
existing material evidence and facts that irrefutably dismiss PHH and Chase's complaint,
allegations, and defenses to stand or be entered in the record. Judge Griffin overlooked,
misapplied, and failed to consider statutes, decisions, and principles directly controlling this
foreclosure action and the truth of the matter surrounding it. Consequently, PHH has derived
unlawful benefit from foreclosing on this prope1iy and we have been systematically denied our
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rights to properly present a defense and state our claims. Therefore, by law, the final judgment
rendered is not based on the merits of this case. Rather, the judgment is rooted in lies and fraud;
erroneously ignores issues that irrefutably defeat surmmuy judgment in favor of PHH or Chase;
unjustly cloaks material facts and questions that dismiss their claims with prejudice; and
catastrophically evades its lawful, moral and ethical obligation to ensure equal access and
consequence to justice.
Not only has our ranch and its equity been stolen in this unjust decision, but our good
name and perfect credit has been stolen, c01rupted, and destroyed by the willful actions of Chase
and PHH. A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. For this reason, the law protects
one's good name and justice demands truth is what must govern the affairs of those found within
its jurisdiction.

Justitia nemini neganda est - Justice is to be denied to no one
Omnis indemnatus pro innoxis legibus habetur - Every uncondemned person is held by
the law as innocent.

Quisquis przesumitur bonus; et semper in dubiis pro reo respondendum - Everyone is
presumed good; and in doubtful cases the resolution should be ever for the accused.

Justitia non novit patremnec matrem; so lam. Veritatem spectat justitia. - Justice knows
not father nor mother; justice looks at truth alone.
"All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among which
are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting
prope1iy; pursuing happiness and seeming safety." Constitution of the State ofldaho,
Article 1 Declaration of Rights. Section 1. Inalienable Rights of Man.
On April 27, 2016, this Supreme Court affirmed the smnmary judgments rendered in a
judicial foreclosure action by Judge Michael Griffin of the Second Judicial District of the State
ofidaho, Clearwater County. We disagree and dissent. Written opinion to follow.

Perhaps the most serious financial conviction rendered against a financial portfolio and a
good name is foreclosure. Foreclosure is the felony of the financial world where the confiscation
of a convicted person's land and goods is the penalty. This most serious offense constitutes the
m01igagor has failed, committed a crime, and brands the m01igagor a financial criminal.
Foreclosure is the ultimate consequence of default without legal excuse, to keep one's
word or to fulfill and perform promises made in a contract. Default is "by its derivation, a
failure. Specifically, the olnission or failure to perfo1m a legal duty, to observe a promise or
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discharge an obligation, or to perform an agreement. The term also embraces the idea of
dishonesty and of wrongful act, or an act or omission discreditable to one's profession." Black's
Law.

It is well settled a foreclosure conviction mars your record and changes your life forever.
The financial felon is no longer presumed trustwmihy to pay or do the right thing. The
consequences are far reaching, making financial recovery very difficult, if not near to impossible.
In times past, debtors who failed to pay were proclaimed rebels or outlaws in public places.
Today they are proclaimed financial lepers in public records.
As Idaho litigants, we have been condemned and branded unjustly; and unlawfully
deprived of our rights to defend against our false accusers and to find relief against a vicious
assault on our persons, the ownership of our ranch, our financial reputations, and our financial
portfolio. We have been deprived oppmiunity to be heard or for evidence of our innocence to be
considered. Default is not proven. The right of our accuser to bring this complaint against us or
to suffer injury does not exist and is not established.
Nemo debet rem suam sine facto aut defectu suo amittere - No man ought to lose his

property without his own act or default.
Ne,no punitur sine injuria, fhcto, seu defctlta - No one is punished unless for some wrong,

act, or default.
Per Black's Law Dictionary, deprive is "to take. The term has this meaning in a
constitutional provision that no person shall be 'deprived of his property' without due process of
law, and denotes a taking altogether, a seizure, a direct appropriation, dispossession of the
owner."
Karlin noted, "Rights were owned by the people, as individual, and never dichotomized
into personal and property. The principle established by the Magna Carta and thus basic
to the common law and later to the Constitution was the identification of liberty and
property. Ownership of property was evidence oflibe1iy. In solemn ceremony, it was
there decreed that neither the King nor government could take property except per le gem
terrae. The reach was not procedural but substantive. Coke in his writings used the
phrase interchangeably with "due process of law;" and, in this form, the concept was
included in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. Life, liberty and
property comprised an invulnerable trilogy ... "
per le gem terrae - by the law of the land; by due process of the law

Amendment V of the Constitution grants the right of due process to us when it creates a
number of rights relevant to both criminal and civil legal proceedings and issues surrounding this
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litigation in particularity. It forbids against double jeopardy. Creating double indemnity for us by
not requiring the genuine issue of ownership of the note be proven violates this right.
Jus non patitur ut idem bis solvatur - The law does not permit that the same thing be
twice paid.
Amendment V protects against self-incrimination. We have penned journals to
demonstrate our passionate desire to tell our story to the Court. We have hid nothing for we are
innocent and have done nothing wrong. Allowing depositions to be relied upon in the presence of
our attorney's admissions we had no knowledge of them, when they do not in any way reflect the
statements and admissions made by us, and when the only undisputed issue surrounding the
truthfulness or veracity of their presentation is that we were present the day the depositions were
allegedly taken, defies and mocks these rights. Failing to strike the depositions, ensure equal
access to justice by requiring all attorneys to comply with the rules of procedure, and refusing to
suppress without providing law or reason for us to refute, violates these rights. Repeatedly
allowing opposing counsel to reference them to forge a self-incrimination that is not rooted in
reality, truth or lawful discovery is fraudulent and violates this right. Despite any prejudices
against us, or misrepresentations presented by opposing counsel, Amendment V guarantees our
rights to fair and just proceedings and that we will not "be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."
Further, Amendment XIV of the Constitution states, "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Black's Law states, "The essential elements of 'due process oflaw' are notice and
opportunity to be heard and to defend in orderly proceeding adapted to nature of case, and the
guarantee or due process requires that every man have protection of day in court and benefit of
general law. Daniel Webster defined this phrase to mean a law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds on inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
This injustice demonstrates the inadequacy of the Idaho judicial system to protect innocent
homeowners, is of great precedent potential, and of grave public concern.
The State of Idaho has not been and is not immune to the mortgage crisis that has
plagued and is plaguing our country. The Idaho and United States Constitutions consider the
right of homeowners inalienable. Thus, the right of due process is in place to protect these rights.
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Chase admitted to owning our note and mortgage verbally (to us and third parties) and in
writing. (R. 1232) Judge Griffin was aware we had witness testimony and physical evidence that
PHH did not own our note. He prevented us from entering either in the record prior to the
Summary Judgment hearing, promised to allow us to enter it afterward, then decided to base his
ruling on only the evidence he had received prior to the hearing.
R. 1325-1329. Nickersons' 1\1emorandum in Support o._lMotion to Reconsider Judgment
"The Nickersons filed a motion for continuance on the hearing for summary
judgment, motion to strike, motion to take judicial notice and motion to amend to
conform to evidence on February 5th informing the Court and opposing counsel they
were not ready to proceed with the hearing because they had not received the opposing
counsel's response and unexpected three additional motions in a timely enough manner to
respond, being constrained by natural forces beyond their control. Because opposing
counsel filed three additional and unexpected motions with their response that were to be
addressed at the hearing, the Nickersons felt they needed more time to research, respond
and prepare their defenses. The Court did not acknowledge or respond to the Nickersons
request for continuance until the Court denied that motion at the start of the hearing on
February 11th. The Nickersons had prepared responses but were waiting for a decision on
the continuance before filing them. During the hearing, the Court ordered that only
Charles or Donna Nickerson could address the court on each motion. As previously
stated, the Nickersons clearly communicated to the court they were not ready and were
ce1iainly unaware of the Court's restriction to only let one of them speak on a specific
point so they did not have opportunity to prepare their arguments accordingly. The
Nickersons have not been able to find this rule anywhere in the Idaho code so they do not
know how they could have known of this restriction prior to the hearing. Further, this
created undue prejudice against the Nickersons to deny their Continuance, prevent the
Nickersons from expanding the factual record of the case prior to judgment, and then
grant judgment based on the absence of those facts. It created undue prejudice and
confusion to state the Nickersons could send in their responses and even provide the
address to send them to, then subsequently refuse to consider them, and grant judgment
for the Plaintiff. It created undue prejudice to receive supplemental evidence of such
importance that it refutes the Plaintiff has any ownership of the Nickerson loan
whatsoever and the case must be dismissed, ignore it because the Court did not approve
of the way it was presented, not provide the Nickersons the opportunity or any
instructions to remedy their presentation, and then grant judgment in favor of PHH.
For the Court to rule against the Nickersons based on lack of evidence when the
evidence was in the Court's chambers and in the record is an extreme injustice and is
denying the Nickersons their right to due process. Obviously, the Nickersons were of the
impression and should have believed these documents were accepted and being
considered by the Court. There were no objections by the Plaintiff to their submission,
the Comi requested and provided instruction on how to send them, and the Nickersons
were unaware of any other process or procedure to submit these documents.
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"***'The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard.' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363,
[1368]. This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is info1med that
the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest.
******
'An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. (Citations). The notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information,** *and it
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.
(Citations)' 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. at page 657, 94 L.Ed. at page 873. "Roos v.
Belcher, 79 Idaho 473,321 P.2d 210 (1958).
The Nickersons contend, since the Court requested the documents, the Nickersons
had no reason to believe the Corni was not considering those documents; and thus, the
Nickersons had no cause to file a motion to reconsider. There was no order entered or
judgment passed until now and the Nickersons have now filed a motion to reconsider.
The Nickersons also contend, since the Court did not inform or provide notice to
the Nickersons that the documents and evidence would not be considered, by entering
judgment, the Comi denied the Nickersons rights to protect and keep their property and
of due process guaranteed by the Constitution ofidaho Ali. 1 §§ 1 and 13. Therefore, the
Nickersons respectfully request the Corni to reconsider and set aside judgment and
provide the Nickersons with their constitutional rights to own and protect their property
and to due process.
***
In accordance with I.R.C.P. 56(e) the Nickersons filed a Notice of Supplemental
Evidence which included a supplemental affidavit introducing new evidence. I.R.C.P.
56(e) states, "The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or finiher affidavits." However, the Corni was
silent on this affidavit. If the Court objected to the form, timing or substance of this
affidavit then the Court should have notified the Nickersons and given the Nickersons an
opp01iunity to correct any objections particularly in light of the importance of the
evidence, and justice being served and the seriousness of the issue at stake. The evidence
presented in this affidavit irrefutably denied and denies the Plaintiff had standing to bring
the complaint before the Court. This evidence demonstrates PHH does not own the
Nickersons loan or hold the Nickersons Note or have beneficial interest in the Nickersons
Mortgage. This evidence clearly demonstrates and confums PHH' s entire case was based
on fraud. Furthermore, on the opposite end, this Court failed to require PHH to produce
the original note and mortgage despite the Nickersons numerous requests to PHH going
back as far as early 2010. This court has broken long standing precedents and
requirements by not forcing and compelling PHH to produce the original note and
mortgage and has created a serious double liability for the Nickersons because PHH does
not hold the Nickersons Note and Mortgage. Plaintiff must produce original note not
copy othenvise maker may face double liability. McKay v. Capital Res. Co., Ltd 940
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S.W.2d 869 (Ark. 1997). "From the maker's standpoint, therefore, it becomes essential to
establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable note, or to whom
payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is exposed to the
risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incuned to prevent
duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers with a recognizable
interest in demanding proof of chain of title. Consequently, plaintiffs here, as makers of
the notes, may properly press defendant to establish its holder status." Kemp v.
CounfTJ!Wide Home Loans, Inc., 440 B.R. 624 (2010). Therefore, PHH must be required
to produce the original note and mmigage and prove they were in possession of them
prior to filing this lawsuit in order to prove standing. Since, according to the evidence,
PHH cannot produce the original note nor prove they had it prior to filing their complaint,
the judgment must be immediately vacated and judgment in favor of the Nickersons must
be granted."
Judge Griffin's act of ignoring our evidence violates one of the very foundations of due
process - a law which hears before it condemns. This act - refusing to hear our supplemental
evidence in which Chase claims to be the real pmiy in interest - violates the US and Idaho
constitutions and has quashed the admission of Chase that this entire action is a fraud. Think
about this for a minute. Let this sink in. Chase has admitted this entire action is a fraud. This
evidence and admission has never been addressed or refuted by PHH or Chase and therefore
should legally be deemed well taken. Neither has answered to this evidence. Additionally,
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inference establish probable and presumptive evidence
that create genuine issues of material fact that PHH does not have standing to'bring this
complaint. It is time for the Idaho Supreme Comito uphold the law and require Chase and PHH
to admit the truth - PHH does not have standing to foreclose on us. Idaho law confirms this fact
and this Court must not ignore Idaho law or our right to due process. See Appellant's Brief p. 27
~

c. Therefore, since the evidence clearly shows PHH does not hold or own our Note and neither

Chase nor PHH refute the evidence, justice and truth demand this Supreme Comi retract its
opinion, rule in our favor, dismiss PHH's complaint with prejudice and allow us to pursue our
counterclaims.
Further, affirming a judge's decision that is clearly the result of ignoring evidence sets a
dangerous precedent against Idahoans and goes against the fundamentals of Justice

the fair

treatment of people (Black's Law Dictionary). Justice does not allow the door to be closed on the
evidence. Even the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a) and 60(b) promote justice by
allowing newly discovered evidence to be presented. We presented the evidence of Chase's
claim to own and hold our note prior to judgment being rendered and demonstrated why the
evidence was not available in time for the summary judgment hearing.
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R. 1227-1229. Nickersons' Notice a/Supplemental Evidence
"This evidence was discovered through a Qualified Written Request (QWR)
requested under RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), and a true and correct copy is attached as
Exhibit A. Because this letter was sent to an alternate address on the account, the
Nickersons were delayed in receiving it and therefore in presenting this evidence to the
Court. Regardless, this letter irrefutably proves PHH does not have possession or
ownership of the Nickersons Note and Mortgage, and judicially denies PHH's rights and
standing to bring a complaint for foreclosure or any other action before this or any other
court. Therefore, the Nickersons request the Comt consider the evidence presented and
rule accordingly.
In Exhibit A, Chase states, "We are not required to produce the original note
which will remain in our possession in accordance with applicable record retention
requirements ... The investor for this loan is JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Association." (emphasis added) This evidence contradicts and invalidates all previous
assertions, answers, statements, arguments and representations presented to the Court by
Chase and PHH that have been provided and used to attempt to establish standing,
compliance with discovery, motions, and right to action. PHH and Chase have previously
unequivocally claimed Chase did not own the Note, that Chase was only the servicer and
that PHH allegedly received ownership via a transfer through a web of contradictory
assertions. (See Nickerson Memorandum for Summary Judgment).
These misrepresentations were presented to the Court freely, willingly,
intentionally and purposefully, and further demonstrate the malicious and outrageous
pattern of fraud, deception unlawful acts, misrepresentation, reckless and unconscionable
mortgage and foreclosure abuse and fraud PHH, Chase and Just Law have perpetrated
against the Nickersons, their family, their property, this Court and the world at large. By
now irrevocably claiming to be the Note holder and investor on the Nickersons Mortgage,
Chase proves PHH does not have possession of the original Note and Mortgage, has no
standing to bring or enforce this action, has not suffered loss, and has illegally attempted
to create and forge illegal ownership. PHH' s total lack of legal standing to present a
claim can be summed up by the following legal phrases and legal maxims that have been
passed down throughout the history of law:
fraus ominia vitiates - fraud vitiates everything
ex dolo malo non oritur action - No right of action can have its origin in fraud
ex dolo malo actio non oritur - A right of action cannot arise out of fraud
allegans contraria non est audiendus - One making contradictory statements
is not to be heard
For summary judgment, movant must provide original note with proper
certification. Sherer v. Bench 549 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App. 1977) Plaintiff must produce
original note not copy otherwise maker may face double liability. McKay v. Capital Res.
Co., Ltd. 940 S.W.2d 869 (Ark. 1997). "It is also well settled that in moving for summary
judgment in an action to foreclose a mo1tgage, a plaintiff establishes its case as a matter
of law through the production of the m01tgage, the unpaid note, and the evidence of
default." Rebuplic National Bank a/New York v. Zito ,280 A.D.2d 657 (2001) 721
N.Y.S.2d 244.
Since PHH cannot produce the original note because Chase has it in their
possession and claims ownership of it, PHH does not have standing to bring this
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complaint or enforce this action nor do they have a cause of action upon which relief may
be granted. LC.§ 6-101 Proceedings in foreclosure, states" (2) The provisions of this
section must be construed in order to permit a secured creditor to realize upon collateral
for a debt or other obligation agreed upon by the debtor and creditor." PHH does not have
ownership nor possession of the Note (the debt) and thus, is not a secured creditor.
Therefore, as a matter of the laws of the State ofidaho, the Constitution of the United
States Article 3, common law, public policy, and longstanding and established legal
principles, the Nickersons humbly request the Court consider this evidence, dismiss and
deny PHH's complaint and summary judgment with prejudice, and grant summary
judgment in favor of the Nickersons."
This was ignored by the District Court so we presented it again in our Rule 60(b) motion
and it was ignored once again. Now this Court has ignored it as well. Chase, PHH and their
counsels of record have lied to the District Cowi and now this Court. Justice demands our
evidence be heard. In addition to this letter, testimony of verbal admissions made to us and third
parties needs to be heard. Anything less is an extreme abuse of the judicial authority granted to
this Supreme Comi and an extreme violation of our rights to due process - a law which hears
before it condemns.
Foreclosure is a harsh remedy and should not be treated lightly. Genuine issues of
material fact exist that defeat Summary Judgment in favor of PHH or Chase.
PHH' s complaint of default is inaccurate. The complaint claims 13 missed payments, but
now PHH has changed their testimony to claim there are only 9 missing payments. Chase
claimed we were current in January 2010, but has since changed their claims to 11 missed
payments. Based on fact and law, no default exists. Justice demands a complaint of default to be
accurate. Justice demands evidence that can refute any existence of default to be heard.
PHH does not own our note and mortgage and did not when this Complaint was filed.
Chase claims to be the real party in interest, but has testified they were the Servicer only. Idaho
laws and federal regulations have been violated. Judge Griffin relied on our evidence regarding
ownership for findings and rulings, but ignored the evidence in the record in regards to final
judgment. Judge Griffin then failed to provide rulings we could reference so they could be
reversed.
There are other genuine issues that demonstrate error in summary judgment that are
already in the record and that will be addressed with a rehearing. See Addendum.
Foreclosure affects thousands of Idahoans. This Supreme Comi cmmot ignore the
evidence, fraud, and violations committed. Consider the widespread devastation such a
precedent could set. Unchecked mortgage fraud has wreaked havoc on some innocent Idaho
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homeowners. Justice has and is being trampled upon and it is the obligation of this Supreme
Court to defend it.

A law which proceeds on inquiry.
Material facts and witness testimony demonstrate PHH does not own our loan, dispute
any evidence of a default, and invalidate any claims of injury by PHH and Chase. PHH and
Chase have fatally failed to refute our facts and impeach these testimonies so these facts and
testimonies become presumptive facts. Due process requires discovery be conducted to resolve
genuine issues of material fact before rendering judgment. Instead, Judge Griffin stated opinions
such as "There was no contract between Chase and the Nickersons that has been presented to the
corui" to help Chase avoid discovery, then in contradiction stated, "Chase assigned the note
[contract] to PHH in 2010" to help show a chain of title so PHH could foreclose. Judge Griffin
then called a letter from Fannie Mae hearsay when it rendered the assignment to PHH invalid,
but later referred to its contents as undisputed fact, as did this Supreme Court. These are but two
examples of the myriad of contradictions and inconsistencies developed and presented by PHH,
Chase, the District Court and now this Supreme Court. All of these errors could have been
avoided if the District Court understood and upheld "a law which proceeds on inquiry" instead of
ignoring the evidence and arguments we presented. The District Court should have compelled
Chase and PHH to provide the discovery we requested instead of quashing due process of law.
We have been severely prejudiced in this appeal because of the District Court's denial of our
right to due process and this Supreme Court has erred in affirming this denial.

A law which renders judgment only after trial.
A trial must include due process of law. Summary judgment is not appropriate unless
there are no genuine issues of material fact present. No evidence submitted by PHH and relied
upon for Summary Judgment would be admissible at trial.
It is an assignment of error to award Summary Judgment to PHH when PHH never
established standing. At the first summary judgment, Judge Griffin recognized there was no
assignment to Chase in the record that proved they had beneficial interest and asked Kipp
Manwaring, PHH's counsel, if it mattered that no assignment to Chase existed in the record.
Inconceivably, Kipp Manwaning falsely stated it did not matter because the assignment from
Chase to PHH gave PHH beneficial interest. However, Chase has to have something to give
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something. This material fact is in dispute based on Chase's own admissions. At that time, Chase
had denied ever owning the Note (R. 747-751, 759, 760), and the Court had determined Chase
was the Servicer and not in contract with us (R. 689). Chase had no beneficial interest to give.
Any beneficial interest Chase allegedly gave to PHH in the assignment presented had to be and
must be firmly established if it is to be relied upon to grant PHH standing.
quad ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalesce/

That which is bad in its

commencement improves not by lapse of time.

It is an assignment of error to ignore default records proven inaccurate and ignore the
errors in Chase's record keeping and PHH's regurgitation of it when they establish genuine
issues of material fact. Mr. Mitchell spoke with bank employees who provided solid testimony
regarding the abusive debt collection experienced by us, detailed how their attempts to help us
were maliciously thwarted by Chase and PHH, and validated prevention of performance. Ron
Casperite's, PHH's only witness, testimony was impeached, invalidated, and did not comply
with Rule 56 as he did not and could not have had personal knowledge of our interactions with
Chase, but the Judge accepted his testimony as fact anyway. As a matter of record, there is no
proof anyone by the name of Ron Casperite even signed this affidavit as no notary attested to the
signature on the affidavit.
Judge Griffin held his own trial with he, the judge, as his own jury. Frankly, ifwe had
been given the opportunity to pick our jurors as in a normal trial, we would have immediately
disqualified Judge Griffin as a juror for obvious lack of knowledge regarding mortgage lending
and personal prejudice toward this case. Whether or not the judge has previous experience with
people paying or not paying their bills or any prejudices regarding collection practices is
irrelevant to this litigation. PHH must be required to prove they owned our note, we defaulted,
and they have been injured. The Comi failed to require them to prove this. Chase had the burden
of proving our allegations regarding their abusive debt collection practices were false, that they
and PHH were not misrepresenting who owned the note, and that they were innocent of fraud.
The Court failed to require them to produce evidence, mandated to be readily available at their
disposal, which irrefutably proves our claims. PHH nor Chase have ever answered the letter from
Chase claiming they own the property. PHH has never answered to the invalid assignment in the
record. Look at the chain of title ... it is a popcorn record, popping wherever it needs to go for the
argument being presented. Neither PHH nor Chase has been challenged on the fact their default
amounts disagree. We have been denied due process of law. We have been denied a true trial.
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Judge Griffm detennined what evidence he wanted to hear and allow to be entered in the record
so he could render the judgment he wanted to render. This is not justice. This is bought and paid
for injustice, extreme ignorance of judicial responsibility, or organized crime exhibiting its
power in this State. We apologize for bluntly stating our honest opinions; however, the severity
of consequence we are unjustly experiencing and the finality of your decision at the State level
compels us to be forthright.
This violates our right to due process. The State of Idaho has violated Amendment V and
XIV of the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution by affirming this decision.
Courts in Idaho cannot ignore the truths of matters and manipulate laws and rules randomly to
create decisions with no reversible errors that support judgments they want to render. This
Supreme Court is in error to simply affirm the lower Court decision and not consider the laws in
place to protect the public. Yes, some laws are subject to interpretation and a trial court is
granted discretion to apply those laws to cases in front of them. However, allowing a Judge to
ignore evidence and prejudicially fail to require counsels to follow Rules of Civil Procedure and
obey the laws of the land defies the very definition of discretion and defiles his oath of office.
This denies due process oflaw, violates the United States and Idaho Constitutions, and is beyond
the authority ofthis Comi and this State to uphold.

The law cannot be bent by favor, not broken by power, nor corrupted by money; for not
only if it be overthrown, but even

if it be neglected or carelessly preserved, there is

nothing secure in what anyone may think he has, or will inherit fi·om his father, or yet
may leave to his children. Cicero, Pro CAECINA 73

This Petition for Rehearing is hereby submitted as a whole and in its entirety to protect
our rights to a defense, to ensure our rights to equal access to justice, and so this Comt may
address issues of grave public concern. Our Objection to Costs and Fees and Motion for
Sanctions along with all other documents submitted to this Supreme Court should be considered
in conjunction with this Petition for Rehearing and incorporated herein in order to facilitate
brevity in presenting our meritorious reasons and needs for a rehearing.
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Statement of injustice and grounds for remedy
1. Prevention of Performance and Abusive Debt Collection p. 15
2. Misconduct and Negligence of Former Attorney p. 41
3. Misconduct, fraud, and violations by opposing counsels, PHH, and Chase p. 45
4. Impasse created by non-judicial foreclosure p. 51
5. Summary Judgment p. 54
6. Motions for Reconsideration p. 69
7. Motion To Amend p. 74
8. Rule 60(b) Motions p. 76
9. Forced Pro Se Representation p. 79
10. Attorney fees p. 81
11. Mortgage on 50 acre agricultural property p. 83
12. Preserving legal remedies p. 83
13. Right to a defense p. 84
14. Citing rulings without orders, memorandums, factual or lawful basis p. 85
15. Arguments waived p. 88
16. Issues raised on appeal p. 89
17. Other issues of injustice p. 90
Request For Rehearing

1:

of

to cause of

to

and

our

to a

"Prevention doctrine is a common-law principle of contract law which says that
a contracting party has an implied duty not to do anything that prevents the other party
fi·om pe1:forming its obligation. A party who prevents pe1:formance of a contract may not
complain o..fsuch nonpe1:formance. n 1vww.definitions.uslegal.com. The Nickersons assert
PHH prevented the ]\Tickersonsfi·om pe1:forming by, 1) refi1sing to vert/51 the alleged
defcwlt by claiming they did not have the account records, 2) refitsing to alloHJ the
Nickersons to dispute and cure any alleged default, and 3) intentionally blocking the
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Nickersons' efforts to make payments. Because of the foregoing actions, PHH excused
the Nickersons from pe1formance and entitled the Nickersons to all benefits offull
pe1formance. Therefore, since PHH prevented pe1formance and reprobata pecunia
leberat solventem - money refi1sed releases the debtor, PHH has no basis for a complaint
and their complaint must be dismissed. (T·welfth Affirmative Defense, Amended Answer,
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint).
Black's Law Dictionary defines prevent as "to hinder, frustrate, prohibit, impede, or
preclude; to obstruct; to intercept. To stop or intercept the approach, access, or performance of a
thing."
We were prevented from performance.

Verified first amended answer, counterclaim and third-party complaint.
R. 109 ,r 8 - When the Note and Mortgage was transferred to Chase the Nickersons
immediately began having accounting problems with their account.
R. 109 ,r 9 - Nickersons would receive notices of failure to provide insurance followed by
notices that Chase had made a mistake, etc. Nickersons had contact with Chase
employees who stated from the computer records regarding the Nickersons' account that
it showed they were being billed twice a month instead of monthly.
R. 109 ,r 12 - Nickersons made numerous requests for information about their account,
including but not limited to statements but never received anyihing.
R. 109 ,r13 - During this time the Chase employees that Nickersons had contact with
were rude, offensive and threatening.
R. 111 ,r 32 - Since February of 2010, Nickersons have not been given the opportunity to
make monthly payments on the Note and Mortgage.
R. 111 ,r 33 - Wells Fargo and another entity have told both Coldwell and PHH that the
Nickersons want to pay on the Note and Mortgage. Both Coldwell and PHH has refused
to contact and work with the Nickersons.

R. 112 ,r 38 -Nickersons have communicated to PHH's attorney in June or July of2010
that they wanted to pay and resolve this but were ignored.
R. 112 ,r 39 -As set fo1ih above, Nickersons have always been willing and able to pay
the obligations under the Note. Coldwell, Chase, and PHH have failed to act in good faith
in this matter and refused to cooperate with and work with the Nickersons in resolving a
matter that was created by the accounting errors and notice errors by Coldwell, Chase,
and PHH.

Affidavit of Charles Nickerson in support of motion for Summary Judgment
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R. 1085, 1086 - after months of us disputing the default and PHH refusing payments, on
May 25, 2010, Coldwell Banker sent a letter to the Nickersons referring our m01igage to
an attorney to start the foreclosure process .. .In January of 2010, the Nickersons were in
good standing with Chase.

R. 1290-1292
6-24
6.
Despite numerous requests, I was denied payment receipts, account
statements, escrow analysis and written confirmation of changes made to account history
due to misapplied payments, force placed insurance, payments placed in suspense
accounts, double charges removed, and other such Chase record and bookkeeping error
documentation.
7.
The principal balance on the detailed transaction history (account history)
provided by Brandie S. Watkins (Affidavit of Brandie S. Watkins, Exhibit F) shows a
balance of $0 in November 2009 and a negative balance of $-1, 186. 90 on January 21,
20]0.
8.
Chase's detailed transaction history principal balance shows the
Nickersons were due a refund of $1,186.90 as of January 21, 2010.
9.
Since the principal balance on Chase's account history is $0 in November
of 2009, then as of November 2009 according to Chase, there is no more debt owed on
this loan.
10.
If there is no more debt owed on a loan, then the loan cannot be in default.
11.
If all payments are made, then the loan cam1ot be in default.
12.
I made all payments I was allowed to make, knew to make or was
instructed to make by Chase and to Chase, and was current and in good standing with
Chase in January 2010.
13.
A Chase employee named Kim who we trusted and believed told us our
account was in current and in good standing as of January 2010.
14.
A Wells Fargo employee named Heather reviewed a credit report in
January 2010 and told us Chase represented and reported that we were current on this
account. We relied on these representations.
15.
According to Chase's account history, we were not in default as of
January 21, 2010.
16.
Upon the alleged transfer of servicing from Chase to PHH, PHH
immediately claimed a default of 14 missed payments.
17.
My wife and I disputed the default and requested PHH to provide the
account records. PHH refused to research the disputed default and claimed they did not
have the account records. On July 3, 2012, PHH stated, in response to the Nickersons
request for admissions, "PHH is unaware of any payments made or not made by the
Nickersons to Chase."
18.
Since, in February of 2010, PHH, by their own admission, was unaware of
any payments made or not made by the Nickersons to Chase, then PHH could not claim a
default.
19.
PHH would not, did not and has not allowed me or my wife to make any
payments since February 2010.
20.
PHH would not and did not provide me with any proof of default/
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21.
PHH blatantly refused to accept payments, refused to research and provide
proof of the alleged default, and blocked all efforts and attempts we made to resolve the
disputed default.
22.
As of November 2013, PHH claims the Nickersons missed 9 monthly
payments which contradicts PHH's claim of 14 missed monthly payments in Febrnary
2010. This is an $11,000 difference and is basis for PHH's claims to be dismissed
because the Nickersons were never presented with the default amount nor given the
opportunity to cure it.
23.
The proof of default PHH provided in November 2013 was a part of the
Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite.
24.
The Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite is missing the notary's
signature and thus, is not properly notarized which according to the Washington Supreme
Court constitutes a criminal act, Klem v. Washington Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 179, 176
\Vash. 2d 771 (2013) .. Therefore, the Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite should be
thrown out and stricken from the record. (See Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite)
R. 1419. Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer,
Counterclaim, Third Party Cornplaint and Demand for Jury Trial
PHH relies and their case is fatally dependent on and upon an affidavit of Ron
Casperite. Ron Casperite, working as an Account Analyst on behalf of PHH, provided
these records as true and correct based on his personal knowledge. Ron Casperite
exhibited culpable negligence, contradicted himself and swore to having personal
knowledge regarding information on the Nickersons account which he cannot possibly or
plausibly have any personal knowledge to or of. Ron Casperite began working for PHH
in February 2010. This is the same month PHH started, or at least revealed, this assault
on the Nickersons. Ron Casperite worked in banking and mortgage lending at a New
Jersey bank for at least or around twenty years. Ron Casperite has worked, represented or
provided testimony on behalf of other companies such as HSBC Bank N.A. as a hired to
perform witness. Ron Casperite was given records that he presumably viewed on his
computer screen that could or could not have been altered, edited, corrected, or
fabricated. Ron Casperite did not have personal knowledge of the authenticity, validity,
truthfulness, accuracy, or origination of these records. Ron Casperite cannot swear
whether these records were fabricated or altered by others, who had access and
opportunity, with the intent to swindle the Nickersons and commit fraud on the Court.
Ron Casperite has committed perjury. Ron Casperite has proven his records are
inaccurate, invalid and unreliable. Ron Casperite is not a credible witness and his
affidavits are inadmissible as evidence.
SAR 4 7. Charles Nickerson' s Affidavit in Support ofMotion for Reliefji'om
Judgment
I presented evidence to the Court prior to judgment being rendered that the
Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite was invalidly notarized. See Nickersons
Objection to Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite filed on March 24, 2014. In
addition, the Court, on its own initiative should have noticed this affidavit was
improperly notarized and in keeping with the Court's duties and responsibilities to" ... be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it." Idaho Judicial Canon
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3B(2), should have disregarded this affidavit and sanctioned PHH and Just Law for
submitting documents that embody a criminal act.
SAR 54. Exhibit 4 attached to this affidavit is a true and correct copy of a letter
from James Zombeck, Notary Unit Supervisor for the State of New Jersey Department of
Treasury. In this letter Mr. Zorn beck states the notarization of the Second Affidavit of
Ronald E. Casperite is invalid. This new evidence was obtained after the Court chose to
ignore and disregard the evidence, laws and case law the Nickersons presented proving
the notarization was invalid. 1vir. Zombeck 's letter can be found at SAR 63.
Witness testimonies, account notations, taped conversations and solid material evidence
supports our claims of prevention of performance and the abusive debt collection practices of
PHH, Chase and their accomplices. Witness testimony and authority collected and reviewed by
legal representation confirms our integrity, commitment to our obligations, and sound financial
decisions caused us to be victimized by Chase and PHH's abusive debt collection practices. In
our answers to PHH's second set of discovery requests we provided a list of witnesses that had
specific knowledge of our interactions with Chase and PHH and provided details of what these
witnesses could attest to. Additional witnesses and details regarding testimonies was provided to
Mr. Mitchell but was not entered in the record. Times, numbers, third paity \Vitnesses who could
corroborate and testify to taped conversations, and other such information was also provided as
applicable, but not entered in the record.
R. 286-289, 490-493. Nickersons' answers to interrogatories and requests for production.

"Heather. Wells Fargo: Heather knows everything about what has happened and
she recommended numerous times for the Nickersons to get an attorney. Heather told the
Nickersons that Chase reported that everything was OK in January 2010. Heather is
expected to testify that both Chase and PHH broke federal regulations by not working out
a solution/resolution with the Nickersons. She is also expected to testify about the
relationship between the Nickersons and Wells Fargo and the status of the Nickersons'
second mortgage.
Jody, Wells Fargo: Jody knmvs everything about what has happened.
Theresa, Wells Fargo: Theresa knows everything about what has happened.
Kim, Chase: Kim knows all of the accounting issues on Chase's side. She is
expected to testify with regards to how hard the Nickersons worked to settle this issue.
Kim repeatedly told the Nickersons that there was a problem with their records. Kim
made numerous research requests. Kim also made numerous document requests for the
Nickersons to get receive statements, account histories, etc. Kim told the Nickersons that
it appeared they were being billed two times monthly. In January 2010, Kim told the
Nickersons that they were in good standing with Chase.
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Erika. Chase: On December 15, 2010, Erika told the Nickersons that they were
not in foreclosure and that everything was OK. Nickersons asked that this conversation
be recorded.
Ann, Chase: On May 13, 2010, the Nickersons called and spoke with Ann for the
first time. Ann already knew the Nickersons' because Kim (referenced above) told Ann
the Nickerson's situation. Ann facilitated acquiring the Nickersons' account history.
Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded. [Note: this is the same account
history provided by Chase's witness Brandi Watkins which this Court affirms is
inaccurate.]
Yara, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on January 12,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Resa, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on January 15,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Jamie, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on February 5,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
MaribeL Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on March 9,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Veronica. Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on April 23,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
EarL Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on April 30, 2009.
Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Michelle. Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on June 1,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
McKayla, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on September
2, 2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Greg, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on November 11,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Bridget, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on November
11, 2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.

Izzy, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee on December 11,
2009. Nickersons asked that this conversation be recorded.
Thomas, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee and requested
the conversation be recorded.
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Kyle, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee and requested the
conversation be recorded.
Shannon, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee and requested
the conversation be recorded.
Andrei, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee and requested the
conversation be recorded.
Linda, Chase: The Nickersons spoke with this Chase employee and requested the
conversation be recorded.
Dominic, PHH: The Nickersons spoke with this PHH employee on March 11,
2010.
Richard, PHH: The Nickersons spoke with this PHH employee on March 11,
2010 by calling (888)418-0364.
BilL PHH: The Nickersons spoke with this PHH employee on March 22, 2010.
Michael, Customer Service, PHH: The Nickersons spoke with this PHH employee
on April 23, 2010 by calling (856) 917-0050.
Lindsey, PHH: The Nickersons spoke ,vith this PHH employee on May 13, 2010
by calling (800)330-0423. Lindsey informed the Nickersons that all they could do to
obtain an account history was to call Chase.
Kelly, PHH: The Nickersons spoke with this PHH employee on May 19, 2010.
Dominic, Coldwell Banker: The Nickersons spoke with this Coldwell Banker
employee. Did original loan and Nickersons discussed with him trying to straighten
things out after PHH repurchased loan.
Albert Ernacchio, Coldwell Banker: A title company employee at closing
communicated with this Coldwell Banker employee.
Bradon Howell, Just Law: Mr. Howell informed the Nickersons of the default
amount. The Nickersons' told him that they disputed that default amount. The Nickersons
told Mr. Howell (a) that Chase/PHH were fraudulently attempting to take their property,
(b) that their last payment was made on January 21, 2010, and (c) that they were denied
the opportunity to make any payments after that January date. The Nickersons also told
him that they wanted to work out a resolution with his client and bring the account into
good standing. The Nickersons clearly stated to Mr. Howell that they wanted to keep the
property and explained that they had the financial resources to do so. The Nickersons
expressed how damaging Mr. Howell's client's proceedings were to their credit rating
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and that it was creating extreme financial hardship for them. The Nickersons pointed out
their parcel was a 50 acre parcel and a non-judicial foreclosure was not appropriate. Mr.
Howell state he would speak with Jason Rammell and get back to them. Mr. Howell,
spoke with Mr. Rammell and then infom1ed the Nickersons that Mr. Rammell would be
going forward with the non-judicial foreclosure.
Jason Ran1mell [PHH's first attorney of record]: The Nickersons requested to
speak with Mr. Rammell. Bradon Howell stated that he relayed the Nickerson's
information to Mr. Rammell, but Mr. Ramm.ell said they were hired to foreclose and were
going forward with the foreclosure.
Pete Elliot, Genworth Financial (PMI Insurance Provider): The Nickersons spoke
with this Genworth Financial customer service employee. Aware of entire situation.
MichaeL Genworth Financial (PMI Insurance Provider): The Nickersons spoke
with this Genworth Financial customer service employee. A ware of entire situation."
R. 742. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Nickersons' Request for Admissions
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. Admit the Nickersons made payments
to Chase in November 2009, December 2009, and January 2010.
RESPONSE: PHH is unaware of any payments made or not made by the
Nickersons to Chase. In that regard this request is denied.
The testimonies of these and other witnesses will comprehensively attest to all claims
made by us and provide proof and evidence of prevention of performance, false claims of
abandonment, threats of unlawful eviction, malicious attempts to break down our relationships
with other creditors, validation of our perfect credit history, forensic analysis of our chain of title,
and other such claims. These testimonies will prove PHH has no beneficial interest in our Note,
no default occuned, no injury has or could be suffered by PHH, and we have suffered severe,
significant and substantial damages. Testimony is evidence that a competent ·witness under oath
or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition. Black's Law. Verbal motions were
made to present witnesses to expand the factual record of the case. Mr. Mitchell heard the
testimony of many of our witnesses. We were denied our right to present a defense so we submit
the existence of our witness testimony as evidence to refute all rights and claims of PHH and
Chase.
Blacks Law states, To perform an obligation or contract is to execute, fitljill, or
accomplish it according to its terms a.nd qualifies performance as the ful.fillment or
accomplishment ofa promise, contract, or other obligation according to its terms. Montana
Code Annotated (MCA) § 28-1-1302. Effect when performance prevented by creditor. "If the
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performance of an obligation is prevented by the creditor, the debtor is entitled to all the benefits
that the debtor would have obtained if the obligation had been performed by both parties."
Failure to perform if prevented negates obligation of the debtor and claims of injury for
the creditor.
15 U.S.C. § 1692d Harassment or Abuse
"A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of
which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a
debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a
violation of this section:
(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to hann the
physical person, reputation, or property of any person.
(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence
of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.
(3) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation
repeatedly or continuously with intent to am1oy, abuse or harass any person at the called
number."

us

access to our account records. This violates:

12 C.F.R. § 1024.38 which requires servicers to "(iii) Provide a borrower with
accurate and timely information and documents in response to the borrower's requests for
information with respect to the borrower's mortgage loan."

to research its

of

violation of:

12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. "(e) Response to notice of error. (1) Investigation and
response requirements. (i) In general. Except as provided in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
section, a servicer must respond to a notice of enor by either: (A) Correcting the error or
enors identified by the borrower and providing the borrower with a written notification
of the correction, the effective date of the correction, and contact information, including a
telephone number, for fmiher assistance; or (B) Conducting a reasonable investigation
and providing the bonower with a written notification that includes a statement that the
servicer has determined that no error occurred, a statement of the reason or reasons for
this determination, a statement of the borrower's right to request documents relied upon
by the servicer in reaching its determination, information regarding how the borrower can
request such documents, and contact information, including a telephone number, for
further assistance."
As demonstrated above, PHH's and Chase's refusal to provide records and research
disputed errors violates federal law. PHH refused to respond to the Nickersons notice of error.
PHH refused to take any corrective action. PHH refused to even conduct an investigation. PHH
has admitted they did not have any of Chase's account records. If you do not have the account
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records, you cannot claim a default, because you have no proof, evidence, foundation or basis to
claim default. PHH's and Chase's failure to provide mandated documentation circumvented our
ability to review our account records for errors and fraud, and creates impossibility in providing
physical discovery without access to those records. One cannot produce what one does not have.
Reasonable inference creates a material fact - PHH and Chase intentionally failed to provide
required documentation in order to prevent us from successfully creating a paper trail that would
indict them and generate extreme exposure for their actions.
PHH and Chase failed to provide mandated receipts for payments according to the terms
of the alleged contract and according to LC.§ 9-1502 "Whoever pays money, or delivers an
instrument or prope1iy, is entitled to a receipt therefor from the person to whom the payment or
delivery is made and may demand a proper signature to such receipt as a condition of the
payment or delivery." Chase refused our demands. The District Court erred by ignoring this and
recognizing how destructively it impacted our ability to defend against their claims.
R. 1522. Charles Nickerson 's and Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim,
Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
a.
Chase refused to provide statements and research discrepancies. 12 C.F .R.
§ 1026.41 Periodic statements for residential mortgage loans requires servicers to provide
statements. Numerous conversations took place with Chase employees asking them to
and demanding they provide statements to the Nickersons so they could confirm the
payments they were making were being credited correctly. The Nickersons would call in
a payment or pay in person at a local branch and receive a confirmation number. Then
they would call back to make sure the payment was accepted and get a Chase employee
who would state they did not see the payment made so the Nickersons would provide the
confirmation number for the payment that was just made. At times, the Chase employee
would state "that is not a Chase confinnation number" and act rudely when questioned.
The Nickersons would then end the conversation call back, or stop by a branch.
Sometimes this process would go on three or more times before they finally spoke with a
Chase employee who could confirm the payment had been made. This was extremely
time consuming, vexing, frustrating and annoying for the Nickersons and only had to be
done because Chase would not send statements or provide receipts to the Nickersons.
This is further traumatizing and becomes even more inconceivable and outrageous when
Chase and PHH have 1) maliciously and falsely claimed default 2) tried to transfer the
federally regulated burden of record keeping that belongs to the lender to rest upon the
Nickersons, 3) concealed, hid, destroyed and prevented the Nickersons access to any
records on their account, 4) fraudulently crafted records to reflect the records they
thought the Nickersons could produce or had access to, 5) petition the court to alter, edit
and change these "true and c01Tect" records multiple times to reflect the irrefutable
"oops" proofs they did not yet know the Nickersons had, and 6) so far seemingly and
effectually get away with it.
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The records presented have been altered and are not a true reflection of the account
records. Though the burden of record keeping clearly rests with PHH and Chase, we produced
receipts of payments and other account records in order to stop PHH's non-judicial foreclosure
and compel them to work with Chase to get the records straightened out. We sent Just Law our
records in good faith based on unfulfilled promises of returning all originals to us after copies
were made. Even in light of proving the inaccuracy of the records and impeaching the testimony
provided, we were denied oppmiunity to conduct finiher discovery or have the Court consider
the evidence discovered. Conducting discovery of our account records, notations and testimony
defeats the summary judgments rendered and irrefutably supports every claim we have made.
Due process requires the evidence be heard. R. 1419.
PHH and Chase refused to provide printouts of our account which we repeatedly
requested in writing, telephonically, in person, and through third parties. We did not receive
requested documentation of record keeping errors, their subsequent corrections, proof of
payments made and other account documentation needed for our personal records even though
customer service representatives and bank employees repeatedly requested these items be mailed
to us for documentation purposes. Notations of each occurrence were made on our account and
read back to us and other third parties at our request to verify the accuracy of the record being
created and requests being made. Tape recordings of these conversations were created.
R. 1421-1422, 1489, 1524. Charles Nickerson 's' and Donna Nickerson 's Amended
Answer, Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
121. By law the m01igage servicer is required to save and store all
communication between themselves and the mortgagor. The Nickersons insisted all
conversations between the Nickersons and PHH and, or, Chase be tape recorded. The
Nickersons were assured all conversations were being taped. The representatives even
paused at times to "turn on the recording." At all times they promised the conversation
was being taped. No taped conversations have been provided. The Nickersons also
insisted notations be made on the accounts. No records of our countless and extremely
detailed conversations have been provided. These notations were read back to the
Nickersons at the end of conversations at the request of the Nickersons. Both Chase and
PHH have either broken the law by destroying evidence or are refusing to provide the
requested communications records because they fmiher incriminate them. There is no
question as to the existence of the records. Since Chase refused to provide receipts,
statements, transaction records, error corrections and other documentation for the
Nickersons as required by law, the records recorded by Chase are necessary for the
Nickersons to be able to have due process of law. Record retention is their rightful, legal
and regulated responsibility (12 C.F.R. § 1024.38). They have failed to perform it.
Therefore, the Nickersons should have the benefits of full performance under the law.
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R. 1489
On all of these calls, the Nickersons asked the Chase employee to make
54.
notes on the account and tape the conversation so a complete record of what was going
on could be referenced later because Chase was not sending statements. The Nickersons
requested Chase employees read their notations and requested them to add to the
notations as needed to create a complete record. The Chase employees stated they would
send a confirmation and or a copy of the changes made, but none were ever forthcoming.
The Chase employees stated they would tape the call and at times asked the Nickersons
to hold a minute while they started the recording. The Nickersons never once agreed to
speak to a Chase employee without the conversation being taped. The Nickersons were
told the tapes were being stored by a third party entity and would be available to the
Nickersons if needed at a later date.
R. 1524
c.
The Nickersons required all phone conversations with Chase to be taped.
During these numerous, frustrating and time consuming conversations the Nickersons
always asked and insisted as a prerequisite to speaking with the Chase employees that
they tape the conversations so there would be an irrefutable record of the calls and their
content. The Nickersons refused to speak with the representatives, until the
representatives confirmed the conversations were being taped. The Nickersons believed
every conversation would be and was notated according to Federal Banking guidelines.
According to the representations made by the Chase employees, every conversation with
the Nickersons was taped. At times when the Nickersons would make a request to record
the conversation, the Chase employee would say hold, on and then indicate the recording
had been started. The Nickersons requested these recordings or transcripts of these
recordings be provided but Chase refused even after the Nickersons provided dates of
when some of these conversations took place and the name of the Chase employees who
took the calls.
d.
In addition to insisting calls be taped, the Nickersons requested notations
be made to the account with each call for documentation of the call and what had been
discussed. The Nickersons then requested Chase read those notations back to make sure
they were accurate and complete. Other Chase employees read previous employees
notations on the account on numerous occasions.
From February 2010 to present, Chase has barred us access to bank employees intimately
familiar with our accounts who 1) have personal knowledge of the record keeping nightmares we
experienced, 2) have personally researched and proven false and inaccurate all claims of default
or missed payments, 3) have worked with numerous other departments to find moneys hidden in
"unusual" suspense accounts, 4) have coITectly applied those moneys according to the terms of
the loan, 5) have validated excessive moneys were being held in escrow accounts that could be
applied to future payments, 6) have dete1mined suspicious activity was plaguing the veracity and
authenticity of our account records, and 7) have admitted to us and other third parties that our
account along with a batch of others were being intentionally tampered with. Further, these
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witnesses agreed and have offered testimony to corroborate and confirm they made notations to
our accounts and read notations on our accounts that dispute any finding of default and to
confirm all conversations with us were required to be taped. If Chase and PHH are telling the
truth, they should not object to providing the notations and taped conversations, nor should they
avoid answering whether or not PHH owns the loan. Justice and due process require them too.
When PHH became involved with our loan in February 2010, PHH barred us from
performance. PHH has stated "PHH is unaware of any payments made or not made by the
Nickersons to Chase." (R. 742) They used this admission to avoid allowing discovery that refutes
the existence of any default whatsoever. Their admission prevents PHH from claiming any injury
caused by the Nickersons.
R. 1406-1407. Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer,
Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial
55.
Showing that the Plaintiff suffered an injury and that it was caused by the
Defendants is a necessary component to establishing a cause of action upon which relief
may be granted. PHH, has not, can not, and never will be able to establish any alleged or
actual injuries suffered by PHH or other principals could possibly or plausibly be the
result of any alleged action or non-action of the Nickersons.
56.
Failure to establish an injury caused by the Nickersons is fatal to PHH's
complaint.
57.
Based on prevention of performance, condition precedent, breach of any
alleged contract by interference with performance, impotentia excusat legem impossibility is an excuse in the law, and nemo tenetur ad impossibile - no one is
required to do what is impossible, any alleged or sustained injuries, damages or losses are
caused by, and are therefore the direct and sole responsibility of and liability of PHH and
the other principals and not the Nickersons. 1) The Nickersons have made every regular
periodic payment they were allowed to make. 2) The Nickersons understood, believed
and were told their account was current and in good standing. 3) The Nickersons
communicated they wanted to keep their property and demonstrated they had the
financial wherewithal to do so. 4) PHH took over servicing the loan and belligerently
refused to accept any further payments. 5) PHH prevented and prohibited the Nickersons
from establishing or curing any alleged default. 6) PHH failed to provide the Nickersons
with an oppmiunity to reinstate the loan. 7) PHH prevented and prohibited the
Nickersons from refinancing or satisfying the loan. 8) PHH and Chase prevented the
Nickersons from selling the prope1iy and satisfying the loan. 9) Any alleged default and
subsequent injuries were solely and categorically caused by the direct and indirect actions
and inactions of PHI{ and the other principals conspiring with them. As a result of these
and other outrageous actions, along with intentional and malicious prevention of
performance, PHH's own actions bar their right to claim injury, and they have no way to
establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.
58.
Therefore, because, among other issues, 1) PHH is not the Note holder and
has no interest in the Note, 2) PHH claims beneficial interest in the wrong instrument, 3)
PHH claims to be the assignee of an instrument that assigns interest to another party, 4)
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PHH is attempting to foreclose on the wrong property, and 5) PHH does not have nor can
they ever have any injury, PHH fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted and PHH' s claim must be dismissed.
At no time did PHH comply with notice of default, service or process, notice or hearing
requirements as required in the alleged contract. We were denied opportunity to challenge this
genuine issue of material fact.
Public record from 2007 to present alone corroborates the habitual abusive debt
collection practices suffered by us and details the convictions of PHH, Chase and their
accomplices in mortgage fraud and abuse. Our perfect payment history, types of credit secured,
length of perfect and strong credit history, income to debt ratios, and new credit eligibility
combined with the expert witness testimonies presented to om attorney and refused to be heard
by the District Court (despite written and verbal requests) regarding our banking activities prior
to Chase becoming involved with our loan corroborate our innocence and victimization. These
irrefutable facts require any reasonable person to acknowledge and recognize we were prevented
from performance and victimized by abusive debt collection and to consider how that fatally
affects all claims of default or injmy.

allegans contraria non est audiendus - one making contradictory statements is not to be heard
Affirming the decision of the District Court is a judicial admission this Court has
determined PHH and Chase have both lied to this Court, to the Dist:iict Court, and to the World
At Large, as they lied to us in 2010 and have continued to persist in doing since. Their willful
and intentional lies and misrepresentations prevented our performance, formed the foundation for
their false claims of default, impeaches their testimony, and defeats their complaint.
In January 2010, Chase accepted payment from us and confirmed we were current and in

good standing. In February 2010, PHH erroneously claimed a default of 14 payments and
claimed we were in default from January 2009. PHH would not accept a payment unless we
cured the entire claimed default amount. We challenged the existence of a default, but PHH
refused to review, research or consider any of Chase's records or speak to Chase employees most
familiar with the account. They made false rep01is to credit bureaus and our personal creditors.
They prevented performance. They created long te1m consequences that sabotaged om financial
portfolio. However, now PHH has testified, via an inadmissible affidavit that was not properly
notarized and contradicts the witness' prior testimony in which he claimed we missed 13
payments, that we only missed 9 payments. SAR 54, 63, 77-83.
R. 1237-1238. Objection to Second Affidavit ofRonald E. Casperite
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In accordance with common law and the maxim,/raus
- fraud
vitiates everything, the Nickersons object to the Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite
because it contains notary fraud. The notary seal is affixed to the affidavit but the notary
did not sign the affidavit. It is the Nickersons hope and prayer this Court is as equally
frustrated and appalled as they are at this blatant disregard and disrespect of the notary's
oath to fulfill their duties and concurs with the Supreme Comi of Washington in viewing
this act as a crime. "A signed notarization is the ultimate assurance upon which the whole
world is entitled to rely that the proper person signed a document on the stated day and
place. Local, interstate, and international transactions involving individuals, banks, and
corporations proceed smoothly because all may rely upon the sanctity of the notary's
seal ... 'The proper functioning of the legal system depends on the honesty of notaries
who are entrusted to verify the signing of legally significant documents.' ... a false
notarization is a crime and undennines the integrity of our institutions upon which all
must rely upon the faithful fulfillment of the notary's oath." Klem v. Washington Jvfut.
Bank, 295 P.3d 179, 176 Wash. 2d 771 (2013). Therefore, the Nickersons request the
comi to ignore the second affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite and consider any appropriate
disciplinary action and or sanctions to be assessed on the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's counsel
for submitting a document that embodies a criminal act. Furthermore, since the Plaintiff
bases their motion for summary judgment upon Mr. Casperite's affidavit, their motion for
summary judgment must be denied.
R. 1291. Charles Nickerson's Affidavit in Support oflvlotions to Reconsider
24.
The Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite is missing the notary's
signature and thus, is not properly notarized which according to the Washington Supreme
Comi constitutes a criminal act, Klem v. Washington Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 179, 176
Wash. 2d 771 (2013 ) .. Therefore, the Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite should be
thrown out and stricken from the record. (See Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite)
SAR 31-32. Nickersons' Motion .f<Jr Relieffi'om Judgment
In response to the Nickersons inquiry regarding the validity of the notarization on
the Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite, James Zombeck, Notary Unit Supervisor for
the State of New Jersey Depaiiment of Treasury, stated in a letter (See Affidavit of
Charles Nickerson in Support of Motion.for Relieffi'om .Judgment, Exhibit 4), "Upon
review of the SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD E. CASPERITE that you provided,
it is apparent that the notarization is invalid. It lacks the signature of the Notary Public."
Mr. Zombeck then referenced NJSAS 52:7-19 which states, "Each notary public,
to

his

to any jurat upon the administration of

any oath or the taking of any acknowledgment or proof, shall affix thereto his name in
such a manner and by such means, including, but not limited to, printing, typing, or
impressing by seal or mechanical stamp, as will enable the Secretary of State easily to
read said name." (emphasis added). Clearly, the State ofNew Jersey considers the
notarization on this affidavit to be invalid. Therefore, Idaho and this Court should as well,
and thus, the judgment in favor of PHH must be reversed because PHH has no affidavit
or other evidence to rely upon to support its motion for summary judgment, and the
Nickersons must be granted relief from judgment.
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Logically and according to common law, PHH should be required to prove the default
amOlmts they claimed back in 2010 and 2011 when they filed their complaint or the complaint
should be deemed moot.
R. 1412. Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim,
Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jwy Trial
"Educational note in pro se litigants terms: Proving the default was $1 off in the
payment records or escrow accounts is enough to invalidate and prove the records
presented are umeliable, untrustworthy, unlawful and unenforceable. These errors are not
moot, irrelevant, insignificant, inadmissible or legally able to be glossed over. The
irrefutable fact is these errors and all malicious and negligent intentions smrounding them
and their origination are quite serious, civilly, criminally, morally and ethically. An "as a
matter of law" statement that is appropriate here, is errors in records, especially when
dealing with escrow, send people to jail. The law does not think nor can justice rule that
falsifying or altering account records is a joke. This becomes especially true in light of
the proof the errors are intentional, malicious and serve to gain substantial unjust
emichment. May it please the Comito note that the factual basis for this is Basic
Accounting 101, no conclusory or "no foundation to have an opinion" kind of stuff. Any
reasonably intelligent person who has ever sat through a principles of accounting class,
even at junior high education level, read an accounting for Dummies book or listened to a
professor lecture on the importance of accurate record keeping knows, when dealing with
financial accountability, if the record is not accurate, it is not a viable record. Debt must
be proven, not claimed. (i.e. This includes ownership of the debt.) Default must be
proven, not claimed. (i.e. It has to be accurate.) The burden and responsibility of record
keeping belongs to PHH and Chase. As alleged servicers and/or those having alleged
beneficial interest in the Nickerson accounts, they had and have contractual obligations,
federal responsibilities, and civil liabilities to maintain resolute, truthful and reliable
records. They irrefutably did not do this. Their responsibility and liability for failing to do
so becomes even greater 1) when their errors were and are so glaring and present criminal
activity, 2) their incompetence and unprofessional conduct created severe problems and
damages for the Nickersons, and 3) they belligerently and repetitively refused and are
refusing to provide the Nickersons with mandated statements, receipts, account
documentation, etc. The bottom line, pun intended, is PHH and Chase have admitted to
being $11,644.75 off, in error, wrong, whatever you want to call it. That means, dollar for
dollar, they have already admitted, and a true review of the Nickerson's accounts will
demand even more admissions, they erred over 11,000 times. That is 11,644 % times to
be exact. Penny for penny which is more fair, since that is how the Nickerson family has
earned the money these crooks have lost, stolen and cannot account for, the fact is based
on their own records, PHH and Chase have en-ed over a million times. That is 1, 164A7 5
times to be exact. Further, the account records PHH and Chase are relying on actually
show a negative balance. Technically, this means the Nickersons are due a refund.
Clearly, PHH and Chase have problems and need new record keepers, financial
counseling and to write the Nickersons a check for all damages caused by their actions
and inactions. The reality of the situation bars the Plaintiff's complaint. Further, the
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reality of the situation convicts and bars their co-conspirators from any present detenses
or further complaints against the Nickersons. Case Dismissed."
To allow an alleged creditor to send a demand letter with an inaccurate default, refuse
fmiher payments based on that inaccurate default, file a complaint based on that demand letter
claiming it to fulfill federal notification requirements, and then, after their demand amount and
facts are proven to be false, simply claim a new demand amount and proceed with the complaint
defies fundamental reason. Producing accurate records to demonstrate true obligation or default
is required to comply with fair debt collection per the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
Disputed default must be validated based on federal lending laws, the FDCP A, and rights granted
by the alleged contract in this case.
R. 1517. Charles Nickerson 's and Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclain1,
Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jwy Trial
12 C.F.R. § 1024.35. "(e) Response to notice of error. (1) Investigation and
response requirements. (i) In general. Except as provided in paragraphs (f) and (g) of this
section, a servicer must respond to a notice of error by either: (A) Correcting the error or
errors identified by the borrower and providing the borrower with a written notification
of the correction, the effective date of the correction, and contact information, including a
telephone number, for further assistance; or (B) Conducting a reasonable investigation
and providing the borrower with a written notification that includes a statement that the
servicer has determined that no error occurred, a statement of the reason or reasons for
this determination, a statement of the borrower's right to request documents relied upon
by the servicer in reaching its determination, information regarding how the borrower can
request such documents, and contact information, including a telephone number, for
fu1iher assistance." PHH refused to respond to the Nickersons notice of error. PHH
refused to take any co1Tective action. PHH refused to even conduct an investigation. PHH
claimed they did not have any of Chase's account records. If you do not have the account
records, you can not claim a default, because you have no proof, evidence, foundation or
basis.
Therefore any and all notifications and collection attempts allegedly made were false,
inaccurate and invalid. The condition precedent of notification was not met. Therefore, per
Black's Law, the legal requirement of notice for judicial foreclosure has not been met.
Additionally, the demand letter submitted does not qualify according to the alleged
mortgage. The mmigage requires the lender to send the demand letter and at the time the alleged
demand letter was sent PHH was a servicer not the lender.

R. 1417, 1514-1515. Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer,
Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint and Demand.for Jury Trial
99.
The Nickersons assert the Note and Mortgage presented by the Plaintiff
requires PHH to provide a notice of any breach to the Nickersons, and allow a reasonable
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period of time for them to have the opporhmity to remedy any such breach prior to the
initiation of any legal proceedings.
100. PHH has failed to provide such notice.
101. In section 20 of the Mortgage presented by the Plaintiff (Complaint
Exhibit A) the second paragraph states. "Neither B01rnwer nor Lender may commence,
join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an individual litigant or the member of a
class) that arises from the other party's actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or
that alleges that the other party has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by
reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other
party (with such notice given in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such
alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of
such notice to take corrective action."
102. After PHH allegedly became the lender on June 9, 2010, no notice of
breach was sent to the Nickersons as required by the alleged contract.
103. As a matter of record, PHH has never provided any proper notice of
breach to the Nickersons.
104. Therefore, because PHH did not provide any such required notice of
breach, PHH is in breach of any alleged contract and has no right to action.
R. 1514-1515
184. The Nickersons have not been served a true and accurate Notice of
Default.
185. PHH has never served the Nickersons proper notice.
186. PHH breached the alleged contract by not providing notice of breach. The
Note and Mortgage presented by PHH requires the lender (creditor) not the "loan
servicer" to provide a notice of any breach to the Nickersons, and allow a reasonable
period of time for them to have the opp01tunity to remedy any such breach prior to the
initiation of any legal proceedings. PHH has failed to provide such notice. In section 20
of the mortgage presented by the Plaintiff (Complaint Exhibit A) the second paragraph
states. "Neither borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial
action (as either an individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other
party's actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or that alleges that the other party has
breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instnunent, until
such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in
compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the
other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective
action." After PHH allegedly became the lender on June 9, 2010, no notice of breach was
sent to the Nickersons as required by the alleged contract. PHH is unquestionably in
breach of contract.
187. PHH also breached section 22 of the contract presented by not providing a
notice of default. Section 22 states, "Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to
acceleration." Again, PHH as the alleged Lender must provide notice. PHH, by their own
admission, did not become the alleged lender until June 9, 2010. PHH, as the alleged
lender, did not provide notice to the Nickersons prior to acceleration and are in breach of
contract.
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Incidentally, according to the evidence PHH is still not the lender. Therefore the required
notifications per the alleged mortgage were not and have not been properly served. Condition
precedent has not been met. Case dismissed. The inability of PHH to rely upon the demand
letter is further compounded by the fact we informed PHH they were wrong at the time of the
demand letter being relied upon, but PHH totally ignored us even after we proved PHH was
wrong (R. 901

Communication from us to PHH documenting some of the payments we made

to Chase in 2009. PHH's erroneous complaint states we are in default from January 2009.) and
PHH did not have a record or knowledge of any payments made or not made by us to Chase.
Further, Chase had admitted this default letter was in error in 2009 and we had been told to
disregard it. Numerous other faulty letters were also sent that we were told were computer
generated in error. No default letter has ever been provided to us that was not retracted by Chase
and that has not been proven inaccurate. No accurate default letter was ever provided to us at any
time by PHH. PHH admitted this in their response to admissions (R. 1417, 1514-1515)
This is but one of the blatant examples where the Court has overlooked, misapplied, and
failed to consider statutes, decisions, and principles directly controlling this foreclosure action
and the truth of the matter surrounding it. Judgitis, as defined by Black's Law, not the facts of
the matter, allowed a false default amount to meet the claim qualifications in an improperly
sworn to document by a paid for non-employee witness claiming personal knowledge who does
not, did not and could not legally have the ability to testify with personal knowledge of our
accounts. Judge Griffin then allowed PHH to radically alter their previous claim of default.
R. 1385. j\;femorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Chase's and PHH's Summmy
Judgments
b.
PHH has alleged different default amounts for this time period:
i.
Located in Exhibit D (Affidavit of John Mitchell, 1/22/13, Exhibit D) is a
copy of PHH's Notice oflntention to Foreclose dated February 12, 2010. This
notice claims the Nickersons were 14 months past due with a total default amount
of $32,605.66 with $0.00 in late fees
In an affidavit in support of PHH' s second attempt for summary judgment
ii.
PHH now claims 9 months past due which would be $20,960.91.
This is a difference of $11,644.75. This difference constitutes significant and
substantial accounting errors which should not be glossed over and cannot be ignored.
This substantial difference makes a huge difference on whether or not one could pay it if
there had been a legitimate default, and any reasonable person could conclude the errors
were intentional to ensure the Nickersons could not cure it. Fmiher, this default amount
voids all previous notices as well as PHH's complaint, and requires PHH by contract to
provide new notices and by law to withdraw their complaint. Even further, at that time,
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the Nickersons disputed the default, challenged the accuracy of the records, and proved
payments had been made and transactions had occuned, but PHH refused to provide
proof of the default or even research the Nickerson' s disputes which created an
impossibility for the Nickersons to cure it. In fact, PHH claimed it did not have any of
Chase's account records. If you do not have the accoW1t records, how can you claim a
default? As a matter of law, you cannot.
Providing an accurate accounting is essential to claiming the default remedy
provided for in the alleged contract, and thus, refusing to and being unable to provide an
accurate accounting because of the lack of integrity and accuracy of the account record is
a breach of good faith and breach of contract.
The injustice in this is compounded by our not being informed of these rulings nor being
given opportunity to defend against the judgments. When presented with a request to expand the
factual record of the case, Griffin directed us to wait for a status hearing to address these issues.
When the status hearing converted to a summary judgment proceeding, Griffin prejudicially
ignored our request for extension despite multiple requests. He then denied the request minutes
before the Motion For Summary Judgment hearing. The clerk explained AGAIN we had
supplemental evidence that defeated their claims and proved no standing existed which we
wanted to file prior to the hearing. His response was we were proceeding with the hearing, but
we could go ahead and send our information in and he would consider it. This decision
procedurally prevented opportunity to expand the factual record of the case prior to the summary
judgment hearing. (R. 1176) Griffin gave us permission to send in our supplemental evidence
that defeated their claims and proved no standing existed. We did. He refused to consider it. This
redefines access to justice. Clearly Griffin conducted the litigation in this case and created a
record to support a foregone judgment. Our previous attorney can testify this was his experience
in trying this case. He stated, "It appears the level of fraud and cover up is not limited to Chase
and PHH!!!! Other entities engaged facilitated and profited in this fraudulent activity." R. 1319.

It is axiomatic to state a claimed default amount proven inaccurate constitutes grounds
for dismissal. This is glaringly true when PHH and Chase claimed different default amounts.
Chase claims we missed 11 payments and PHH obtained a summary judgment ruling based on a
claim of 9 missed payments. Both entities allegedly used the same Chase data to back up their
contradictory claims. PHH has admitted they do not have any knowledge about this other than
what Chase provided during this action. How can PHH disagree with Chase? Judge Griffin's
response to all attempts to find justice were, "your only course of action is the Supreme Court.
You will not find any relief in my court room." He is right. We did not.
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This Supreme Court must look at the evidence. Judge Griffin refused to. We have been
denied our right to due process. The complaint was allowed to proceed without PHH proving
ownership. The decision was based on instructions received from Kipp Manwaring of Just Law
when Mr. Manwaring lied to Judge Griffin by stating he did not have to prove the chain of title.
The inaccurate default amount fatally defeated PHH's complaint, dismissed their claims,
and demanded the Court compel Chase to answer discovery. PHH proceeded with their
fraudulent foreclosure scheme even though fact and law required the Court dismiss it with
prejudice. PHH should have been required to file a new claim based on the newly claimed
default amount since 1) the proceedings to that point were tried on false pretenses, 2) PHH
provided a judicial admission we were never properly notified of their "newly corrected" alleged
default amount, and 3) we were never provided the opportunity to cure the "new" alleged default
amount prior to them taking foreclosure action.
Instead of recognizing PHH and Chase's inaccurate record keeping raised genuine issues
of fact regarding the existence of any default and that we should be permitted to refute any
default claimed at trial, the Court blindly accepted their claims, corrected claims, and lack of
admissible evidence as fact and relied upon it accordingly.
R. 1073-1076. 1vfemorandum in Opposition to Plaint[ff's Second j\;Jotionfor Summcay
Judgment
Whether or not the Nickersons were in default in January of 2010.
The Nickersons assert, contend, and maintain that they were in good standing
with the note as of January of 2010. The basis for this belief is a representation from a
Chase employee named Kim and a representation by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that Chase
had represented in a credit repmi the Nickersons were current and in good standing as of
January of 2010. See Amended Answer and Counterclaim 120 and 21. Additionally, after
a thorough review of Chase's Detailed Transaction History (Affidavit ofBrandie S.
Watkins, Exhibit F and incorporated here by reference "Exhibit F") it is clear there is no
default and can be no default based upon their transaction history. The principal balance
on the last entry in the history is $-1,186. 90 which indicates an overpayment of principal
of$1,186.90. If there is no principal balance owed, there can be no default. Furthermore,
the escrow balance is $0.00 meaning all escrow obligations have been satisfied.
Therefore, the Detailed Transaction History (Exhibit F) confirms the representation made
by Chase employee Kim that the Nickersons were in good standing. In fact, according to
the Detailed Transaction History provided by Chase (Exhibit F), as of January 21, 2010,
the Nickersons had satisfied the obligations of the note and were due a refund of
$1,186.90.
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Even with this glaring evidence, PHH still contends the Nickersons are in default.
They now base their claim for default on the Second Affidavit of Ronald E Casperite,
Exhibit C and incorporated here by reference "Exhibit C" and the Affidavit of Chase
Employee in Support ofSecond Jvfotion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A. The
Nickersons object to Exhibit C based on the rules of best evidence. Clearly, Chase's
Detailed Transaction History Exhibit Fis the best evidence because it comes from the
entity who was servicing the loan and maintaining the account history and ovenules any
conjectures and extrapolations made by a third party. However, for the case of argument
we will compare Exhibit C to Exhibit F.
First, :Mr. Casperite totally disregards the principal balance Chase has on their
records and creates his own. See below.
e
Review the Exhibit C Principal Balance column Transaction Dates 7/21/2009
thru the second·entry on 10/3/2009. There is nothing there. However, a careful
review of Exhibit F for these dates show a Principal Balance of $391.52.
• The next entry on Exhibit C Transaction Date 10/3/2009 has a Principal
Balance of $261,170.62 and on Exhibit Fit is $0.00.
• The next entry on Exhibit C that has an entry for a Principal Balance is
Transaction Date 11/11/2009 with a balance of $261,170.62. Even though a
payment was credited on that date with a principal amount of $391.52 which
would normally reduce the Principal Balance, :Mr. Casperite did not credit the
$391.52 against his Principal Balance of $261,170.62. Exhibit Falso shows a
payment was credited on 11/11/2009 with a principal amount of $391.52
which brought the Principal Balance to $0.00.
e
The next entry on Exhibit C that has an entry for a Principal Balance is
Transaction Date 12/11/2009 with a balance of $260,777.05. Exhibit F
Principal Balance is $-393.57.
• The next entry on Exhibit C that has an entry for a Principal Balance is
Transaction Date 1/13/2010 with a balance of $260,381.42. Exhibit F
Principal Balance is $-789.20.
e
The last entry on Exhibit C that has an entry for a Principal Balance prior to
the transfer of the loan to PHH is Transaction Date 1/21/2010 with a balance
of$259,983.72. Exhibit F Principal Balance is $-1,186.90.
Below is a summary table demonstrating a side by side comparison of the above
narrative.
PHH' s Interpretation Chase's Transaction History Exhibit F Principal Balance
Transaction Date Exhibit C Principal Balance
Blank
$391.52
7/21-10/3/2009
$261,170.62
$0.00
10/3/2009
$261,170.62
$0.00
11/11/2009
$-393.57
$260,777.05
12/11/2009
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Next, Mr. Casperite disregards his own illustrative principal balances and claims
"upon PHH's receipt from Chase of the Nickerson's loan, the principal balance was
$261,170.62." (Second Affidavit o.fRonald E. Casperite). According to Mr. Casperite's
illustrative loan history, Exhibit C, the principal balance at the time of the transfer should
have been $259,983.72. Mr. Casperite is either contradicting his own affidavit in regards
to the principal balance at the time of transfer or he made a mistake on Exhibit C or both.
Clearly, he has cast doubt on PHH's claimed default amount of $340,339.84 as of
December 1, 2013 (111femorandum in Support of P HH's Second 1Uotion for Summary
Judgment).
Additionally, Exhibit C sheds no new light or contradiction of payments made or
not made. It simply copies over the transaction data as listed on Exhibit F.
Lastly, neither Exhibit C nor Exhibit F account for the Nickersons $4,549.04
payment that was made in July of 2009 and is reflected on the escrow statement.
(Affidavit ofJohn 1\1itchell, Dated 10/31/2012, Exhibits A and B).
As for the Affidavit of Chase Employee in Support o.fSecond Motion for Summmy
Judgment, Exhibit A, Chase's own Detailed Transaction History (Exhibit F) contradicts
the data contained in this letter because the principal balance at the time of this letter was
$0.00 (Ref# 83, Transaction Date 12/2/2009). Therefore, there was no default at that
time because the obligations under the note were already satisfied. Additionally, the
question must be asked, Why is this letter just now showing up? Chase was requested to
provide all c01Tespondence as a part of the discovery process. The Affidavit o.f Chase
Employee in Support of Second ~Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A was not
included in any discovery Chase provided. Therefore, there is serious doubt as to the
validity or originality of these letters and whether they are admissible evidence.
R. 1343, 1350. 1\1emorandum in Support o.f A1otion to Reconsider Judgment
The Court states, "PHH relies upon ... an affidavit of Brandie S. Watkins." This
affidavit contradicts the second affidavit of Ron Casperite. Mr. Casperite testified after a
review of the detailed transaction history provided by Brandie S. Watkins, with her first
affidavit, the Nickersons missed a total 9 monthly payments during the time Chase
serviced the Nickersons loan. However, in the exhibit provided by Ms. Watkins in her
second affidavit, Chase claims the Nickersons had missed 12 monthly payments.
Obviously, there is a problem with Chase's account history. The Nickersons contend one making contradictory statements cannot be heard. Both Chase and PHH have made
numerous contradictory and misleading statements throughout these proceedings. As a
result neither Chase nor PHH can or should be heard.
R. 1350.
In addition, PHH has never provided any proof their alleged default amount is
correct. The account history provided by Chase employee Brandie S. Watkins shows a
principal balance of $0 in November 2009 and $-1186.90 on January 21, 2010. This does
not validate or confirm PHH's principal balance claims, but, in fact, contradicts and
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refutes those claims. PHH cannot be permitted to fabricate a principal balance. Since the
evidence PHH has provided contradicts and refutes their principal balance claims,
judgment must be vacated and judgment in favor of the Nickersons must be granted.
R. 1467. Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim,
Third Party Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
298. In paragraph 10 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite
states, "From November 2007 through December 2009 the Nickersons were obligated to
pay 26 monthly payments. During that time period the Nickersons only made 17 monthly
payments. The Nickersons failed to make 9 monthly payments causing their loan to go
into default." As of December 2009, the total amount for 9 missed payments is
$20,960.91. However, in the affidavit of Chase employee in support of summary
judgment, Brandie S. Watkins presents, in letters dated December 7, 2009, a conflicting
amount of $28,368.84 of which $27,514.84 was due to missed payments. This
contradictory evidence, at a minimum, clearly and deeply demonstrates the total lack of
integrity, credibility and reliability of Chase's and PHH's account records and history.
Though we assert there was no default and true discovery will support our claims, any
reasonable person is compelled to agree the accuracy of default is critical in being able to
determine a borrower's ability to cure any alleged default. The consequence of default in this
case is foreclosure. The severity of this judgment destructively impacts our financial portfolio
and name perpetually as it does for any mortgagor accused of default. The system has been
inadequate to protect us from this fraudulent theft of our property. This Supreme Comi must
address this.
Any :reasonable person is also compelled to agree a demand letter allegedly mailed a year
earlier by another entity with a different default amount cannot fulfill required notification of
default.
R. 742. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Nickersons' Request for Admissions
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. Admit the Nickersons made payments
to Chase in November 2009, December 2009, and January 2010.
RESPONSE: PHH is unaware of any payments made or not made by the
Nickersons to Chase. In that regard this request is denied.
This is prevention of perfonnance in the extreme. PHH has judicially admitted they
would not accept any payments from us unless we cured the entire alleged default. (R. 314 ,r9, R.
1012) Now PHH admits their claimed default amount was wrong proving we were right in
asse1iing their default amount was inaccurate and needed to be researched. This Supreme Court
has also affirmed we were right to contest PHH' s alleged default. PHH blatantly and arrogantly
prevented any performance by us by belligerently refusing to prove or even research their claim
of default in 2010. To emphasize, this is a claim they themselves have now admitted was wTong.
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This Court has affirmed Chase's and PHH's account records are inaccurate and that PHH's
claimed default amount was wTong. Allowing the District Court decision to stand creates severe
injustice, especially when we have irrefutably been denied the right to fully and properly defend
ourselves against these false claims. Chase and PHH have withheld the account notations,
communication records and taped conversations we requested in discovery. Those records, and
rights to access to them, belong to us, are their responsibility to maintain, and validate our
claims. The fact and truth of the matter is we were current and making our payments to Chase.
Among others, this statement is supported by direct testimony that was presented in our verified
pleadings (R. 110,

19-21).

"On January 22, 2010, the Nickersons made a monthly payment with a
confirmation number of 24262170. This payment was coordinated with [Chase
representative] Kim.
In January of 2010, Nickersons were told by [Chase representative] Kim their
account was in good standing.
Nickersons were also told by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. that Chase had represented
in a credit repo1i the Nickersons were current and in good standings as of January of
2010."
was

our

our

of our

R. 1086-1087
"In January 20 I 0, the Nickersons were in good standing with Chase."
was

our

our motions to reconsider.

R. 1290-1291.
"12. I made all payments I was allowed to make, knew to make or was
instructed to make by Chase and to Chase, and was current and in good standing with
Chase in January 2010.
13.
A Chase employee named Kim who we trusted and believed told us our
account was in current and in good standing as of January 2010.
14.
A Wells Fargo employee named Heather reviewed a credit repmi in
January 2010 and told us Chase represented and reported that we were current on this
account. We relied on these representations.
15.
According to Chase's account history, we were not in default as of
January 21, 2010."

R. 284
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Admit that you have never received any
written documentation excusing your payment performance required under the Note
RESPONSE:
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Admit but conditionally. Nickersons were told by JPMorgan employee Kirn that
account was in good standing in January of 2010. Nickersons were also previously told
by JPMorgan employees that they did not have to make payments. Nickersons also
contacted PHH and attempted to make payments but PHH would not accept payments
from the Nickersons.
R. 291
ANSWER: On January 21, 2010, Kirn with Chase, told the Nickersons that their
account was in good standing with Chase.
ANSWER: There was never a time the Nickersons did NOT tender a payment.
The only time payment was not made was when a Chase or PHH employee refused the
tendered payment. The payment issues have already been stated. Since 2010 the
Nickersons did not tender a payment to PHH because PHH would not accept payments
from the Nickersons.
R. 305
ANSWER: On January 21, 2010, Kirn with Chase, told the Nickersons that their
account was in good standing with Chase.
ANSWER: There was never a time the Nickersons did NOT tender a payment.
The only tin1e payment was not made was when a Chase or PHH employee refused the
tendered payment. The payment issues have already been stated. Since 2010 the
Nickersons did not tender a payment to PHH because PHH would not accept payments
from the Nickersons.
In light of our direct testimony of the fact we were making our payments to Chase and
that we were current and in good standing with Chase; in light of the fact PHH admitted they did
not know if we had even missed any payments; in light of the fact PHH has admitted prevention
of performance; and in concurrence with the summary judgment standard cited below; summary
judgment in favor of PHH should not have been granted and must be reversed on appeal.
"On a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not weigh evidence or determine
truthfulness of allegations; instead, it determines the existence of genuine issues of
material fact ... Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed ... (citations
omitted)." Sparks v. ALLSTATE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, INC., Case No.
1:14CV00166EJLCWD. (D. Idal10, 2015).
This is not a foreclosure case where the borrowers stopped making their payments nor is
it a case where the borrower no longer had the wherewithal to make their payments nor is it a
case where the loan amount exceeded the property value so the borrower quit making payments.
This is a case of organized crime, lending theft, and mortgage fraud. The fact is we were current
and making our payments to Chase. (SEE ABOVE) The fact is PHH erroneously claimed
default, a default that this Court affirms was wrong, and PHH prevented us from making any
further payments to steal the substantial equity built up in our property and commit other such
unlawful acts. The fact is PHH refused to validate the alleged default amount, admitted during
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these proceedings that it did not know if we had missed any payments, and now admits their
alleged default amount is wrong. The default in this case is the thousands stolen from our escrow
and hidden suspense accounts have not been returned to us.
R. 1379. lviemorandum in Support ofMotion to Reconsider Chase's and PHH's Summary
Judgments
"d.
Chase mishandles escrow funds and accounting. The escrow balance
appearing on Exhibit Fon Tran Date of7/21/2009 of $3,391.90 does not match the
Escrow balance $935.27 reported on Exhibit 6 for that time period nor do the escrow
balances line up from that time thru 1/21/2010. Additionally, a closer look at Exhibit 6
reveals a discrepancy in the Escrow Balance on that document alone. The Loan Summary
at the top of the page reflects an ending Escrow Balance of negative $3,613.77 - while the
Actual Activity column has an ending Escrow Balance of positive $1,503.90. This is a
difference of over $5,000.00. Where did all of that money go?
e.
On 11/21/2009 Chase disburses a $2,870.00 payment from escrow for
forced placed homeowners insurance when proof of insurance was already provided.
(Affidavit of.John C. Mitchell, Dated January 22, 2013, Exhibit C Nick0002 and
Nick0007)
f.
Chase did not reimburse the Nickersons for the forced placed homeowners
insurance when the insurance was cancelled on 2/11/2010, effective 2/05/2010 and
cancelled again on 2/24/2010 with an effective date of 9/16/2009 (Affidavit of John C.
Mitchell, Dated January 22, 2013, Exhibit C Nick0018 and Nick0019). Where did the
$2,870.00 go? It was not returned to the Nickersons."
The fact is PHH prevented our performance and their complaint must be dismissed with
prejudice. We did not default. We made and were making our payments. PHH and their
accomplices prevented performance to steal our equity.
The intentional prevention of performance and abusive debt collection practices of PHH,
Chase and their accomplices has irreversibly impeached their rights to cause of action and claims
to injury, and unjustly denied our rights to a defense and relief.

of our former counsel and

Error 2:

we
our

to overcome the

unjust rulings,

incomplete
to defeat

now our

to secure

at

This error stems from the fact this Court did not address the assigmnent of error we set
fmih on page 43 of our brief.

District

err

refusing to acknowledge
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consider appellants prejudice due to issues surrounding their attorney's negligent
misrepresentation and undisclosed withdrawal?
We have been denied the right to defend ourselves. Mr. Mitchell agreed to compel Chase
to fully answer their questions and requests for production, to specifically require Chase to
provide all of the account notations and communication records, and to provide access to the
witnesses we requested to depose. He provided the dates and the names of customer service
personnel we had spoken with to Chase and PHH in our discovery responses and there was no
ethical or lawful reason why Chase could not cooperate and easily provide the account notations
and communication records requested. This is especially true since Mr. Stenquist claimed to
have access to Chase's records. R. 330. Mr. Stenquist claims, "I have access to my client's files
in this matter. .. " Our answers were provided in a timely manner in accordance with our
attorney's instructions. PHH and Chase repeatedly refused to cooperate and provide witnesses
for us to depose, which we had been repeatedly requesting since the claim was first filed. Mr.
Mitchell told us he filed a motion to compel discovery and that it was denied. It was our
understanding and agreement at the time set for the depositions Chase and PHH were finally
being required and had agreed to provide their representatives for us to depose prior to our
depositions being taken so we could prove there was no default and reference records they were
bringing with them that they had failed to provide to us previously. The federally mandated
records requested prove all payments were made and are foundationally necessary to our
defense. The depositions were originally scheduled near the end of August 2012, but PHH had
not yet responded to our interrogatories and requests for production, so the depositions were
rescheduled for October 3, 2012. At that time PHH had still not provided their discovery
responses which were 90 days late as of October

3rd.

The record shows they were provided on

October 18, 2012, and they were not even verified. When we arrived in Idaho for our depositions
we found out neither Chase nor PHH had representatives present we could also depose and
neither had brought the promised documentation so we requested the depositions be cancelled
until they were compelled to honor their prior agreements. Mr. Mitchell coerced us into going
forward with the depositions by assuring us telling our story to the Judge could end our
nightmare and informing us we had no choice but to go forward. Because of the extreme abuse
experienced (threatening phone calls, contact with other creditors and business associates to
discredit us and create problems with their relationships with us, sabotaging employment
opportunities, etc. (R. 285,299, 1224, 1380-1381, 1560-1562), we understood the District Court
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had specifically ordered we did not have to provide any personal information in response to
questions we felt might put us, our family, our livelihood, or our credit at risk of further abuse.
Therefore, when such questions were asked, we consulted with Mr. Mitchell to make sure we
were not in error to refuse to answer the question, and then clearly and articulately
communicated for the record why we were not comfortable answering questions of personal
nature that did not have any bearing on this litigation. We were told these responses were being
recorded. We asked if we could tape them as well but were told it was not allowed. "Just tell our
story" was the instructions we received from Mr. Mitchell. Clearly we stated we wanted to keep
our property, we had the wherewithal to keep our property, and we intended to fight to keep our
property. Repeatedly we stated we did not default, both PHH and Chase knew the truth, and we
wanted them to cease and desist from this fraudulent action. Again, we were told the depositions
were being taped so we thought our answers were being completely recorded. Unfortunately, that
was not what happened. (R. 1819-1825). After the failed attempt at providing depositions or
finally getting to tell our story to the Judge, we never really knew the true status of our case
because it was negligently kept from us. We were told no depositions were prepared and had no
reason to doubt what we were told. We did not know PHH had provided any discovery
responses. We did not know a summary judgment process had taken place and our counterclaims
and third-party complaint were dismissed. Mr. Mitchell told us everything was ok, to be patient
and let him do his job, and that our case was in appeal. We did not get to provide any affidavits
or testimony to defend ourselves or prosecute our claims. Bank employees and other third parties
who provided testimony to Mr. Mitchell that refutes the existence of default, confirms prevention
of performance, and coIToborates our claims of abusive debt collection and fraud did not get the
opportunity to be heard. We had no idea Mr. Mitchell had withdrawn as our attorney until
August 2013. (See R. 997-998 where Mr. Mitchell's boss confirms we had no idea Mr. Mitchell
had withdrawn.) Incidentally, we found out Mr. Mitchell had withdrawn the day after Mr.
Mitchell represented to the Attorney General's office and other public officials he was
representing us and our case was in appeal. Regarding this Mr. Mitchell stated:
" ... during my representation of the Nickersons I did not know what to do and not
knowing what to do led [me] to being dishonest with myself and others, notably the
Nickersons.
I did not keep the Nickersons informed about the status of their case after their
depositions were taken, did not tell them about a sununary judgment motion, the
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summary judgment decision, told them an appeal had been filed when it had not and
withdrew from the case without telling them.
The Nickersons deserve to have the underlying complaint and their counterclaims
decided on the merits of the case and not have their life affected because they put their
faith in an attorney who did not have the mental and emotional capabilities to give them
adequate representation.
The Nickersons have uncovered countless irregularities and falsities in their case which if
presented properly to a Court should be a defense to the foreclosure claim and support
their counterclaims.
During my representation of the Nickersons I talked with several governmental agencies
about wrongful foreclosure in general and the Nickersons' case in specific. I talked with
the FBI agents in Lewiston and the Attorney General's office in Boise. I gave the FBI a
fairly thick binder identifying specific incidents of misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs
with supporting documentation that this type of conduct had been done extensively
before. Off the top of my head I cannot remember the specifics but I seem to recall notary
fraud. To the best of my recollection I remember interest and thinking that one of these
agencies would take the case on and investigate but ultimately these agencies declined. I
also filed online complaints with one or two federal agencies but do not remember if they
took any action.
The Nickersons' case was not decided on the merits and really no meaningful discovery
was ever answered by the Plaintiffs. There is no prejudice to the Plaintiffs in allowing the
Nickersons to have discovery done properly and have the underlying case and their
counterclaims decided on the facts of the case and not have the case decided because of
an incompetent mentally unfit at the time attorney who did not know how to handle the
mess that he created. I believe all the Nickersons want is the chance to put on their
defense and their proof of their counterclaims."
See affidavit of John Mitchell (SAR 69, 70).
Immediately upon finding out Mr. Mitchell had withdrawn from the case we were forced
to file an appearance pro se. R. 1000. We filed this appearance pro se with the understanding
from Mr. Mitchell that he would approach the Corn1 in due time to properly represent our case.
At that time, we found out our case was not in appeal so we spoke with the District Court clerks
to inform the Corn1 we wanted Chase and PHH to be compelled to provide answers to our
original discovery requests, we wanted the opportunity to depose witnesses, and we wanted the
opportunity to amend our answer and claims based upon the discovery and proof of fraud we had
found in the limited discovery PHH and Chase had provided. We were instructed by the Court to
wait for a status conference. Judge Griffm communicated he would schedule a status conference
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and all of those issues would be addressed at that time. In deference to his authority, we waited
to move forward.
Judge Griffin scheduled the status conference for December 17, 2013 (R. 1007). At that
time, PHH filed their second motion for summary judgment abruptly turning the waited for
status conference into a summary judgment hearing. Our verbal and written requests were
ignored and we were forced without representation to defend their motion without knowing the
status of the case, what the actual factual record looked like, or having the opportunity to obtain
additional discovery and submit existing discovery previously provided to Mr. Mitchell but
which he had apparently not put before the Court. We were severely and iITecoverably
prejudiced by Mr. Mitchell's prior actions and inactions, by Judge Griffin's refusal to allow the
factual record to be expanded, and by not being given the oppmiunity to obtain additional
discovery. In effect and reality, we were systematically denied the right to defend ourselves. That
denial has continued to this day, because, as a result of the incomplete record, now this Supreme
Comi has refused to consider the evidence in the record; has refused to consider the additional
discovery we were able to obtain through our own effmis; has refused to consider the statutes
and case law we presented in our briefs; has refused to see and consider the misconduct,
deception and fraud perpetrated by Chase, PHH and their counsels; and has refused to see how
severely we were prejudiced by Mr. Mitchell's negligence, misrepresentation and his difficulty
navigating the legal system in Judge Griffin's courtroom.
As we stated in our Appellant Brief, this Comi has held, "It is said that, where it appears
that a judgment was taken against appellant through the negligence of an attorney who had been
employed by such paiiy, nothing is left to the discretion of the court, and the judgment must be
set aside." Pierce v. Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274, 301 P.2d 1099 (1956). The record demonstrates
and our attorney has admitted a judgment was taken against us because of his negligence. We
have been denied our rights to present a defense. The judgment must be set aside. We pray this
Court recognize the extreme precedent potential of allowing PHH and Chase to prevail in their
fraudulent attack on our financial p01ifolio and their malicious theft of our ranch and the grave
public concern and imminent thTeat this creates. We plead with you to exe1i reasonable and
conscientious judicial effort to ensure justice is found in this case. At the very least, we implore
you to set aside the judgments and remand this case back in its entirety to the District Court as
the law requires. In the interest of justice, we implore you to dismiss PHH and Chase's
complaint, claims and defenses with prejudice and hold them accountable for their vicious and
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unprovoked assaults on our persons and our property. Read our Amended Answers and
Counterclaim. Do not allow injustice to continue. In the interest of justice, read it!
Professional neglect involves "indifference and a consistent failure to perform those
obligations that a lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a
lawyer owes to a client." Iowa Supreme Ct. Ed. ofProfl Ethics & Conduct v. Kennedy,
684 N.W.2d 256, 25960 (Iowa 2004).
Misrepresenting the status of a matter to a client typically wanants a more severe
sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Ed. ofProf! Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N. W.2d 111,
114 (Iowa 2002). Further, we have said more severe discipline is needed when the
attorney's actions caused harm to his or her clients or to third parties. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Ed. of Prof! Ethics & Conduct v. Jay, 606 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2000). IA S. CT ED. OF
PROF'L ETHICSv. Hanken, 688 NW 2d 812

Assignment of Error 3: The misconduct, fraud on the Court, continuous violations of the
rules, and failure of opposing counsels, PHH and Chase to fulfill mandated ethical
responsibilities by presenting false and conflicting evidence, briefs, affidavits, and
memorandums have denied our equal access to justice, thwarted our ability to conduct
discovery, and resulted in unjust summary judgments in favor of PHH and Chase. The
actions and inactions of opposing counsels have denied and prevented our rights to a
defense and opportunity to find relief.
PHH and Chase have persisted in presenting lies and false representations to prevent us
throughout this litigation process. These lies have been incorporated into their appellate briefs. In
fact, in our 300+ page amended pleadings we document over 100 contradictions,
misrepresentations and falsehoods PHH has submitted in this action. (R 1454-1475) Chase has
their own record as well. (R. 1527-1537)
In the following argument we focus our discussion on the facts regarding the transfers
and assignments of our note that have been proven to be false and demonstrate even Chase does
not agree with the facts as presented by the Court.
Justice Horton mentioned the tenn shenanigans in reference to Chase and PHH in oral
argument. Microsoft Encarta defines shenanigan as a questionable act: something that is
deceitful, underhanded, or otherwise questionable. We have provided numerous examples of
these shenanigans in the record and PHH and Chase have continued this practice in their briefs.
One of the most fatal and glaring is the fact that Chase claims we missed 11 payments during the
time Chase was servicing the Note and PHH claims we missed 9 payments and this Court has
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affirmed based on PHH's claims we only missed 9 payments while Chase was servicing the
Note. All claims are based on Chase's account records. Testimony, account records, account
notations and taped conversations refute the existence of any default. Among other issues such as
misrepresentation and fraud, it is a breach of contract and a genuine issue of material fact when
the entity claiming default's account records are proven inaccurate. PHH admits their account
records were inaccurate at the time they set the exact default amount and refused to accept
payments or validate that amount back in February of 2010, and this Court has affirmed that
admission.
That is not the only discrepancy or contradiction between Chase's and PHH's claims.
Notice the difference between the facts regarding the transfer of our note as detailed by this
Court, Chase, PHH and the evidence:
First, the validity and lawful integrity surrounding a Note executed on this property on or
about October 4, 2002, in favor of Coldwell Banker Mortgage is a material issue in question. The
chain of title that follows this alleged Note is broken, corrupted, and contaminated concealing
any and all truth regarding ownership, beneficial interest and right to action. Forensic analysis
demonstrates multiple simultaneous chains. Our expert witness can testify this invalidates any
valid claims to action by PHH. Based on the documents used to claim ownership in this
litigation, PHH has no beneficial interest as no one with beneficial interest has ever assigned it to
them. Further, in 2002, Coldwell Banker Mortgage was neither a part of nor a subsidiary of PHH
Mmigage. Therefore, no claims of beneficial interest or rights to claim associated with any
existing relationship they might have with Coldwell Banker Mortgage currently has any bearing
whatsoever on beneficial interest Coldwell Banker Mmigage may or may not have legally
acquired in 2002 in regards to this property. Research and documentation was provided to Mr.
Mitchell to refute any claims of beneficial interest by PHH being received from Coldwell
Banker.
Next, this Court states the note was assigned to Fannie Mae in December 2002. Neither
PHH nor Chase affirm that fact and the only evidence in the record regarding Fannie Mae
receiving the note in December 2002 is a letter from Fam1ie Mae addressed to us which we
submitted during the summary judgment process (R. 1112) to show fraud regarding the chain of
title presented and impeach Chase's claims of being the servicer only to ave1i discovery. The
District Court ruled this letter as hearsay and refused to consider it. (R. 1243) Yet the District
Court and now this Court accept its contents as fact and rely upon it in judgment. (R. 1248 and
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Supreme Court Opinion dated 4/27 /16) Not allowing this evidence to stand in establishing issues
that defeat summary judgment yet relying on it to supplement incomplete records and settle
contradictory accounts presented by PI-IH and Chase is unjust. Given the threats this behavior
creates for the integrity of Idaho property records and for Idaho homeowners, and the habitual
record of such fraudulent behavior by these entities readily available in public record, any
reasonable person would see the need to require further investigation to protect the welfare of the
general public.
Next, this Court claims J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the note in November 2007. This
refutes findings of fact in the first summary judgment. (R. 692) However, Chase denies this fact
in its answer (R. 128) and in its interrogatory responses claiming it was only a servicer and that it
never owned the note (R. 7 4 7-751, 7 5 9, 7 60) and stated in their brief before this Court that PHH
repurchased the note from Freddie Mac in February 2010 (Chase's Brief p. 3). The letter from
Fannie Mae, which the District Court relied upon for its facts, states Fannie Mae terminated its
interest in the note in December of 2009. This evidence impeaches the evidence this Court relied
on to state Chase acquired the note in 2007 and proves there is a contradiction of facts and
statements as to when or if Chase ever received the note. If Chase never received the note,
obviously it could not assign it to PHH. Therefore, by reasonable inference any person can
conclude PHH never lawfully received the note and PHH's claims must be dismissed. The
circumstantial evidence surrounding the fabrication of the false assignments would also lead any
reasonable person to recognize fraud.
Next, this Court claims Chase assigned the note to PHH in June 2010. Chase denied ever
receiving the note and represented to the Court that PHH repurchased the note from Freddie

Mac. (R. 537 - "In February 2010, PHH repurchased the Note from Freddie Mac ... ") However,
we presented evidence to the Court via letters from Fannie Mae and Chase that Chase purchased
the note from Fannie Mae in December 2009. The letter from Fannie Mae is the same letter the
District Court refused to hear and stated was hearsay, but later relied upon in its judgment. In
addition, we submitted another letter from Chase dated January 10, 2014, in which Chase
claimed to be the possessor and investor (owner and holder) of our note. This letter was provided
to the District Court via a supplemental affidavit in accordance with I.R. C.P. 56 almost a month
prior to its entry of judgment and was not refuted by PHH. PHH objected that it was not
submitted with an affidavit, but it was.
R. 1235. Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Notice ofSupplemental Evidence
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The Plaintiff is attempting to distract the Court by fallaciously objecting to the
Nickersons Notice of Supplemental Evidence. Black's Law Dictionary (2 11 d edition)
defines affidavit as "A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made
voluntarily, and confirmed by oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an
officer having authority to administer such oath. An affidavit is written declaration under
oath, made without notice to the adverse party." Page 4 of the Nickersons notice of
supplemental evidence is clearly and unequivocally an affidavit. Therefore, the Plaintiffs
objection should be overruled and the Court should consider the evidence presented in
making a ruling on summary judgment.
PHH never objected to the evidence nor did they refute it, so it is in the record and
deemed admitted. It is an assignment of error for the Court to just simply ignore it. (R. 12271232)
It is also an assignment of error for this Court to now ignore it because of unfair
procedural technicalities. R. 1247 - "The Nickersons submitted additional documents and
statements after the hearing on motions for summary judgment. The court will not consider those
documents as they were not filed timely, and the Nickersons did not file a motion to reconsider."
We were never served the Cami's order denying our motion to continue so we were unaware of
anything to reconsider or the need to ask for a reconsideration until the District Comi served us
the memorandum and order granting summary judgment to PHH at which time we filed for
reconsideration. The Cami entered this order in the record post the hearing and did not serve or
notify us that it had been done. Note there is no certificate of service on the order. Reasonable
inference on the issues surrounding our entering this information in the record implicates
extreme abuse of power and discretion (R.1178 ).
All hearings we attended were handled telephonically. We were never provided minutes
of those hearings per I.R.C.P. 7(d)(4) "The court may hold the hearing ... by a telephone
conference ... The court shall cause minutes thereof to be prepared, filed in the action and served
upon all parties to the action." Anytime we asked for any document in the record, we had to pay
$1 per page. We were told we had to request the minutes from the transcriptionist and pay their
fee, which would have proven to be a very costly option for us.
In addition, as stated earlier, additional evidence was available that defeats all claims of
Chase and PHH. Account notations, communication records, witnesses and federally mandated
records we requested from the very start prove all claims. Opposing counsels know the truth,
have admitted the truth, but are concealing it from the Cami, and are guilty of fraud on the
Court.
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Concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by misleading and deceptive talk, acts,
or conduct, where it is accompanied by misrepresentations, or where, in addition to a party's
silence, there is any statement, word, or act on his part which tends affirmatively to a suppression
of the truth. Such conduct is designated active concealment. Equitable Life Ins. Co. oflowa v
Halsey, Stuart & Co., C.C.A.111., 112 F.2d 302,309.
Under our system of government the process of adjudication is surrounded by safeguards
evolved from centmies of experience. These safeguards are not designed merely to lend
formality and decorum to the trial of causes. They are predicated on the assumption that to
secure for any controversy a truly formed and dispassionate decision is a difficult thing,
requiring for its achievement a special summoning and organization of human effort and the
adoption of measures to exclude the biases and prejudgments that have free play outside the
courtroom. All of this goes for naught if the man with an unpopular cause is unable to find a
competent lawyer courageous enough to represent him. His chance to have his day in court loses
much of its meaning if his case is handicapped from the outset by the very kind of prejudgment
om rules of evidence and procedure are intended to prevent. Professional Responsibility: Report
of the Joint Conference, 44 AB.A.I. 1159, 1216 (1958) Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition
We truly do not understand how this Court or any court can simply ignore the evidence
and factual issues of this case.
"In T W Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1987), we explained that, "at summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party: if direct evidence produced by the moving
party conflicts with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must
assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that
fact." Id. at 63031 (citations omitted)." Leslie v. Grupo !CA, 198 F. 3d 1152 (9th Cir.
1999)
According to the case cited above, this Court cannot ignore the direct evidence presented.

In fact, in regards to summary judgment the Court is required to assume the evidence we
presented that PHH does not ovvn or hold our note is true and summary judgment must be
denied. (R. 1232) Further, there is so much deception from Chase and PHH regarding the
handling of our account, the transfers of our note, assignments that could not have logistically
occurred, and the obsession with foreclosing, that this Court should not have affirmed the
District Court. Doing so simply affirms the errors of fact and law of the District Court and
condones the fraudulent actions and inactions of opposing counsel, PHH and Chase. Their
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blatant misconduct, fraud on the Court, continuous violations of the rules, and failure to fulfill
mandated ethical responsibilities by presenting false and conflicting evidence, briefs, affidavits,
and memorandums have denied our equal access to justice, thwarted our ability to conduct
discovery, and resulted in unjust summary judgments in favor of PHH and Chase. These actions
and inactions have denied and prevented our rights to a defense and our opportunity to find
relief.

to

of

were

or

as

our

us

There are errors regarding not considering or addressing illegal acts conm1itted by PHH
and Just Law. These acts, among other severe, significant and substantial injuries, specifically 1)
created extreme prejudice that prevented us from defending our rights; 2) inflicted malicious
financial destruction upon us without legal foundation, cause or right; 3) negatively impacted our
credit, livelihood and ability to maintain our livelihood; and 4) constructed procedural
technicalities and insurmountable procedural roadblocks that have defeated our rights to obtain
relief judicially.
The illegal non-judicial foreclosure attempt which commenced in February 2010
breached the alleged contract, defied any alleged agreements, and ignored codified lending rules
governing this property. This 50 acre agricultural property could only be secured with a
mortgage and not a Deed of Trust. I.C. § 45-1502 states parcels over 40 acres cannot be secured
by a deed of trust. Our claims support compliance with this restriction and a faxed
acknowledgment from Coldwell Banker at closing proves Coldwell recognized this code, agreed
to abide by its limitations, and committed to honor the verbal agreements previously made with
us (R. 1539-1543).
Extensive witness testimony from those involved in this transaction from property search
to closing can testify a mortgage is the only instrument we ever considered regarding ANY loans
on ANY of the hundreds of prope1iies visited and thousands reviewed in our search for property.
Jason Rammel and Bradon Howell of Just Law in Idaho Falls admitted we had a
mmigage and admitted the size and use of this property suppmied this limitation. However, they
maliciously pursued the non-judicial foreclosure anyway (R. 493, 922, 15 56-1560). This nonjudicial foreclosure attempt was based on fabricated default claims created solely by grotesque
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prevention of performance. A very rudimentary investigation demands any reasonable person to
suspect the existence of fraud. Further investigation proves it.
As stated and restated in this brief, PHH's claim of default in February 2010 was false,
and this Court has affirmed its inaccuracy. However, there is more to this story that must be
considered to reveal intent. Upon receipt of PHH's notice of intention to foreclose dated
February 12, 2010, (R. 119) and Coldwell Banker's welcome letter (R. 118) and notice of
intention to foreclose (R. 120), we contacted Coldwell Banker to let them know we were excited
to be with them again because our previous experience with Coldwell Banker was mostly
positive and our experience with Chase's account servicing was nothing short of a nightmare.
We infonned Coldwell Banker the alleged default was an e1rnr created by Chase's poor
recording keeping. Coldwell Banker indicated we should not have received any letters from
them, they could not help us, and that we must contact PHH. Notice the different contact
numbers for PHH and Coldwell on their respective letters.
We then contacted PHH, and told them the alleged default was wrong. We assured them
we did make our payments to Chase in 2009, and that our last payment was made in January
2010. We told there was some history of Chase losing our payments, but that the payments had
been found in various places. Chase told us they had fixed the errors in their system, and that we
were showing current.
PHH refused to validate the alleged default and told us they did not have any account
records from Chase. They said we had to get Chase to provide our records to them in order to
prove no default and straighten out our account status. PHH would not accept any payments until
we paid the full amount of the alleged default (R. 561). We contacted Chase but Chase said all
account records were transferred to PHH. We contacted PHH again and they stated, "We don't
have any account records from Chase." Thus, PHH claimed default when they did not have
access to any account records and prevented performance when they had no physical evidence to
validate the existence of any default whatsoever. We provided PHH with payment records that
proved the alleged default was inaccurate but PHH ignored us (R. 901 ).
PHH started this foreclosure process in February 2010. According to the facts presented
by the Court, PHH' s alleged interest in our note or mortgage was created with an assignment
from Chase to PHH that was recorded in the Clearwater County land records in June 2010 (R.
928). Material issues surrounding this assignment prove it is fraudulent. Among other issues,
Chase claimed they never owned our note and mortgage to thwart discovery. Chase cannot
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assign what Chase does not have. Then, in contradiction of all previous assertions, Chase
claimed in response to a Qualified Written Request (QWR) on January 10, 2014, that they still
owned our note and mmigage. Either way, Chase ce1iainly does not believe it assigned our note
and mortgage to PHH in June 2010. Therefore, this finding is an error of fact.
In addition, the body of the assignment references Just Law as the substitute trustee. This
is impossible because PHH did not have any alleged authority to assign Just Law as substitute
trustee until after PHH allegedly received the authority to appoint Just Law as substitute trustee
as a result of the assignment. Reasonable inference can conclude Just Law fabricated this
assigmnent in order to perform an illegal non-judicial foreclosure on our mortgage. Shortly after
this assignment Just Law, as substitute trustee, filed a Notice of Default which contained the
same erroneous alleged default that PHH claimed in February 2010 (R. 925, 926).
This non-judicial foreclosure attempt was illegal because, as stated previously, our
property is 50 acres in size and according to I.C. § 45-1502 parcels over 40 acres cannot be
secured by a Deed of Trust. We signed a Mortgage not a Deed of Trust. As a matter of fact and
law, there is no Trustee for a Mo1igage. The entire non-judicial foreclosure process created a
great deal of prejudice in this action because we provided our evidence that we did not default to
Bradon Howell of Just Law in an attempt to halt the non-judicial foreclosure. Just Law then
ignored it and pushed forward with a sale date. Even though Just Law had our contact
information, and had been previously informed how detrimental this entire situation was to our
testimony and livelihood, the non-judicial and the sale were posted in the paper. No attempt to
contact us was made. The non-judicial sale could have gone uncontested if a neighbor had not
informed us of it. This unlawful and unethical behavior should be of grave concern to all Idaho
landowners in light of the finality placed upon a non-judicial foreclosure sale in Idaho.
After we were informed of the sale, we contacted Just Law again to stop the sale. Our
objections fell on deaf ears. It was not until after Mr. Mitchell informed Just Law of their
liability if they proceeded with a non-judicial foreclosure on our m01igaged prope1iy that they
stopped this illegal action. Subsequently, even though they had evidence in hand that irrefutably
proved PHH's alleged default was wrong, PHH and Just Law pushed forward with this frivolous
and fraudulent judicial action. Incidentally, even though PHH and Just Law had our contact
information and our attorney's contact information, the judicial action was also posted in the
paper. This willful abuse of the system and their attorney oaths created extreme prejudice,
demonstrates malice, and caused substantial, severe and significant injury for us. They knew and
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know the truth but have chosen to stand on their lies. They have utilized legal chicanery and
procedural manipulation to place every roadblock in our path they can in order to steal our
property and prevent us from obtaining justice. Justice demands these roadblocks be removed so
a judgment can be rendered based on the truth of this matter.
PHH has now admitted their alleged default was wrong. Therefore, their testimony is
impeached. Witnesses who testify to falsehoods are impeached because one that makes
contradictory statements is not to be heard. Justice must rule with truth.
PHH must be required to reveal the other material facts they are concealing so justice
may be served. We pray this Court dismiss PHH's complaint, require PHH to provide proof of
ownership, and require PHH and Chase to provide the account and communication records they
are bound to keep so the truth of this matter might be found and they might be held accountable
for their actions. We have the right to defend ourselves. To bind the truth in this matter imprisons
justice and renders the ownership of all Idaho land volatile and inconsequential based on the
whims and greedy wishes of big banks doing business in Idaho. Justice demands a remand and
for appropriate relief to be awarded.
Not considering or addressing the extreme prejudice, financial destruction, negative
impact, and seemingly insurmountable justice roadblock created for the Nickersons with Just
Law and PHH' s illegal non-judicial foreclosure attempt of an over 50 acre agricultural property
secured with a mortgage based on fabricated default claims is an assignment of error that must be
corrected.

Assignment of Error 5: Our rights to representation and to defend ourselves were denied
by all summary judgment proceedings.

There are errors regarding issues relating to summary judgment including but not limited
to prevention of performance, attorney negligence, fraud, ownership and transfer of ownership of
our note, alleged default, contradictory account records, notations and striking of evidence. This
Petition For Rehearing is necessary so these errors may be reviewed and corrected.
We thought by appealing summary judgment and all interlocutory orders, the entire
record was in appeal. Having you review everything was our intention and what we believed we
requested and addressed in the limited space of our brief. The en01mity of injustice ~nd errors in
the record and the lack of space to address them should not be allowed to be used to circumvent
justice. We have been denied our rights to a defense and opportunity to present our claims
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because of procedural technicalities regarding page limitations, having the time and resources to
properly present our claims and defenses, and because of having to dig through the muck of
corruption and misrepresentation that plagues the record in this case. We hereby incorporate the
record in its entirety and the truth presented to it in defense of our need for a rehearing.
We specifically incorporate our Reply Brief In Support of Summary Judgment and
Notice of Supplemental Evidence herein in support of why a rehearing is necessary to secure
justice. These documents rightfully belong in the record and are required in order for this case to
be determined based on the merits of the case. The Notice of Supplemental Evidence defeats the
first and second summary judgments. If Chase owns the Note, PHH had no right to bring this
action and the findings of the Court surrounding the first summary judgment are invalid and
caimot stand. Further, this proves our claims of fraud and misconduct of opposing counsels. The
Notice of Supplemental Evidence also establishes a contract existed with Chase which reopens
our counterclaim. It also proves no contract existed with PHH, which dismisses their complaint
and denies their rights to claims. Judge Griffin willfully and intentionally delayed and prevented
this evidence from being in the record. Reasonable inference concludes his objective was not to
consider the truth of the matter in rendering his decision regarding this litigation. Our Reply
Briefin Support of Summary Judgment provides meritorious reasons why summary judgment
could not be awarded in favor of PHH, and why, if summary judgment were awarded, law and
fact required it to be awarded in our favor.
The District Comi erred in refusing to consider these documents. The Notice of
Supplemental Evidence was ignored in error. The significance of its bearing on this case required
the Court to consider and address it. The Reply Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary
Judgment was denied based on timeliness created directly and indirectly by Judge Griffin
himself. This Supreme Comi cannot allow the prejudice of a District Comi Judge to violate our
rights to due process. It is impmiant to note that both of these documents were in Judge Griffin's
chambers prior to his rendering judgment. The option to consider these documents was at his
disposal and discretion. Therefore, this Court has the discretion and responsibility to consider
them in their de nova review, with a fresh look and no prejudice or bias, in order for this
judgment to be based on the true and complete merits of the case presented to the District Court.
We specifically incorporate our Response and Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Strike
herein in support of our Affidavit Of Charles Nickerson In Support Of Summary Judgment.
Throwing out evidence that is before the Court which irrefutably defeats summary judgment in
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favor of PHH and Chase, and proves Fraud on the Court, then rendering summary judgment in
favor of PHH and affirming summary judgment in favor of Chase based on lack of evidence or
testimony is an abuse of discretion and demonstrates error in judgment, to say the least. Finding
the truth of the matter is supposed to be the responsibility of the jury, not the judge. The judge is
to determine if issues of material fact exist. The evidence presented established genuine issues of
material fact that defeat summary judgment in favor of PHH and Chase. Actually, the evidence
presented dismissed all claims of both entities and established fraud, misconduct, and other such
violations. The Court overreached its authority by striking evidence that proved genuine issues
existed. It was an error and abuse of discretion and authority to proceed with summary judgment
by ignoring the truth of the matter. Refusing to consider or respond to our Response and
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Strike is an error that allowed PHH's Motion To Strike to
be deemed well taken and thereby granted. We hereby incorporate the fact vve oppose and
opposed PHH's Motion To Strike and have appealed this decision before this Supreme Court.
The District Court ignored our opposition. By striking our Affidavit of Charles Nickerson In
Support of Summary Judgment and ignoring our Response and Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion
To Strike, Judge Griffin procedurally denied our right to a defense and circumvented our rights
to due process of law.
We hereby incorporate the Memorandum In Support of Motion To Reconsider Judgment,
specifically pages 1325 - 1329, in support of why this Supreme Court should consider and allow
these documents to carry the weight of securing justice as was intended in their preparation and
creation. Chase fatally failed to refute the evidence presented in these documents in their
Appellate Brief. Chase simply relied upon their ability to navigate, or manipulate, the judicial
process to prevent this Court from considering evidence that defeats their claims and defenses
and proves they are guilty of active concealment and thereby Fraud on the Court.
We hereby incorporate our Memorandum In Support of Motion To Reconsider Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion To Strike in support of why Judge Griffm erred in striking our
Affidavit Of Charles Nickerson In Support of Summary Judgment (R. 1358 -1372). The
majority of the argument PHH used to strike this testimony is based on or gets its foundation
from assignments of error by the District Court in previous findings that this evidence refutes.
Legal chicanery in all its glory - The Three Step Approach On How To Win A Wrongful
Lawsuit For Dummies - Step 1: Lie to create a false record. Step 2: When or if the truth is
discovered and presented, claim it is irrelevant and inadmissible based on the erroneous findings
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you conned the Court into making earlier in Step 1. Step 3: Win the case without the truth of the
matter or merits ever being considered. The question becomes, who are the dummies? The
crooks getting away with stealing our land out from under us or those who have remained law
abiding citizens with faith the system and the truth will set us free. The answer remains to be
seen.
In response to this Court's apparent refusal to consider our evidence submitted during the
summary judgment process and in response to the District Comt's mistreating of our evidence
we submit the following authority:
"In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
( 1986), the Supreme Court explained ... that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment
or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505."
"In T W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.
1987), we explained that, "at summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nom11oving party: if direct evidence produced by the moving
pmiy conflicts with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must
assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving paity with respect to that
fact." Id. at 63031 (citations omitted). We specifically rejected the notion that a court
could disregard direct evidence on the ground that no reasonable jury would believe it."
Leslie v. Grupo !CA, 198 F. 3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1999)
We have provided direct testimony both in our verified amended answer and third-party
complaint and in our affidavit in support of summary judgment that Chase and Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. indicated we were current and in good standing when PHH took over the account
and claimed default; that Chase's account records were in error; that PHH's default amount was
incorrect; that PHH refused to validate its default amount; and that PHH refused to accept our
payments (R. 109-112, 1085, 1086). According to the summary judgment standard set fo1th
above in Grupo and Sparks, the District Court was to believe our testimony and was to assume it
\Vas true. PHH has admitted our testimony was true regarding the alleged default because they
have admitted the alleged default was incorrect. PHH has also admitted they refused to accept
our payments. Therefore, since the legal standard requires the comi to believe our testimony and
assume it is true and especially since PHH has admitted it is true, summary judgment in favor of
PHH is in enor and must be reversed.
Additional errors regarding summary judgment are presented below.
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A. This Court has erred in its findings of fact regarding PHH' s standing

specifically regarding whether PHH is the entity entitled to enforce the Nickersons' note. The
Court simply stated, "The Nickersons' asse1iion that PHH has not provided any evidence of a
valid claim of ownership of the debt lacks support in the record." This Court also stated,
"Although the Nickersons did present the affidavit of Mr. Nickerson, the district court struck the
majority of its contents and the Nickersons have not challenged that order on appeal." We
challenged e v e r y t h i n g. We built our case around the evidence we presented during the
summary judgment process. We anticipated this Court to perform a de novo review of this
evidence on appeal. We provided the affidavit to expand the factual record of the case and
ignoring it is an abuse of discretion. The limited amount of space in our brief made it difficult to
individually address the errors the District Court made in its order striking portions of our
affidavit. However, since it is a subsidiary issue to the Summary Judgment, this all inclusive
evidence is presented on appeal.
The District Court struck our claims of fraud because it struck our evidence
supporting those claims. According to the standards for summary judgment, it is not the judge's
role to weigh the evidence.

"In.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986), the Supreme Court explained ... that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment
or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505." Leslie v.
Grupo ICA, 198 F. 3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1999)
"On a motion for summary judgment, the Court does not weigh evidence or determine
truthfulness of allegations; instead, it determines the existence of genuine issues of
material fact ... Direct testimony of the non-movant must be believed ... (citations
omitted)." Sparks v. ALLSTATE J\!JEDICAL EQUJPJvJENT, INC., Case No.
l:14CVOOI66EJLCWD. (D. Idaho, 2015).
The District Court ruled the letter from Fannie Mae (R. 1112) stating they owned
our loan from December 27, 2002, until December 3, 2009, was hearsay and irrelevant but relied
upon this evidence as fact when it stated Coldwell Banker assigned the note to Fannie Mae in
December 2002 demonstrating it was neither hearsay nor irrelevant. The letter from Fannie Mae
is clearly a hearsay exception according to I.R.E. 803(24) and relevant according to I.R.E. 401.

Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
Page 58 of95

70

"Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustw011hiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable effo11s; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence."
I.R.E. 401 "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
Fm1hermore, this letter confirms PHH's claims that Coldwell sold the note to Fannie Mae
(evidence of a material fact) and is relevant to PHH's lack of proof of chain of possession of the
note. This letter is neither hearsay nor irrelevant. This letter confirms (A) evidence of a material
fact - Coldwell sold the loan to Fmmie Mae, (B) it is more probative on the point than any other
evidence we could procure because Fam1ie Mae is not a party to this litigation so the only way
for us to gather the evidence was to send a request to Fannie Mae to which Fmmie Mae sent this
letter in response, and (C) justice will clearly best be served by allowing this letter into evidence.
This letter is direct evidence that confirms realities regarding PHH's illegitimate claim to our
note and the conspiracy from the beginning. This letter is direct evidence that has not been
refuted by any evidence submitted by PHH. Note: PHH claims Coldwell sold the note to Fannie
Mae, and then claims Coldwell assigned it to Chase in 2007.
This letter is evidence of fraud and the intent to defraud on the part of Coldwell
from the beginning by Coldwell knowingly and illegally selling, without our knowledge or
consent, our over 50 acre agricultural prope11y ineligible for purchase, due to federal rules by
Fannie Mae, to Fannie Mae.
Note this letter says Fmmie Mae and not Freddie Mac as Chase persists in saying.
Forensic analysis of our Note can shed light on why Chase persists in saying Freddie Mac in lieu
of Fannie Mae. Proving duplicated and multiple entities have exchanged ownership with Chase's
knowledge demonstrates motive for Chase to foreclose /cause foreclosure in order to fix the
violations. It also provides motive as to why Chase and PHH refused to allow us or third pm1ies
who approached them on our behalf to pay off the loan with other available resources in order to
end this nightmare. It also conoborates fraud is why Chase and PHH blocked the sale of the
property. As the preliminary title search demonstrated, they had no way to satisfy or release the
loan for our secured buyer. Allowing us to sell the property to end their assault on our financial
portfolio exposed them to too much liability, civil and criminal. We have offered expe1i witness
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testimony of forensic analysts who can provide testimony regarding the true happenings and
occunences surrounding any alleged Note on this property. Genuine issues exist that not only
defeat Summary Judgment, but implicate these entities in criminal wrongdoing.
The District Comi struck the Notice of New Creditor letter from Chase dated
December 22, 2009 (R. 1139, 1140). The District Court ruled this letter was irrelevant. (R. 1244)
However, this letter is evidence to the material fact Chase obtained the Nickersons note on
December 3, 2009, which contradicts the fact accepted by the Court that Chase acquired the note
in November 2007, impeaches the statements made by Chase that they never owned our note and
that PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac. Therefore, this ruling is in error. This
evidence is relevant and must be considered in the determination of this case. Chase refused to
provide answers and production based on their claims they were only the servicer. (R. 747-751)
For some unknown and undisclosed legal reason, the Judge determined their being the Servicer
waived their requirement to produce discovery. This contradicts federal m01igage lending and
collection laws, guidelines and requirements regarding obligations of Servicers. If the District
Court had required Chase to provide account records, notations, information from the research
department, taped conversations and witness testimony from the employees who worked with us,
this case would have been dismissed long ago and relief would have been granted to our family.
Third paiiy witnesses have been presented to corroborate the conversations took place and attest
to the contents of the conversations.
The District Court struck the testimony of Charles Nickerson in his affidavit (R.
1086-1088) where he states, "Conspicuously absent from the record is a Notice of New Creditor
letter from PHH. We never received a notice from PHH stating that they own the loan which
confirms the evidence that PHH does not own the loan." The District Court stated this argument
is irrelevant. This is an error of fact and finding. It is not inelevant for PHH to have to prove they
are the real party in interest regarding their complaint. This is particularly true when all of the
evidence demonstrates PHH does not own the note!
Ownership is an essential element that must be proven in a foreclosure case. The
District Court erred in weighing the evidence of whether or not PHH had beneficial interest or
right to foreclose in the presence of genuine issues and a lack of evidence in the record to supp01i
their claims at the first summary judgment hearing. This error in judgment established the
foundation for all future findings and rulings. If reversed, PHH's claims have no merit and must
be dismissed. PHH has fatally failed to establish ovmership. Therefore, there is no foundational

Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
Page 60 of95

72

basis for PHH to prevail in Summary Judgment. Further, by reversing this error, our claims
against Chase can be reopened and they must answer for Fraud on the Court. This evidence and
testimony cannot be ignored. Federal law requires PHH to provide this notice of new creditor.
Chase affirmed this requirement in the notice they provided to the Nickersons.
"We are sending you this
in accordance with the requirements of the "Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009." Your mortgage loan (referenced above) has
been sold or transferred to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"). Chase is the New
Creditor of your loan.
Any investor or creditor that purchases your loan is required under federal law to give
you written notice." R. 1139, 1140
PHH has never complied with their obligation to notify us of becoming our New
Creditor. Charles Nickersons' testimony that PHH did not send this Notice, the fact that federal
law required PHH to send this Notice and the fact that it is absent from the record provides
reasonable inference that the reason PHH did not send this Notice is because PHH does not own
our loan. This material fact coupled with the Q WR response from PHH in which PHH does not
claim ownership and QWR response from Chase dated January 10, 2014, in which Chase states
they have our note in their possession and that they are the investor on the loan provides more
than reasonable inference of the undisputed fact that PHH does not own our note.
Additional rebuttal to the District Court's striking of our evidence can be found in
our Memorandum In Support Of Our Motion To Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion
To Strike which is in the record, R. 1358-1372. We specifically incorporate this document herein
in support of our Petition For Rehearing.
Contrary to this Court's Opinion, we did submit an additional affidavit in
response to PHI-I's motion for summary judgment. On March 7, 2014, we submitted our Notice
of Supplemental Evidence (R. 1227-1232) which introduced a letter dated January 10, 2014,
from Chase in which Chase states they possess our note and that they are the investor on our
loan. This evidence was not refuted by PHH and the District Comt simply ignored it because it
was presented, because of the Comt's direct actions and inactions, after the summary judgment
hearing. On appeal we assigned an e1rnr to this action, Appellant's Brief, p. 30, but this Court did
not address this error in its opinion. We contend this supplemental evidence is a part of the
summary judgment process and must not simply be ignored. PHH had the chance to produce
evidence or affidavit denying this evidence, but chose not to. Therefore, it is judicially admitted
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and according to Leslie and Sparks, this Court must retract its opinion and reverse the order
granting summary judgment to PHH. Any reasonable mind can only conclude that PHH does not
own or possess our note and mortgage, or at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding PHH' s possession and ownership of our note that must be addressed.
Further, on March 26, 2014, prior to judgment being issued, we submitted an
Objection to Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite (R. 1237-1238). Mr. Casperite's affidavit
did not contain the notaiy' s signature which invalidates the affidavit in its entirety and leaves
PHH with no facts or evidence to base its second motion for summary judgment upon. The
District Court ignored this objection not addressing the fact Mr. Casperite's affidavit contains
notaiy fraud even when we presented evidence from James Zombeck, Notary Unit Supervisor for
the State of New Jersey Department of Treasury, which states, "Upon review of the SECOND
AFFIDAVII OF RONALD E. CASPERITE that you provided, it is apparent that the
notarization is invalid. It lacks the signature of the Notary Public." (SAR 63) This Supreme
Court has ignored the illegality of this affidavit as well because it ignored the assignments of
error presented in our Appellant's Brief, p. 30 and p. 32, regarding the District Court's refusal to
acknowledge and consider the evidence presented to it after the hearing, but prior to judgment
being rendered. This evidence impeached PHH's claim to own our note and invalidated PHH's
affidavit in support of their motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this Court has erred by not
addressing the assignments of error we presented on pp. 30 and 32 of our brief and must
reconsider its Opinion.

Our right to provide a defense and assert our claims can only be preserved with a de novo
review of summary judgment and all issues and errors surrounding it.

Apparently, based on the contents of Justice Horton's Opinion, this Court has not
performed a de nova review of summary judgment. Black's Law Dictionary 4th edition defines
de nova as "anew; afresh; a second time". Therefore, in order to perform a de nova review of

summaiy judgment, everything included, especially the evidence, in the summaiy judgment
process must be looked at anew, afresh, a second time. Justice must see what was presented, not
just what Judge Griffin allowed to be entered. Judge Griffin's bias and prejudice against us and
this case sabotaged the record and condition of the record. Truth and fact were in1prisoned
behind a cloak of injustice (R. 1179-1206).
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Black's Law Dictionary 10 111 edition defines appeal de nova as "an appeal in which the
appellate court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without deference
to the trial court's rulings." Accordingly, the facts surrounding PHH's lack of standing and their
false claim of default must be examined in light of all the evidence in the record at the time
judgment was rendered. It also must consider the request to expand the evidence that was before
the Court prior to judgment When viewed in this light, there can be no doubt the Court has erred
regarding PHI-I's standing to enforce our note.
This Court has stated the following facts regarding the transfers of ownership
regarding our Note.
Coldwell Banker Mortgage was the initial holder of the note in October
2002.
We challenge whether or not a legal note was presented or signed and whether Coldwell
Banker M01igage has ever lawfully held a note on our property. R. 1444-1448, 1539-1543.
Categorically, the terms, authenticity and transferability to PHH is in question.

Coldwell assigned the note to Fam1ie Mae in December 2002.

a) This fact is disputed by Chase.
b) PHH has stated they "believe" the note was transferred to Fannie Mae.
"PHH believes that note was transfened to the Federal Home Mortgage
Association, (Fannie Mae), which in turn, had JP Morgan Chase service
the note ... Fannie Mae assigned the note back to PHH as the originating
lender." (R. 882, first answer). PHH is not the originating lender and there
is no evidence in the record to support any claims of a transfer of
ownership from Fannie Mae to PHH.
c) Chase stated the note was immediately sold to Freddie Mac (R. 536 ,i3).
Unless Chase is admitting our note was sold twice to save this Court and
us time and money proving it, this admission does not agree with the
findings of the District Comi or this Supreme Court, which creates a
genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved. Not only does the
law not permit the same thing to be paid twice, but this is also an
admission of Fraud of the Comi regarding the true chain of title by Chase,
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PHH or both. With this admission in the record, it is an assignment of
elTor for the Distiict Court to weigh the evidence regarding chain of title
to determine their own findings. This violates the standards of Summary
Judgment and is in enor.
d) The District Court used the only evidence of this fact in the record, which
happened to be provided by the Nickersons, a letter from Fannie Mae
which stated Fannie Mae obtained the note in December 2002 (R. 1112).
We presented this evidence to prove a genuine issue of material fact
existed that precludes summary judgment in favor of PHH. The District
Cornt used this evidence even though he had ruled it to be hearsay. (R.
1243).
e) No record of this assignment is recorded in the county records.

Statement:

J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the note in November 2007.

Contradictions:
a) This fact is disputed by the evidence, Chase, PHH and Fannie Mae.
b) PHH contends Chase never acquired the note but that the note was
assigned back to PHH by Fannie Mae via the allonges on the note (R. 882,
first answer) However, there are no allonges on the note provided with the
complaint (R. 40-45). This contention appears to be a fabrication of fact
by opposing counsels as Chase and Fannie Mae have both disagreed with
this.
c) Chase, by their attorney of record, maintains that it never owned the note
and that it was only a servicer (R. 747-751, 759-760). This assertion by
Chase is contrary to 1) the New Creditor letter provided by Chase R.
1139-1140, 2) Fmmie Mae R. 1112, and 3) Chase's QWR response R.
1232.
d) Chase, in paragraph 6 of their answer to our Third Pmty Complaint
allegation that Coldwell assigned the Note and M01tgage to Chase on or
about November 20, 2007, states, "JPMorgan admits that the Nickersons'
Note and Mortgage were assigned by Coldwell, but lacks sufficient
information to form a belief as to the pa1ties and dates of assignment(s)
m1d therefore denies the remaining allegations of Paragraph 7 of the
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Complaint." In its answer, Chase denied receiving the note via this alleged
assignment (R. 128).
e) Coldwell Banker Mortgage claims it assigned the note to Chase and
recorded that false assignment in the county records even though the
evidence, PHH and Fannie Mae claim Fannie Mae had the note and did
not assign it to Chase at that time.
J.P. Morgan Chase assigned the note to PHH in June 2010.

a) This fact is disputed by the evidence, Chase and PHH.
b) As stated above, PHH claims the note was assigned back to them by
Fannie Mae. R. 882.
c) Chase claims PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac. R. 537 4!9.
Respondent Chase's Brief, p. 3. "In February 2010, PHH repurchased the
Note from Freddie Mac ... "
d) Chase claims they were only a servicer of the note. R.747-751, 759-760.
e) Chase claims to still own and hold the note. R. 1232.
As this Court can see from the record, the facts regarding the transfer of the note
are disputed by the evidence, Chase, PHH, and us. Further, it is impmiant to note that Chase and
PHH do not agree with each other, the comi or the evidence and that Chase and PHH do not have
a problem presenting false information and testimony to the Court nor do they have a problem
with recording false information and omitting filing information in the county records. Chase's
and PHH's pattern of deception (shenanigans as Justice H01ion labels it) staiied at the conception
of this case and has continued throughout the appeal process. It is extremely eye opening to
realize Chase claims they never owned the note. In Chase's answers to our interrogatories and
requests for production Chase denied they ever owned our note and claimed to be a servicer only
8 times.
1) " ... JPMorgan further objects to this interrogatory as it mischaracterizes
the facts, contending that JPMorgan purchased the Nickersons' note,
whereas, JPMorgan was servicer of the note and not a purchaser." PAGE
2,ANSWERN0.1
2) " ... JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory because it mischaracterizes the
facts, contending that JPIVIorgan purchased the Nickersons' note, whereas,
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JPMorgan was servicer of the note and not a purchaser." PAGE 3,
ANSWER NO. 2
3) " ... JPMorgan, as a servicer of the loan, did not "sell" the Nickersons'
note." PAGE 3, ANSWER NO. 3
4) " ... JPMorgan did not purchase, own or sell the Nickersons' note and
merely acted as a servicer of the loan." PAGE 3, ANSWER NO. 4
5) " ... JPMorgan further objects to this inteITogatory as it mischaracterizes
the facts, contending that JPMorgan was the owner of the note, in a
position to detem1ine to foreclose or not to foreclose, when in fact,
JPMorgan was a servicer of the note." PAGE 4, ANSWER NO. 7
6) " ... Asa servicer for the Nickersons' loan, JPMorgan is not aware of the
information exchanged in the transfer/sale of the note between buyer and
seller." PAGE 5, ANSWER NO. 9
7) " ... when in fact, JPMorgan was merely a servicer of the note." PAGES 56 ANSWER NO. 10
8)

" ... JPMorgan did not purchase the Note, but was merely a servicer of the
Note." PAGE 14, RESPONSE NO. 11

Thus, Chase claims they never assigned the note to PHH thereby stating the
assignments recorded in the country records are fraudulent and cannot be relied upon by PHH,
this Court or the world at large (R. 747-751, 759, 760).
This Supreme Court must now do a legitimate de novo review and consider the
evidence we presented during surnmary judgment and supplemented weeks prior to the order on
summary judgment. We provided a letter from Fannie Mae in which Fannie Mae states they
purchased our loan on December 27, 2002, and terminated their interest in the loan on December
3, 2009 (R. 1112). The District Court determined part of this evidence was an undisputed fact
when it stated Coldwell Banker Mortgage assigned the note to Fannie Mae in December 2002.
Since the evidence demonstrates Fannie Mae owned the note until December 3, 2009, the
assignment of the note recorded by Coldwell in 2007 is in1peached and is a false record of
assignment and is fraudulent evidence that cannot be relied upon. In addition, Chase sent a
federally mandated Notice of New Creditor letter to the Nickersons in which Chase claims they
purchased the note on December 3, 2009, the exact same day Fannie Mae terminated their
interest (R. 1139-1140). This is solid, concrete irrefutable evidence that Chase has averted
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discovery and lied to the Court by claiming it never owned our note and that PHH has lied to the
Court by claiming it received the note directly from Fannie Mae.
There are two banking and m01igage entities that apparently do not have a
problem with lying and presenting false evidence. Please, Supreme Court, open your eyes and
see the truth. Stop PHH, Chase and their accomplices from victimizing innocent families like
ours and doing whatever they want with no regard for the laws in place. On January 10, 2014,
Chase replied to our qualified written request stating "We are not required to produce the
original note which will remain in our possession ... The investor for this loan is JP Morgan
Chase Bank, National Association. "(R. 1232). This letter removes all doubt that Chase and PHH
have lied to this Court and have misrepresented the facts and unequivocally renders PHH's
complaint moot because PHH, by law, cannot enforce what it does not hold and own. See
Appellant's Brief p. 27. The record and evidence before the District Court and now this Court
clearly demonstrates PHH and Chase have lied to the Courts. This Court must also realize that
neither PHH nor Chase have presented any affidavits or argument to refute these facts and that
these facts were present in the record prior to summary judgment. At this point, since PHH's
evidence, affidavits and claims have been impeached and PHH has fatally failed to show they
hold or own our note or have any beneficial interest in our property whatsoever, by law, PHH's
complaint must be dismissed and summary judgment in our favor must be granted.
"Because Movants failed to establish possession and an ownership interest in the
notes, they are not shown to be the real party in interest, and they lack standing to
bring the motions." In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 398 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009).
"plaintiff presented no evidence of having possessed the underlying note prior to
filing the complaint. If plaintiff did not have the note when it filed the original
complaint, it lacked standing to do so, and it could not obtain standing by filing an
amended complaint." Deutsche Bank Nat. v. J\llitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 27
A.3d 1229 (2011 ).
"U.S. Bank was required to show that at the time the complaint was filed it
possessed the original note either made payable to bearer with a blank
endorsement or made payable to order with an endorsement specifically to U.S.
Bank. See Bank ofN. Y v. Ra(iogianis. 418 NJ.Super 323. 13 A.3d 435, 439-40
(20 I 0) (reciting requirements for bank to demonstrate that it was holder of the
note at time complaint was filed)." US Bank Natl. Ass 'n v. Kimball, 2011 VT 81,
27 A.3d 1087 (2011 ).
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"Appellee must demonstrate it is a person entitled to enforce the note. It must
provide evidence it has possession of the note either by being a holder or a
nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder. .. Evidence establishing
when Appellee became a person entitled to enforce the note must show Appellee
was a person entitled to enforce the note prior to filing its cause of action for
foreclosure." Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, 270 P.3d 151
(2012).
"The real pmty in interest in foreclosure actions is the current holder of the note
and m01igage .. .if the note is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires
transfer of possession of the instrument and endorsement by the holder." Bank of
Am., NA v. kiiller, 194 Ohio App. 3d307 (2011).
The evidence shows PHH does not hold or own our note. Therefore, PHH is not
the real party in interest and their complaint must be dismissed.
B. The default amount claimed in the notice of default does not match the default
PHH now claims and this Court claims as correct. It is axiomatic that in order for a creditor to
demand payment and file a complaint, the creditor must be able to prove the amount claimed is
100% accurate. PHH has only proven their demand amount was inaccurate and their complaint
based upon that an1ount is illegitimate. Thus, since PHH and this Court have determined the
default amount originally claimed was and is not accurate; PHH's case must be dismissed
because the new alleged default irreversibly alters the circumstances and facts PHH' s complaint
is based upon. PHH' s original notice of default and subsequent complaint claims we had not
made any payments since January 2009 and that we were 14 payments ($32,605.66) in arrears.
However, PHH and this Court have now stated we were only 9 payments ($20,960.91) in arrears
for a difference of 5 payments or $11,644.75 and have acknowledged we made our January 2010
payment. In addition, both PHH and this Court acknowledge that since February 2010 PHH
refused to accept any payments from us thereby preventing our performance (R. 561) and even
though we disputed the alleged default amount at that time and proved to PHH that we had just
made a payment to Chase in January 2010, PHH still refused to research the disputed default and
prevented performance. We have stated and testimony from Chase employees, records and taped
conversations validate we were not in default. Further, we tried to make our regulm· monthly
payments to PHH and Chase. During this time, we pied with PHH to research the disputed
default. However, PHH refused to research the disputed default stating we had to contact Chase
directly and work it out with them. PHH prevented any performance by refusing to accept our
payments, failing to provide proper and accurate notification, and pushing foreclosure based on
an inaccurate and non-existent default amount.
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Since, according to PHH and this Court, the default is not the same as what is
contained in the notice of default, blackmail demand, or complaint, PHH is admitting and this
Comt has affirmed that PHH has not acted in good faith because PHH refused to and did not
validate the disputed default amount. Rather, PHH tried to non-judicially foreclose, and when
stopped, pushed an illegitimate foreclosure knowing we were pleading with them to work out
this situation caused by the inaccurate records (this Court has affirmed Chase's and PHH's
records were inaccurate) of Chase and PHH. Further, PHH has admitted and this Court has
affirmed PHH has breached the contract by not providing an accurate notice of default. Even
further, PHH admits and this Comt acknowledges that PHH prevented our perfonnance by
refusing to research the disputed default, refrtsing to accept performance and refusing to
acknowledge our testimony and that of Chase employees that refute the existence of any default.
In addition, since this Court has affirmed PHH' s position, this Court is stating
Chase has lied to the Court. As stated previously, Chase claimed we missed 11 payments but this
Court has ruled we only missed 9 payments. Also, this Comt is stating Chase's account record is
inaccurate because the account record submitted by Chase reflects a different account balance
than what PHH has claimed. This Court, in reality, has affirmed what we have claimed since the
beginning, "Coldwell, Chase, and PHH have failed to act in good faith in this matter and refused
to cooperate with and work with the Nickersons in resolving a matter that was caused by the
accounting errors and notice errors by Coldwell, Chase, and PHH." (Answer and Counterclaim,
R. 112). Therefore, this Court should be reversing all summary judgment decisions of the lower
court because it has affirmed what the Nickersons have claimed since the day Chase told them
they could not access their records.
Reasonable inference would suggest Chase realized they had messed up the Nickersons'
account and created extreme exposure for their abusive debt collection practices when the
Nickersons requested a payoff figure in January 2010.

of
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There are extenuating circumstances that prevent timeliness alone from being the
determiner of justice. Issues of life require procedures implemented to create order and prevent
prejudice from circumventing the purpose for which they were created. There are errors
regarding the Court dismissing the Nickersons' motions for reconsideration based on timeliness
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alone without reviewing the evidence and whether this dismissal follows the intent of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and the standards for a de novo review. No prejudice against PHH
existed. We committed the alleged timeliness error based on the rules of civil procedure and
instructions received directly by the Court and other legal professionals, but the Comi still chose
to strictly enforced this alleged deadline. This demonstrated extreme prejudice toward us when
opposing counsels have been granted extreme leniency and latitude throughout the litigation that
has resulted in adverse and prejudicial rulings against us. A rehearing will allow us to address
specific instances.
In regards to our motions for reconsideration, this Supreme Court simply ruled the
motions were not timely based on the rulings of the District Comi, and thus, ignored the basic
tenants of the rules and our appellate argument. According to I.R.C.P. l(a) "These rules shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."
"In addressing the effect of noncompliance with procedural statutes and rules, the Court
in Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 177, 12L 247 P.2d 469,471 (1952), said:

The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote the
administration of justice. Those statutes and rules which fix the time within which
procedural rights are to be asse1ied are intended to expedite the disposition of causes to
the end that justice will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But, except
as to those which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations should not be so
applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of causes upon their
substantial merits without delay or prejudice."
"A 'determination' of an action within the meaning of Rule 1 is meant to be a
determination of the controversy on the merits - not a termination on a procedural
technicality which serves litigants not at all. A determination entails a finding of the facts
and an application of the law in order to resolve the legal rights of litigants who hope to
resolve their differences in the courts. The 'liberal construction' of the rules required by
Rule 1, while it cannot alter compliance which is mandatory or jurisdictional, will
ordinarily preclude dismissal of an appeal for that which is but technical noncompliance.
This will be especially so where no prejudice is shown by any delay which may have
been occasioned ... Sound judicial discretion properly exercised will reflect the judicial
policy of this State developed over many years by case law, and lying within the spirit of
liberality mandated by Rule l." Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 587 P.2d 1245 (1978).
Neither the District Court nor this Comi has claimed the time limits imposed by Rule
1 l(a)(2)(B) are mandatory or jurisdictional nor did they claim the alleged delay would prejudice
PHH and Chase. This Couii implies we have asked for special treatment because we are pro se.
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We have not asked nor are we asking for special treatment. We submit nor have been given it.
We are simply asking the Court to do what it is mandated to do by the rules and case law
presented. We are only asking for fair treatment.
This strict adherence to this deadline in the presence of material issues that present
weighty evidence that affects the outcome of this case is not in balance with the leniency and
favor the District Court has granted to PHH:
First, the District Court waived PHH's responsibility to demonstrate Chase had beneficial
interest in the loan and had interest they could assign to PHH via assigmnent. No transfer of
beneficial interest to Chase was in the record at the first summary judgment. Judge Griffin
questioned this fatal flaw in the chain of title, but erred in not recognizing it as a genuine issue
that prevented summary judgment. This error in judgment defeats standing for PHH to bring this
complaint, reopens our rights of claim against Chase, and grotesquely violates our rights to due
process and the standards of judicial foreclosure. Chase has actively concealed beneficial interest
in our prope1ty during this litigation. Chase has denied ever receiving ownership. To impeach
PHH's claim of ownership, we acquired and provided a QWR completed by Chase that claimed
Chase owns and holds the Note. This should have dismissed PHH's complaint, defeated both
summary judgments, and caused Chase and PHH to be held accountable for fraud. We
corroborated this evidence with a letter from Fannie Mae. Even though none of this evidence has
been refuted by Chase or PHH, the District Court erroneously ignored this evidence, relied on an
assigmnent it knew is not supported by fact and law, and granted summary judgment to both
PHH and Chase.
Secondly, the District Court allowed PHH to submit an affidavit that contains notary
fraud from an affiant who could not have had personal knowledge nor the competency required
to testify the Nickersons missed payments to Chase. The District Court then used the
contradictory evidence presented in that affidavit to rule against us. This affidavit has been
proven inaccurate and inadmissible, but has been allowed to stand and be relied upon for
summary judgment. Whereas, our affidavit that irrefutably defeats summary judgment was
struck because Judge Griffin refused to allow it in the record in order to create a record that
supp01ted summary judgment in favor of PHH.
Thirdly, the District Court simply ignored the supplemental evidence and affidavit we
submitted which presented genuine issue of material fact regarding whether PHH could be the
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real party in interest in a foreclosure action against us. This error resulted in summary judgment
against us.
Fomihly, the District Court granted PHH's motion to amend judgment when it was
presented 41 days after judgment when the rules specifically state amended judgments have to be
presented within 14 days of judgment. Ignoring this deadline, then enforcing a deadline only
missed because of confusion regarding service by mail, especially when the confusion was
created by instructions received from the Comi and only amounted to 3 days, demonstrates
extreme prejudice.
Lastly, the District Court allowed opposing counsel to enter depositions 9 days after the
alleged taking of them that violated all rules regarding the taking, preparation and filing of
depositions I.R.C.P. 30(e), 30(f)(l)(A), 30(f)(3), 30(f)(4)(B), but refused to consider the
Nickersons Motion To Suppress and Strike Depositions without providing a reason for the
denial. As stated previously, the depositions are inaccurate, incomplete, and completely alter and
misrepresent answers provided. Opposing counsel has been erroneously allowed to repeatedly
rely on these depositions to correct fatal flaws and establish a prima facie case that is nonexistent in truth and reality. This is an error of judgment that must be reversed.
The depositions and the issues allegedly being relied upon by them are in dispute and on
appeal, for appeal, both summary judgments and all rulings or orders that relied upon them
directly or indirectly. The depositions are inadmissible and invalidated. Opposing cotmsel
relying upon them is illegal. Opposing has made claims based on these depositions that we
comprehensively refute. At a bare minimum, we did not verify signatures on the Deed of Trust;
did not admit we agreed to the Terms of the Note presented or understood the contents thereof;
did not admit we have no documentation to prove payments have been timely made; have
provided phone numbers of calls initiated by us and by Chase even though the account record
notations reflect those numbers (included names and times where applicable); did not admit we
have no evidence to prove Chase damaged our credit or extensive proof of the damage to our
credit history from 2008 to 2012; did not refuse to bring information - all documentation to be
referenced at the depositions was agreed to be provided by Chase; did present evidence of breech
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing and other federal guidelines to our attorney for this
Court and other entities; did provide exhaustive details regarding Chase's abusive debt collection
practices; did not admit to the existence of any default whatsoever or that we missed any
payments; did not acknowledge or admit proper notification was ever received; did not agree we
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signed the alleged Note; did not admit we do not have evidence to present our claims; and did
not admit we have no evidence other than personal testimony. Certainly the volumes we have
written dispel these wacko assertions. Questions not answered that were asked were explained
and our refusal to answer was directed and suppmied by our attorney. These depositions took
place under false pretenses and with false assurances. We did not provide right for any testimony
provided the day of the depositions to be edited or presented in part. We required a tape of the
proceedings be made because we did not trust opposing counsel and did not want what has
happened to happen. We wanted an audio recording that could be referenced if they tried to twist
testimony provided. Therefore, no testimony claimed is valid, lawful or admissible. As a matter
of record, we are very comfo1iable the answers provided at the alleged depositions in no way
implicate us of fault or wrongdoing. Both of us told the truth and there is no effor against us to
be found in the truth of this matter. Our request to strike depositions is not a case of Chase or
PHH tricked us and we made some crazy, accidental "admission" to guilt that is being used to
prosecute us or something like that. We said nothing wrong because we have done nothing
wrong. When taken in context, every answer provided suppmis our claims and defeats theirs.
The issue is the depositions presented are not admissible and are illegal. Even if they did not
violate the rules and procedures created to preserve their truthfulness and veracity, the answers
presented do not reflect the answers given. This is an error in judgment. Allowing opposing
counsel to correct fatal fla\VS ,vith misrepresented and inadmissible evidence has caused
summary judgment and other adverse rulings to be granted against us. This denies us due process
of law and our rights to a defense.
Not only are the depositions being used to correct fatal flaws in this appellate process, but
they were relied on to prevail in the first summary judgment. The first summary judgment was
then relied upon for all subsequent adverse rulings and to establish precedent for the second
summary judgment. The depositions and the issues allegedly being relied upon by them are in
dispute and being appealed for both summary judgments and all interlocutory orders. The
depositions were unlawfully taken, prepared and entered in the record. It is a vicious assigm11ent
of error and a draconian injustice to allow the depositions to remain in the record or for PHH and
Chase to be allowed to rely upon depositions that our attorney and we have testified were taken
improperly to render judgment.
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Further, allowing Chase to violate I.R.C.P. 30(f)(4)(B) and submit the entire unverified
deposition transcript creates undue prejudice and violates our rights. We request a rehearing so
these enors may be conected.
Clearly, the District Comi treated all our motions with prejudice. We simply
misunderstood the deadline based on directives provided by comt officials and filed our motions
accordingly 3 days after the judgment because we were served the judgment by mail and Rule 6
provides for 3 extra days when served by mail. We faxed our motions to the District Court and
they were received by the District Court's fax server prior to 5pm on April 21, 2014, but the
court clerk admitted she did not stamp and file the fax until the following morning April 22,
2014. Neither this Court nor the District Court has determined the alleged delay in any way
prejudiced PHH or Chase and both Comis have ignored the merits of the reconsiderations and
the rulings in Bunn. This Court, according to the case law it cited, is required to perform a de
nova review of our motions for reconsideration and according to the Bunn case we cited,

timeliness alone is not to be used as the determining factor. Therefore, since this Court did not
consider Bunn and evaluate the merits of our motions to reconsider, this Court has ened and
must now evaluate our motions to reconsider based upon the merits of those motions.

Assignment of Errors 7: Our rights to a defense were denied by not allowing us to amend
our pleadings.

There are errors regarding determining the appellate review of the denial of the
Nickersons' motion to amend was ,vaived.
This Cami stated, "The Nickersons argue that the district court abused its discretion when
it denied their motion. However, the Nickersons fail to provide a citation to the record showing
the district court's decision on the issue, much less address the basis for that decision." We
cannot provide a citation to the record regarding the District Court's decision or address the basis
for the decision when the District Court failed to provide a supporting order or memorandum
stating its decision. The entire comi record is present on appeal and there is no supporting order
or memorandum from the District Court detailing the reasons why the District Court denied the
Nickersons motion to amend.
"As Foman and Smith declare, a district courts refusal to grant leave to amend without
any justifying reason is, per se, an abuse of discretion." Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,
715 P.2d 993 (1986)."
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According to Clark, if the District Court denies a motion to amend without providing a
justifying reason, it is an abuse of discretion. Therefore, according to Idaho law, the outright
denial of the District Comito provide any justifying reason is automatically an abuse of
discretion and we must be allowed to amend our pleadings.
In addition, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permit amendments to the pleadings.
According to I.R.C.P. l 3(f) "Omitted Counterclaims. When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, the
pleader may by leave of comi set up the counterclaim by amendment." Throughout this brief we
have detailed the negligence of our former counsel and it is due to his actions that our cmTent
counterclaims were not set up earlier in the process. We have also detailed some of the fraud
PHH and Chase have committed throughout this case.
Fmiher, I.R.C.P. 15(b) states, "If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby
and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice the pmiy in maintaining the party's action or defense upon the merits. The comi may
grant a continuance to enable the objecting pmiy to meet such evidence." PHH objected to our
claims of fraud during summary judgment because they had not been pled. Therefore, according
to Rule 15(b) we should have been permitted to amend our pleadings to include fraud. Our
amended answer and counterclaims contain 70 pages of pleading fraud with specificity. Many of
these 70 pages detail occurrences of events that have happened since the filing of our answers
and counterclaims and according to Rule 15(d) we should have been allowed to supplement our
pleadings.
15(d). Supplemental Pleadings. "Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth
transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought
to be supplemented, whether or not the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim
for relief. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse pariy plead thereto, it shall so order,
specifying the time therefor."
Therefore, because the District Court abused its discretion, because of excusable neglect,
because the rules allow it, and because justice demands it, we should have been allowed to
amend our pleadings.
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Assignment of Error 8: Our rights to a defense were denied by abuse of discretion.
There are enors regarding finding the District Court did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting the Nickersons' rule 60(b) motions. The District Court did not address all of the new
evidence presented by the Nickersons, did not address all of the misconduct presented by the
Nickersons, made errors of fact, and did not address all the facts regarding fraud and fraud on the
Comi.
We did not try to bypass the appeal by filing our 60(b) motions. We desperately wanted
out of the Clearwater County District Court and in front of this Supreme Court. We followed the
rules regarding deadlines in filing our 60(b) motions in order to preserve the rights they granted
and the opportunity to demonstrate errors of fact and law they presented.
As evidenced by our assertions in the body of our Rule 60(b) motions, our request for
relief at the end or om motion, and our certificate of service including all parties, it is evident we
intended the District Comito grant relief from all of its summary judgments.
"Wherefore, because of the mistakes, surprises, excusable neglect, the new
evidence presented, the fraud and misconduct of PHH, Chase and the counsels of record,
and fraud on the comi, the Nickersons request the court to set aside the judgments on
file and grant judgment in favor of the Nickersons." (emphasis added)

In addition, it is evident the District Court understood our intentions as well because in its
order setting the schedule for responsive briefing he included all pmiies (SAR. 94-96).
Therefore, among other enors regarding our 60(b) motions this Court has erred in limiting its
review of our 60(b) motions to the context of PHH's second motion for summary judgment only.

A Regarding our Rule 60(b)(l) motion based upon mistake, this Court claims all of the
mistakes we identified were mistakes of law and only mistakes of fact qualify for relief from
judgment. However, we identified several mistakes of fact made by the District Comi. Point #4
lmder the heading of mistake references our affidavit which details the mistakes of fact made by
the Distiict Court (SAR. 23, 48-53). The District Court ened in fact by stating Chase acquired
the note in November 2007 because he had just stated Coldwell assigned the note to Fannie Mae
in 2002. The evidence the District Comi relied upon to state Chase acquired the note in 2007 is
an assignment from Coldwell to Chase. However, he just stated Coldwell assigned it to Fannie
Mae in 2002 and therefore, Coldwell could not assign the note to Chase in 2007. The District
Court made a factual enor regarding a genuine issue of material fact. Further, the Coldwell
assignment to Faiillie Mae is only evidenced by a letter in which Fannie Mae claims to have the
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note until December 3, 2009. The errors regarding the chain of title mistakes of fact are
thoroughly detailed in our discussion regarding the errors granting summary judgment, point #5
above. Since these mistakes of fact were not addressed by the District Court and in fact the
District Court erroneously determined relief could not be granted due a mistake of the court, the
District Court abused its discretion and the 60(b) motion regarding mistake must be granted.
B. Regarding our Rule 60(b)(l) motions based upon surprise and excusable neglect, this
Court has ened in determining our 60(b) motions for relief only applied to the final judgment.
See our introduction to this argument above. All parties, including the District Court, understood
all summaty judgment decisions were being addressed and questioned. In light of this fact, it is
apparent this Court agrees we were unjustly prejudiced by Mr. Mitchell's actions. Fmiher, in our
argument under point #9 we demons1rate Mr. Mitchell's actions continued to prejudice our
efforts to defend ourselves. Mr. Mitchell left discovery incomplete and non-existent and we were
never given the opportunity to recover from his negligent misconduct. Therefore, the District
Court abused its discretion and the 60(b) motion regarding surprise and excusable neglect must
be granted.
C. Regarding our Rule 60(b)(2) motion based upon "new evidence". As we stated, some
of the evidence we presented as new was evidence the District Court had in its chambers but
chose to ignore because it was presented after the hearing on summary judgment. This Court has
reasoned 1he District Court did not err because we have not shown why this evidence could not
have been discovered and presented to the District Court prior to the summary judgment hearing.
We ask this Court the same question just in a different light. Why was this evidence concealed
by PHH, Chase and their counsels of record? This evidence was sought in discovery 18 months
prior to when we sent QWRs to Chase and PHH and we only received answers because federal
law requires Chase and PHH to respond to a QWR. Since this evidence demonstrates Chase and
PHH have lied to the Court and have withheld evidence, why should we be punished for not
obtaining it timely enough? It is difficult to obtain discovery when the opposing pmiies are
willing to conceal it and refuse to provide it. The District Court abused its discretion in refusing
to consider the QWR evidence.
Fmiher, in addition to the QWRs, we presented new authoritative evidence regarding the
invalid notarization of Mr. Casperite's affidavit and evidence from the officer in charge of our
deposition transcripts demonstrating the Rules regarding the deposition process had been
violated (SAR. 31-32, 63-65). The District Court did not address this evidence and did not make
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any rnlings or findings of fact regarding this evidence. Therefore, the District Court abused its
discretion and relief from judgment must be granted.
D. Regarding our Rule 60(b)(3) motion based upon fraud. The District Comi opined
"Fraud" is fraud upon the court system and that the Nickersons extensively alleged fraud
committed on them by other parties but not fraud on the court. This Court stated we did not point
them to any evidence of fraud; however, the 60(b) motion itself details the fraud (SAR. 33-38)
and that is an incomplete analysis. The District Court abused its discretion by not addressing the
fraud he admits we extensively allege. Therefore, the judgment must be set aside.
E. Regarding our Rule 60(b)(3) motion based upon misconduct. This Court has erred in
its analysis by claiming we had only cited to our motion to suppress. At the bottom of page 40
and top of page 41 of our Appellant's Brief we directed this Court's attention to SAR p. 38, L. 12
-p. 43, L. 5. This is the portion of the record where we argued and detailed the misconduct. We
demonstrated to the District Court that Ivlr. Stenquist and Mr. Manwaring violated the rules of
civil procedure by their mishandling of our deposition transcripts, violated the rules of
professional conduct, violated the attorney's oath, and violated their statutory duties as an
attorney. Mr. Stenquist and Mr. Manwaring lied to and misled the District Court. Mr. Stenquist
lied to the court regarding Chase's involvement with our loan and misled the District Court into
believing no contract ever existed between Chase and the Nickersons. In addition, he used this
lie to thwart discovery, conceal the truth and mislead the District Comi into granting summary
judgment in Chase's favor. Mr. Manwaring violations are even more comprehensive and are
thoroughly detailed in our 3 00+ page amended pleadings where we detail over 100 false,
misleading and contradictory statements he, PHH and Just Law have submitted in this action.
The District Court did not address the misconduct we detailed in our motion. Therefore,
the District Court abused its discretion and judgment must be set aside.
F. Regarding our Rule 60(b)(iii) motion based upon fraud on the court. The District Court
did not address this fraud and specifically stated we did not allege fraud on the court. We
addressed this in our Appellant Brief, p. 41, and SAR 43-44.
"Submitting an affidavit that embodies a criminal act is clearly a tampering with the
administration of justice and a wrong committed against the court. Lying to the court
about ownership and possession of the Nickerson Note and about default is an egregious
tampering with justice and wrong against the court. Using feloniously filed documents to
attempt a foreclosure is irrefutably fraud on the Court. Misleading your client regarding a
case and allowing a case to proceed when, as an attorney, you "don't know what to do" is
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unmistakably tampering with justice and committing a wrong against the institution set
up to safeguard and protect the public."
Since the record and evidence demonstrates fraud on comi and since the District Court
did not address this issue, the District Court abused its discretion regarding this motion and
judgment must be set aside.

9:

to a

were

There are errors regarding determining we willfully chose to proceed without an attorney
after our attorney withdrew from the case without our knowledge; not acknowledging we were
forced to represent ourselves against our will; not recognizing the prejudice suffered by us when
the initial status conference post our prose appearance was turned into a Second Motion For
Summary Judgment by PHH preventing and barring any opportunity for discovery by us; not
realizing the prejudice suffered by us in defending that motion without any knowledge of the true
status of the case due to the deception of our attorney and through no fault of our own; and
determining that we were allowed to fully patiicipate in all or any matters before the Comi
without extreme prejudice.
As stated above and confirmed by Mr. Mitchell's affidavit, Mr. Mitchell, our attorney,
withdrew from this case without informing us, did not inform us or allow us to pmiicipate in any
way in the first summary judgment process or other court proceedings. He told us our case had
been appealed, that everything would be ok, and that our case was a slam dunk. Just prior to our
appearance prose, Mr. Clark, the attorney we hired who assigned Mr. Mitchell to our case,
called and told us Mr. Mitchell was no longer with his firm. Mr. Clark did not offer to continue
to represent us and due to the extreme misconduct and contradictory stories presented by Mr.
Clark and Mr. Mitchell and the extreme misconduct of Mr. Stenquist and Mr. Manwaring, we
did not trust any legal professional and were therefore forced to represent ourselves (R. 997998).
As a result of Mr. Mitchell's negligence and misconduct, we were completely in the dark
regarding the true status of our case. We asked the District Cami what the next step in the
process was going to be because we wanted the District Court to compel Chase and PHH to
provide all of our account records, account notations and communication recordings. We also
wanted to amend our pleadings to include everything Mr. Mitchell failed to enter and what we
had covered with the limited discovery Chase and PHH had provided. As demonstrated
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throughout this brief, Chase and PHH had provided false and conflicting testimony and evidence
which demonstrated fraud. Chase and PHH had withheld discovery and evidence critical to our
defense. We were instructed by the District Court to wait for a status hearing. A status hearing
never came because it was converted into a summary judgment hearing by PHH. We were
extremely prejudiced and handicapped by this occurrence. We were forced to defend ourselves
without the benefit of having all of the evidence that Chase and PHH had withheld. In fact and
reality, we were denied the opp01tunity to properly defend ourselves and were taken advantage
of by Chase, PHH, and the District Couii.
Even so, we worked diligently to present our defense, but the District Court ignored and
struck the evidence that demonstrated fraud perpetrated by Chase and PHH, completely ignored
the supplemental evidence in which Chase claimed to be the real party in interest on our note (R.
1232), and dismissed our objection to the fraudulently notaiized affidavit of Ron Casperite
(R.1237-1238 ). In addition, the Distiict Court disregarded the evidence that was already in the
record and did not require PHH to account for the large payment ($4,549.04) shown on our
escrow statements that it had recognized in its prior summary judgment ruling; nor did it require
PHH to account for principal balance discrepancies and other errors and irregularities contained
within the account history; nor did the District Court recognize the fact PHH prevented our
pe1formance by refusing to accept payments and validate their alleged default which they have
now recognized and proven was in error. As demonstrated throughout this Petition, the District
Comt' s facts were contradicted by both PHH and Chase. The District Court contradicted itself by
stating as fact that Fannie Mae bought our loan in December 2002 when it had declared the
evidence that entered that fact into evidence was hearsay. As a result, the District Court's ruling
was in error. As demonstrated throughout this appellate process, the District Comi abused its
discretion by not providing orders or memorandums documenting its rulings and by continuing
to ignore and disregard all of the evidence we have provided that demonstrates, among other
material facts, we did not default, PHH does not own our note, and Chase and PHH have
committed fraud on us, the Court and the world at large.
The evidence, the District Court's errors, the misconduct of all counsels of record, the
extreme prejudice suffered by us and the mandate of the Idaho Rules requiring a just
determination all call for this Court to reconsider its Opinion and either remand or dismiss
PHH's complaint. We did not default. We were prevented from performance. We were denied
the right to defend ourselves.
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is not
There are errors regarding determining we have pursued finding justice with this appeal
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation and that opposing counsel be awarded any
attorney fees.
This Supreme Court can choose to ignore the evidence, facts, rules and laws we presented
but it cannot claim we have not acted in good faith to present our evidence and arguments before
this Court and the District Court. What else could we or any other victim have done to stop their
abusers when time after time the District Court chose to ignore our evidence or simply deem it
inadmissible because it did not fit with how it wanted to rule? This Petition offers this Supreme
Comi opp01iunity to hear our evidence and render justice or to ignore our evidence in order not
to overturn the District Court ruling. What else could we or any other victim have done to stop
our abusers when the District Comi chose to close their eyes to the contradictory representations
of Chase and PHH and to believe the lies and false representations of Chase and PHH? This
Petition offers this Supreme Court opportunity to consider the lies and misrepresentations
surrounding this litigation and hold PHH and Chase accountable for them; or to make the choice
not to consider these lies and misrepresentations and to let injustice reign simply because the
District Court chose not to look at this evidence. We presented our case and followed the
appellate rnles to the letter of the law. Every point argued is suppo1ied by evidence, rules, laws,
case law and the record. Therefore, the case law cited by this Comi to award attorney fees
against us should have been used to grant judgment for us. "Ordinarily, attorney fees will not be
awarded where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of
law was presented." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.3d 375,383 (2007). We should
have received some meritorious judicial whistleblower award, not be punished for exposing
mortgage fraud, banking crimes and judicial corruption. We are not attorneys, but at least we are
trying to do something to fight injustice. Where are all the Idaho attorneys? What are they doing
to battle mortgage fraud? Reasonable inference from our vantage point concludes they are all
working for the banksters or are counting the spoils collected from innocent homeowners like us.
Is it not a genuine issue of law that the holder of the note is the only one entitled to
enforce it? Is it not a genuine issue of law that to issue a summary judgment the facts must be
construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party? Is it not an issue of law that the
Supreme Court is to perform a de novo review of both the summary judgment and the motions of
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reconsideration? We have made a good faith attempt to present arguments in the manner and
fo1111at expected by the Supreme Com1. We have poi11ted to (scoured) the record and case history
in order to back up the genuine issues of material fact that defeat PHH' s claim of summary
judgment and the other orders of the District Coru1 that have denied us justice. The time is now
for this Court to decide if issues of material fact exist that deny summary judgment in favor of
PHH and Chase. We have firmly established that PHH has no beneficial interest in our property
or standmg to foreclose on our property. No admissible evidence is in the record that proves
default or establishes an accurate default other than our testimony that no default exists. PHH can
have no injury. The evidence convicts Chase of active concealment, fraud, misrepresentation and
misconduct. We petition this Court so that a rehearing may render a judgment based on the
merits. Truth cannot be bound by our ability to present it or the laws that bind it quash justice.
Truth has a voice of its own and it must be heard. Liberty, justice and the American way require
truth not be prejudiced by our inadequacy to present our case properly. No reasonable person can
deny we have made a good faith effort to demonstrate to this Supreme Court that Judge Griffin,
acting on behalf of the District Com1, ignored meritorious evidence presented to him, made
inexcusable errors of fact and law that resulted in adverse rulings, demonstrated extreme
prejudice toward us thereby denying us due process, and failed to abide by the law and follow
the rules. Therefore, even if this Supreme Court should for some unknown procedural reason not
grant our Petition for Rehearing and choose not to hear and consider the truth of this matter, this
Supreme Com1 cannot and must not persist in ruling our appeal was fiivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation. Chase has earned sanctions and jail time, not attorney fees (See Nickersons
Objection to Costs and Fees and Motion for Sanctions). The facts remain constant and cannot
change because PHH, Chase, the District Court or even this Supreme Court will or order the
truth to change - We did not default. PHH prevented our performance. PHH does not hold our
note and mortgage. Chase abused us. PHH and Chase are guilty of active concealment and have
committed Fraud On This Corut, against us, and against all Idaho homeowners. We ask this
Court to remember:
"When deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121, the entire
course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate
issue presented, attorney fees may not be awarded ... " Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho
224, 220 P. 3d 580 (2009)
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Our appeal was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Chase must not be awarded
attorney fees.

11:
a deed

we

trust.

There are errors regarding stating the Nickersons executed a Deed of Trust when we
executed a Mortgage, not a Deed of Trust. This is a 50 acre agricultural property that could only
be secured with a M01igage and not a Deed of Trust. This is a 50 acre property we were only
willing to secure with a Mortgage. PHH falsely claimed this in order to do a non-judicial
foreclosure after they had admitted a non-judicial foreclosure was not appropriate. This e1Tor
creates extreme prejudice for our property and the rights surrounding it. Affirming the loan
attached is a Deed of Trust affirms fraud at the closing table and grants us right to pursue civil
and criminal damages. It is an error in fact in finding to claim there is a Deed of Trust on this
property (R. 1539-1543).

of

by

There are e1Tors in determining why we filed a timely appeal, but continued to pursue all
other legal remedies available at the District Court level. We did not attempt to bypass a timely
appeal. This was our only way to preserve the legal remedies provided to us with a 60(b).
We filed a timely appeal. However, because we experienced extreme prejudice by our
counsel's negligence; Chase's and PHH's dishonest and deceptive practices; and the District
Court's willingness to simply ignore evidence, we continued to pursue all legal remedies
available to us. Knowing our appeal was in progress, we continued to diligently pursue all
evidence we could uncover to demonstrate to the District Comi the en-ors it made and the fraud
of PHH and Chase. As a result of our efforts, we presented several Rule 60(b) motions to
demonstrate to the District Court the errors it had made, the surprise and excusable neglect due
to our former counsel, the new evidence we were able to uncover and the fraud and misconduct
of the opposing pmiies. However, once again, the District Court prejudicially ignored our
evidence and arguments, denied our motions and simply stated we did not present any admissible
evidence. In so doing the District Comi abused its discretion, because it did not state why any of
our evidence was inadmissible. Presumably, the District Court just wanted to rule against us.
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We pursued our Rule 60(b) motions in order to corroborate our testimony and our claims.
We wanted to present a more complete picture of this case to the appellate court and were
hopeful District Court Judge Michael Griffm would fmally get it and do the right thing. He did
not. We have been diligent and have persistently pursued all legal remedies available to us in
order for our story to be heard; in order to be able to defend ourselves; and in an effort to seek
justice. We call on this Court to perform a de nova review; to consider the facts and evidence; to
understand the prejudice we have been victims of; to force Chase and PHH to provide discovery;
and to allow us to present our defenses and claims.
We incorporate this brief in its entirety under this assignment of error. We have discussed
at length under other errors the prejudice created by the condition of the record. For the sake of
brevity, we incorporate it herein.

Assignment of Error 13: Our rights to due process and to provide a defense were denied
due to misrepresentation from opposing counsel and the District Court refusing to allow
our evidence to be entered in the record.
There are errors regarding failing to ensure equal access to justice for us, by accepting as
trne, documented and conflicting lies and fraud of PHH and Chase; and by refusing to consider
or accept evidence and truth presented and attempted to be presented by us that the District Court
prejudicially refused to hear. Allowing the lies and fraud of PHH and Chase to be relied upon as
fact has created impossibility for us in defending our rights. PHH does not own our loan. We did
not execute a Deed of Trust. We did not default. Even though these statements are all true, the
enoneous fmding of the Court that PHH has beneficial interest allowed Judge Griffin to render
evidence that Chase provided in response to a Qualified Written Request (QWR) that Chase
owns and holds the Note to be ignored and not considered based on timeliness alone. If the Court
had recognized the fatal flaws in the chain of title, and denied PHH standing instead of
enoneously finding PHH had beneficial interest, PHH would have had to prove they had
beneficial interest. PHH does not have beneficial interest and cannot prove it. This is a genuine
issue that refutes summary judgments in favor of PHH or Chase.
The adverse rulings that were based on the lies and misrepresentation of counsel have
prevented us from successfully entering evidence in the record and being able to properly present
our defenses and claims. We have covered this error in detail throughout this brief and
incorporate the brief in its entirety under this assignment of enor. We also specifically
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incorporate our Objection To Costs and Fees and Motion For Sanctions herein in support of this
assignment of error.

to a

were

:reason or

There are errors regarding finding we failed to cite adverse rulings in the record for the
Court to consider, provide citations to the record to review, or waived any of their issues on
appeal. District Court Judge Michael Griffin grossly abusing his discretion in the denial of
various motions and prejudicially ruling without providing written orders, supp01iing
memorandums or a factual or lawful basis for his decisions. Requiring us to cite something that
does not exist creates impossibility. We appealed the decision and rulings as a whole so this
Court would review the record de nova.
This error is similar to error number 7 because this Court found we did not provide any
citation to the record regarding our Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite
and Motion to Strike the Depositions of Charles and Dom1a Nickerson. There is nothing in the
record to cite other than the ruling. The District Court denied the motions without providing any
order or memorandum setting forth its decision or reasons for denying these motions. The Court
granted the motions by weighing inadmissible evidence and ignoring genuine issues that
prevented summary judgment in favor of PHH or Chase. Therefore, we are citing the denial as a
whole for abuse of discretion due to the prejudice and judicial impossibility it created for us.
"Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same language in describing
genuine factual issues under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at
the summary judgment stage the judges function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
to determine the truth of the matter but to determine there is a genuine issue for
trial ... there is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact. The inquiry
performed is a threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 342, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91, L. Ed.
2d 202 ( 1986)
Both of these documents represent inadmissible evidence for the reasons detailed in the
record. Without this affidavit and without the fabricated depositions, there is nothing in the
record to support any default whatsoever. Therefore, our claims were dismissed without cause or
right and Summary Judgment has been granted without proof or evidence.
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\,\Then Judge Griffin confronted Mr. Manwarring directly about proving the existence of
default at the first Summary Judgment hearing, Kipp Manwaning relied on the inadmissible
deposition testimony submitted as his ·only evidence to cite. He stated, "the default is clear in
relation to the status of their loan as of 2010. The Nickersons acknowledge that they have made
no payment since then." PHH did not even challenge whether or not we were current in January
2010. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the existence of default when the
complaint was filed and perfmmance was prevented. PHH only claimed we had not made
payments since February 2010, which is an issue of prevention of performance, not default. PHH
has admitted they refused payment from February 2010 to present (R. 561). The complaint was
not filed based on what happened in or after February 2010. The complaint is based on a default
that was supposedly pre-existent in February 2010. PHH has not proved default. The only
admissible evidence in the record regarding default is our testimony that they cannot prove
default for there was no default.
As discussed in point 5.A. above and in our Motion To Strike, the Second Affidavit of
Ronald E. Casperite is not validly notarized and cannot be used as evidence. Further, Mr.
Casperite could not have had any personal knowledge of any of our payments made or not made
to Chase because he was a hired litigation liaison of PHH. All he did was take some of the data
Chase provided on their account history and massage it to fit his format. He did not take the
principal balance provided by Chase on their account history. He claimed "Upon PHH's receipt
from Chase of the Nickersons' loan, the principal balance was $261,172.62." However, he
contradicts that principal balance with his own illustrative loan history which shows the principal
balance of $259,983.72 as of January 21, 2010. As demonstrated above, even if one ignores the
notary fraud, Mr. Casperite's testimony is contradictory and incomplete. This w1tness is
impeached and his testimony cannot be relied upon for summary judgment. Additionally, this
testimony only confirms what we have stated since February 2010 - PH.H's alleged default was
wrong. Since PHH' s alleged default is wrong, and in reality non-existent, PHH' s complaint fails
and must be dismissed.
Our motion to strike depositions is another example of the flagrant violations perpetrated
against us by Chase, PHH and their counsels of record. In our Motion To Suppress, we detailed
the meritorious reasons why our depositions should have been suppressed (R. 1819-1825) and
perhaps the most grotesque is the fact I.R.C.P. 30(e) was violated.
I.R.C.P. 30(e) Submission to witness - Changes - Signing.
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When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness
for examination and shall be read to or by the witness, unless such examination and
reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance
which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer with
a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall
then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the
witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the
witness within 30 days of its submission to the witness, the officer shall sign it and state
on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact
of the refusal to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the deposition
may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under Rule
32( cl)(4) the comt holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection of
the deposition in whole or in part.
We were denied the opportunity to read the transcripts, make changes or sign the transcripts. We
did not even know any transcripts existed. Mr. Mitchell told us they had not been prepared and
we had no reason not to believe him. Making a transcript of the true depositions would have
defeated PHH and Chase's claims, not allowed them to be granted Summary Judgment. In
addition, the transcripts were submitted to the District Comt prior to the 30 day time limit for
signing breaking the Rules of Procedure. PHH referenced pmtions of the transcripts in
documents submitted to the District Court just 9 days after the taking of the depositions and
Chase submitted the entire transcript, in violation ofl.R.C.P. 30(f)(4)(B) "only those portions to
be used shall be submitted to the court," just 12 days after the taking of the depositions. Fmiher,
the officer did not sign and state on the record the facts or any reasons why the transcripts were
missing our signatures. Mistreating and misusing a witness' testimony violates the very core of
the judicial system. This constitutes severe misconduct on the part of all counsels of record and
calls for this Court to suppress and strike the depositions in accordance with I.R.C.P. 32(d)(4).
Further, as a matter of record, PHH claimed in their Appellate Reply Brief that we did not
object to the depositions during the Summary Judgment. However, this is not accurate. During
the Summary Judgment hearing we not only verbally objected, but we made a verbal motion that
the depositions be suppressed and stricken from the record, the Affidavit of Ron Casperite be
struck, and that we be allowed to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim per I.C.R.P.
7(b)(l). The Court ignored our request and verbal motions. Also as a mat1er ofrecord, our
Summary Judgment Reply Brief was filed prior to his ruling and we objected to the depositions
and affidavit of Ron Casperite in that as well.
We petitioned the Comt for a continuance of this Summary Judgment hearing so we
could expand the factual record of the case as soon as we were notified of it. Judge Griffin
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ignored our request despite numerous calls asking for him to make a decision regarding the
continuance. We communicated extreme urgency to the clerks because we needed to know
whether or not to go ahead and submit our Reply Brief in accordance with the pre-hearing
deadlines. Judge Griffin ignored us. The District Court clerk can affirm this. During the hearing
Judge Griffin told us he was not going to continue the hearing, but would allow us to submit our
Reply Brief and other supplemental evidence after the hearing. Please note this hearing was
supposed to be a status hearing we had been asking for since we first appeared prose. Not only
did the Judge convert it to a Summary Judgment hearing, refuse to answer us regarding the
continuance so we knew whether or not to file our Reply Brief, but at the hearing he abruptly
added other motions we were not previously informed would be addressed at the hearing. We
told him we were not prepared to argue those because we were unaware they were being
included with the Summary Judgment hearing. He held the hearing anyway and we presented our
case the best we could in the presence of such malicious prejudice.
We were denied our right to proper representation and presentation at the Summary
Judgment hearing.
The Court refused to compel discovery, to allow us to depose witnesses, to have access to
evidence that refutes all claims by PHH and Chase, and to present material facts and our witness
testimony. This constitutes extreme abuse of discretion. We were comprehensively denied our
right to due process of law.

Assignment of Error 15: Our right to present claims and offer a defense were denied by
procedural technicalities, prejudicial rulings and legal chicanery.
We did not waive any of our arguments on appeal. We came to this Comt for a de nova
review ofthis entire case, for justice. We appealed everything and tried to address all issues by
pointing to the record in its entirety. Judicial incompetence, Fraud on the Court,
misrepresentations of fact, attorney negligence, failure to establish standing, failure to provide
proof and evidence that create cause or right for PHH or Chase to bring complaints, require this
Comito review the record in its entirety. We have been swindled, abused, and have suffered
severe, significant and substantial damages. Judge Griffin failed to ensure equal access to justice,
uphold the laws surrounding this litigation, and denied our rights to present a defense and offer
our claims. The record is inadequately prepared due to procedural technicalities, prejudicial
rulings and legal chicanery. We attempted to correct this limitation with various motions and
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reconsiderations, but all were denied. Stipulations occuned that violated material evidence
presented to our attorney and defies the truth of the matter. Findings of fact were found that
contradicted previous findings of fact and rulings. Rulings were made by ignoring evidence.
Opposing counsels lied, withheld evidence, and misrepresented truth to the Court without
consequence. Fraud and extensive evidence of fraud, prevention of performance, and abusive
debt collection was pled from the first conversation we had with Mr. Mitchell regarding this
property. We prepared and submitted documents to Mr. Mitchell for this case, the FBI, the
Attorney General, Consumer Protection Bureau, and other such entities. This evidence refutes all
claims by PHH and Chase. Mr. Mitchell's Memorandum In Opposition To PHH Mortgage's and
Chase's Motion to Sunm1ary Judgment attempted to present our arguments before the Comi (R.
609). However, the Court dismissed his attempts. He subsequently withdrew without notifying
us.
We appealed the entire proceeding to this Supreme Couri for justice. Judge Griffin
abused his authority and discretion when he weighed evidence, ignored genuine issues of
material fact, granted extreme leniency to opposing counsel, and enforced umeasonable
prejudice against us. Procedural technicalities, prejudicial rulings and legal chicanery has
victimized our case from its inception and we have been prevented from presenting witness
testimony, evidence and truth that refutes PHH's claim and implicates criminal mischief and
wrongdoing by PHH, Chase and their accomplices. We have been denied our right to present
claims and offer a defense. Nothing has been waived, advertently or inadve1iently. Justice would
not waive it. Justice will not allow it to be waived.

Assignment

to a

were

35(a)(4).

This Court erred in finding we did not challenge all adverse orders when we appealed
from the Final Judgment, the Order Dismissing Motions to Reconsider, and other interlocutory
orders by the District Court in order to make sure all issues were addressed on appeal, even with
the handicaps created by the District Court's prejudicial rulings and failure to provide written
orders and memorandums.
Chase claims we did not specifically address the summary judgment dismissing their
claim on appeal. In our notice of appeal we stated we appealed from the Final Judgment, the
Order Dismissing Motions to Reconsider, and other interlocutory orders by the District Comi.
The order dismissing our claims against Chase is one of the other interlocutory orders that are on
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appeal. This order is specifically addressed in our motion to reconsider Chase's and PHH's
summary judgment and the denial of that motion to reconsider is on appeal. IAR 35(a)(4) " ... The
statement of issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly comprised
therein." Thus, the summary judgment in favor of Chase is before the Court and must be
reversed in accordance with the issues and evidence set forth in our motion to reconsider and in
light of the fact the District Court abused its discretion by not considering all of the evidence and
arguments presented in our Rule 60(b) motions.

Assignment of Error 17: Our rights to a defense were denied and this Petition For
Rehearing has been filed so justice can be found, served, and endure.
This Petition For Rehearing incorporates all other issues and assignments of enor in our
request for rehearing. This Petition For Rehearing addresses assignments of enor and issues that
defeat any judgment in favor of PHH and Chase. This Petition For Rehearing requests
opportunity to present our case before this Supreme Court so that justice can be found, served,
and endure. This Court ruled the truth was presented frivolously, but it did not deny the truth
exists. This Supreme CoUii must be able to see the rulings they are affirming do not provide
justice for us or render it upon PHH and Chase.
Rather than silencing the truth and forcing it to seek justice outside this Court, provide us
opportunity to present our case again. Compel PHH and Chase to answer to our evidence.
Compel PHH and Chase to provide admissible evidence. Compel PHH and Chase to answer for
breaking Rules of Procedure, violating their oaths, misrepresenting truth to this Comi,
committing fraud on the Comi, mishandling facts and evidence, violating lending laws, and other
such acts. Compel justice to be served.
In supp01i of our additional assignments of enor and arguments below, we submit the
findings in Greene v. US. The Greene court found, "Entertaining issues raised for the first time
on appeal is discretionary with the panel hearing the appeal."
"To begin, it is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an
issue raised for the first time on appeal. (citations omitted). This rule is not an absolute
bar to raising new issues on appeal; the general rule is disregarded when we think it
necessary to remedy an obvious injustice. See Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee C01p.,
900 F.2d 522,527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 132, 112 L.Ed.2d 100
(1990). We will also sometimes entertain arguments not raised in the trial court if the
elements of the claim were fully set forth and there is no need for additional fact fmding.
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See Vintero Corp. v. C01poracion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513,515 (2d
Cir.1982). Ente1iaining issues raised for the first time on 1peal is discretionary with the
panel hearing the appeal." Greene v. US, 13 F. 3d 577 (2 11 Cir. 1994).
Although we did not specifically address the following issue in light of the rules of
evidence, we did identify the principal balance discrepancies of Chase's account history.
According to the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the account history submitied by Chase is
inadmissible hearsay. The account history Chase submitted and PHH relied upon for its alleged
proof of default is on its face untrustworthy, and it is also deemed untrustworthy due to the fact it
conflicts with the escrow statement evidence. Therefore, according to I.R.E. 801 (c) and I.R.E.
803(7) this account record is hearsay and all summary judgments in favor of Chase and PHH
must be reversed.
I.R.E. 803(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph ( 6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccunence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was
of a kind of which a memorandum, repmt, record, or data compilation was regularly
made and preserved, unless the sources of i11formation or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness. (emphasis added)
The District Court, Chase and PHH have determined this account history is untrustwmthy
because they do not accept the principal balance as fact. According to Reference #s 62-63 the
principal balance on the account history drops from $261,562.14 on June 16, 2009, to $391.52 on
July 21, 2009, with no payment or other transaction occurring. Also, on those two dates the
escrow balance goes from non-repmiing to a balance of $3,391.90. The principal balance
remained $391.52 from July 21, 2009, until a payment is credited on November 11, 2009, which
brought the principal balance to $0.00. The principal balance then goes negative in December
2009 and ends on January 21, 2010, as $-1, 186.90. (R. 636-639). This account history also
contradicts the escrow statement which demonstrates the account history is untrustworthy. The
escrow balance on July 21, 2009, of $3,391.90 does not match the escrow balance of $935.27
repmied on the escrow statement Chase provided to us (R. 590) for that time period nor do the
escrow balances line up from that time thru January 21, 2010, when the account history shows an
escrow balance of $0.00 (R. 636). Further, the escrow statement shows a payment of $4,549.04
in July of 2009 which is not reflected on the account history (R. 589-590, 639). We contend it is
an extreme injustice to use the account history provided to allege we did not make our payments
when the opposing pmties themselves and the Court have determined it is untrustworthy. This is
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an account history. It is either fact or fiction. Therefore, since Chase, PHH and the District Court
have all dete1mined this account history is untrustworthy and the evidence demonstrates it is
untrustwo1ihy, then, according to I.R.E. 803(7), this account history must be treated as hearsay
and is inadmissible as evidence "to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence" of our payments to
Chase (i.e. - to claim we were in default because we did not make all of our payments to Chase)
and summary judgment in favor of PHH must be reversed. Further, this Court opined that we
must provide our own evidence regarding the account history and not just discredit PHH' s. We
would like to direct the Court's attention to the evidence the Corui missed and our former
counsel provided in our defense of the first summary judgment which showed a $4,549.04
payment reflected on our escrow statement in July of 2009 (R. 589-590). Thus, aside from the
untrustworthiness of the account history and the fact it is inadmissible; the evidence of this
payment into escrow demonstrates there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding default that
warrants a reversal of summary judgment.
Our rights to a defense were denied by the procedures put in place to ensure equal access
to justice.

Under our system ofgovernment the process of adjudication is surrounded by
safeguards evolved from centuries of experience. These safeguards are not designed
merely to lend formality and decorum to the trial of causes. They are predicated on the
assumption that to secure for any controversy a truly formed and dispassionate decision
is a difficult thing, requiring for its achievement a special summoning and organization
ofhuman effort and the adoption of measures to exclude the biases and prejudgments
that have free play outside the courtroom. All of this goes for naught if the man-with an
unpopular cause is unable to find a competent lawyer courageous enough to represent
him. His chance to have his day in court loses much of its meaning if his case is
handicapped from the outset by the very kind ofprejudgment our rules of evidence and
procedure are intended to prevent. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1216 (1958) Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edition

We tried to fight PHH, Chase and their accomplice's theft and assault on our own. They
were too big.
We hired an attorney to fight for us. His battle strategy failed, personal issues defeated
him, and he left the battle without even telling us.
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We pled with the District Court to take over the fight, uphold the law, and render justice.
He ignored evidence and told us he would not help us.
We appealed to the Supreme Court to see truth and help us find relief, to fight injustice
for us and for the law you serve. Our cause is unpopular. Public record has penned encyclopedias
on the hostile takeover of the right to own prope1iy by PHH and Chase. Are you courageous
enough to preserve our rights, serve justice, and uphold the law? Will you ignore the injustice
you know exists or will you use your authority to stand and be counted? If this Couri is unwilling
to help us end this nightmare and reclaim what is rightfully ours, please, as fellow human beings,
as men who have committed your life to upholding the law, will you at least tell us where to go
to find justice in this land? To have life and liberty - To acquire, possess or protect prope1iy in
this State and in this land - To pursue happiness and secure safety - This is all we asked of the
State ofldaho. The Idaho Constitution calls this an inalienable right of man. For us, it has been
unattainable, a right apparently only available to the unjust within these borders. We have told
PHH, Chase, and their accomplices, we will fight all the way for our home, for our family, and
for our name. We prayed the battle would end as we approached your bench. What does properly
in the record mean? As you review the record, please define it in light of justice or it will be
redefined in the darkness of injustice.
We have fought a good fight and we have kept the faith. The opposing parties committed
so many wrong and illegal acts we could not develop our brief any more within the page
limitations. Time limitations beyond our control have been placed upon us that have prevented
us from developing this petition any forther. We appeal to you with the truth. It is all we have at
our disposal to fight this battle. Rule righteously or put us in front of a jury and let them have
opportunity to render a courageous verdict.
We requested this Supreme Comi review all orders. IAR 35(a)(4) " ... The statement of
issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." The
procedure established to make sure we did not inadve1iently forget to mention an important
assignment of error is being used to say we failed to specifically state it. This is not right. It is an
error.

to be served for our

matter must
World At Large.

This Petition for Rehearing must be granted in order for this Court to have opportunity to
render judgment based on the truths of this matter:
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PHH: does not own our note. PP.JI has no beneficial h1terest in u.1.is property.
We did not default on this note. Extensive witness testimony, accou..nt notations, taped
conversations, and material evidence demonstrate and support this assertion. Evidence and proof
refute the existence of any default whatsoever.

PHH has no claim to inju..ry because of failure to es1ablisb right or cause to claim injury,
. prevention of :Performance, and :fraud.

Truth requires our name be cleared of all 1:vrongdoing regarding this property and the
atrocities committed against us be punished. Justice and rules that govern procedure require this
Court severely punish opposing counsels for their active concealment of the truth. This Supreme
Court disba..rred John .wiitchell. lvfo.y the perpetual, malicious acts being committed against us and

the World At Large disbar opposing counsels before God, this State, and this Court.
So tha~ justice may be fully served and to ensure adequate protections are in place to
protect Idaho property o,,,vners from illegal land grabs and hostile takeovers of their finnil y
fortunes and financial :portfolios, we request this Court grant this Petition For Reheming.

DATEDthls.

i

.,-z-dayofJuly,2016
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21

22

COMES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, in accordance with I.R.C .P .

23

l l(c), move this Court to sanction Chase and PHH for signing and submi1ting pleadings, motions

24

and other papers to this Di&trict Court that were known to be or should have been known to be

25

false, misleading and not grounded in fact . Their joint actions have denied us access to justice,

26

robbed us of our right to due process, and prevented us from finding relief at the District Court

27

and Supreme Court levels. They have maliciously caused a record to be created that is

28

incomplete and based on falsehoods . Judge Griffin's judgments rely solely upon these falsehood

29

and are therefore not enforceable by law, fact, or justice. This has created needless pain,

30

suffering, and damages for our family and makes a mockery of finding justice in these

31

proceedings.

32
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PHH has now moved this Court to execute judgment when the appeal has not been fully
2

resolved to circumvent justice and escape full liability for their actions. This Court has rightly

3

granted a stay pending appeal. Since the appeal is not yet fully resolved, PHH's motion to set

4

aside stay is inappropriate and must be denied. The Idaho Supreme Court has determined Chase

5

lied in their pleadings, but have yet to rule on the full consequences of Chase's deception.

CM~

6

7

ln conjunction with and in support of this motion we are submitting a true and correct

8

copy of our motion for sanctions against Chase that was submitted to the Supreme Court. As

9

stated, the Supreme Court has not yet acted upon this motion. The determination by the Supreme

10

Court on this motion will prove justice has been thwarted and that PHH and Chase have

11

sabotaged all proceedings by Judge Griffin at the District Court and Supreme Court levels.

12

Among other errors, Chase has made the following statements that are false, not

13

supported by any evidence and contradict the facts determined by the District Court and the

14

Supreme Court.

15

•

The Nickersons missed 11 payments while Chase was servicing the note.

16

•

Freddie Mac purchased the note from Coldwell Banker Mortgage.

17

•

PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac.

18

•

Chase never owned the note.

19

AH of the above effect genuine issues of material fact and since all claims by PHH and

20

Chase have been proven to be false, in addition to any monetary sanctions, an appropriate

21

sanction would be to vacate the summary judgment decision in favor of Chase becausefrustra

22

legis aru:illium qur,erit qui ill legem comittu - he who offends against the law vainly seeks the

23

help of the law. A very full and detailed briefing regarding this issue was submitted to the

24

Supreme Court and is incorporated into this motion. See Exhibit 2 - Objection to Costs and Fees

25

and Motion fur Sanctions and Exhibit 3 -Affidavit of Charles Nickerson ;n Support of Objection

26

to Costs and Fees andlvfotionfor Sanctions.

V,

28

fflH

The most damaging and blatantly fraudulent statement made in violation of Rule 11 is

29

PHH's claim that they were and are the Note Holder. However, the hard evidence presented

30

clearly demonstrates they were not and are not the Note Holder (R 1112, 1139, 1140 -Affidavil

31

of Charles Nickerson in Support of Motion.for Summary Judgment - Exhibits 6 and 9; R. 1232 -

32

Notice of Supplemental Evidence - Exhibit A). Further, we have documented over 100
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discrepancies, contradictions and falsehoods made by PHH and their counsel in our amended
2

answer - Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense - Contradictory Statements. See Exhibit 1. PHH's

3

and their counsel's blatant violation of the Rule 11 mandate demonstrates a complete disregard

4

for the integrity of the judicial process and proves malicious intent in the filing and prosecution

5

of these proceedings. Therefore, in addition to monetary sanctions, according to the law, PH.H's

<>

complaint must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

7
8

Chase and PHH have built their case based upon lies and deception and have not taken

9

any steps to insure their statements and claims are well grounded in fact. Their actions have

IO

created irregularities which render any judgment in there favor void. Therefore, not only are

11

monetary sanctions warranted, it is appropriate and just to vacate the summary judgments in

12

favor of Chase and PHH, dismiss PHH's complaint with prejudice, and allow us to pursue our

13

amended counterclaims and third party complaint.

14

This wrongful foreclosure complaint is based solely on records and statements whose

15

authenticity and veracity have been challenged and refuted. It is unjust and unlawful to proceed

16

v.-ith execution of judgment without establishing that the facts and issues being relied upon for

17

judgment are truthful and accurately presented in the record. To do otherwise, perpetually

18

condemns the enforceability of this execution. Therefore, a stay continues to be appropriate and

19

necessary until the true merits of this case have been litigated and fully resolved.

20
21

12
23

Wherefore, we request Chase and PHH be appropriately sanctioned and that we be
allowed to pursue all of our claims against them.
Oral argument requested.

DATED this i{#.. day of___...~Jr~'-'-,·..,..1,1_,_{_ _ _ _ _, 2017
J

24

d~

~~-CKERSON

25

26
27

28
29
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17
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Charles Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim, Third-Party
Complaint and Demandfor Jw:v Trial- R. 1454-1475
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Contradictory Statements
250_

allegans contraria non est audiendus - one making contradictory statements is

not to be heard
251.

Based on this Latin maxim, PHH is not to be heard and their complaint must be

dismissed.
252.

The Nickersons assert PHH has made countless untrue and often contraclictory

statements. All of these statements are taken from the record that is before this Court.
253.

PHH claims to be holding a Deed of Trust on the Nickersons property (Complaint

paragraph 1). However, the legal description PHH used to identify the property is not the legal
description of the Nickersons property (Complaint paragraph 7). PHH claimed this was scrivener
error, however, as the evidence presented below demonstrates a pattern of contradictory and
false statements, PHH' sand Just Law's claim of scrivener error has no merit.
254.

PHH, in paragraph 2 of the Complaint claims to have beneficial interest in a Deed

ofTmst instrument number 190566. Instrument 190566 is not the Nickersons Mortgage, and
thus, PHH is not claiming beneficial interest in the Nickersons Mortgage and their complaint
must be dismissed.
255.

PHH, in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, states a copy of that Deed of Trust is

attached as Exhibit "A". Complaint Exhibit A is instrument number 190568 which is not that
Deed of Trust instrument number 190566
256.

PHH, in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, states, ''A copy of the Assignment of

Record recorded December 20, 2007, as instrument number 207590 ... is attached as Exhibit "B".
However, Complaint Exhibit Bis instrument number 214459.
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257.

PHH claims to have beneficial interest in the Nickersons Mongage based on a the

assignment of record recorded on December 20, 2007, as instrument number 207590. Instrument
number 207590 is an assignment in which Coldwell allegedly assigns all of its interest in the
Note and Mortgage to Chase. In other words, PHH is claiming to obtain beneficial interest from
an assignment which assigns interest from Coldwell to Chase and does not even mention PHH.

In addition, instmment number 207590 is fraudulent because Coldwell did not have interest in
the Note and Mortgage in Kovember of 2007. According to PHH and Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae
did. See Exhibit 10.
258.

PHH, in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, claims the Nickersons are the grantor of

the Deed of Trust, Complaint Exhibit A. The Nicker sons did not execute a Deed of Trust, the
Nickersons executed a Mortgage and thus, they are the mortgagor not the granter. Furthermore,
there is no granter defined in this document.
259.

PHH, in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, provides a legal description of a property

that is not the Nickersons property.
260.

PHH, in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, states the Nickersons bre.ached their

obligations; however, PHH blocked all attempts by the Nickersons to keep their obligations or to
cure the disputed default and the >l'ickersons were prevented by PHH from making their monthly
payments. Plll-I, by these and other such actions, breached any alleged contract and violated all
related governing duties, responsibilities and obligation through, among other breaches,
prevention of performance and creating impossibility for the Nickersons.

261.

PHH, in paragraph 12.c of the Complaint, claims interest is due from January 1,

2009, however, PHH dearly knew the Nickersons payments were made in 2009 and 2010 and
thus, their claim of interest from January 1, 2009, is false.
262.

PHH, in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, states the Note is attached as Exhibit B

The Note is not attached as Exhibit B. It is attached as Exhibit C.
Exhibit l
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263.

PHH, in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, claims they are entitled to a deficiency

judgment in accordance with the terms of the Deed of Trust. Since there are no terms in the
Mortgage presented regarding a deficiency judgment, PHH is not entitled to one.
264.

PHH through Just Law moved the Court for an order to serve the Nickersons by

publication and subsequently served by publication when they knew the Nickersons were
represented and had contact information for both the Nickersons and the firm representing them.
The Nickersons counsel stopped PHH's and Just Law's illegal non-judicial foreclosure attempt
in October of 2010 by threatening them with legal action.

265.

In answer to the Nickersons request for admission number 13, PHH states "Pllli

is unaware of any payments made or not made by the Nickersons to Chase." This answer was
provided on July 3, 2012 a full two and a half years after PHH claimed the Nickersons were in
default. How could PHH claim default if they were "unaware of any payments made or not made
by the Nickersons to Chase"? In addition, how can PHH claim they were unaware of payments
when Chase claimed they transferred all account records to PHH?
266.

PHH in response to request for admission number 20 states, "PHH admits that it

is the mortgage company's responsibility to maintain an accurate record of transactions."

However, in reality, PHFI did not maintain an accurate record of the Nickersons account, see
preceding paragraph.
267.

Request for admission number 20 states, "Admit it is the responsibility of the

mortgage company to maintain accurate records of all transactions and communications ... " PHH
admits they must maintain accurate records of transactions, but denies they must maintain
accurate records of communications.
268.

In interrogatory number 1, Plffi was asked who owned the Note prior to Chase

purchasing it. PHH responded by stating "PHH states that it held the original note through its

subsidiary, Coldwell Banker. PHH believes that note was transferred to the Federal Home
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Mortgage Association, (Fannie Mae), which in tum, had JP Morgan Chase service the note.

When you defaulted on the note, Fannie :viae assigned the note back to PHH as the originating
lender. PHH is the holder of the note in this foreclosure action." This answer is contradictory for
the following reasons:
a.

PHH believes the note was transferred to Fannie Mae. How can they not know?
No one knew because this transfer was not recorded in the Clearwater County
land records.

b. Fannie Mae had Chase service the Note. Exhibit 15, a letter from Coldwell not
Fannie Mae, states, "Recently you received a notification letter communicating
that effective November 1, 2007, the servicing of your mortgage loan wi 11 transfer
from the Mortgage Service Center to Chase Home Finance LLC."
c. There is no record of an assignment from Fannie Mae to PHH However, Chase
claims to have purchased the note on the same date that Fannie Mae states they
terminated interest. See Exhibits 9 and 10.
d. PHH claims to be the holder of the note but they can not be the holder of the note.
Chase purchased the note on December 3, 2009, and claims to have the original
note in their possession as ofJanuary 10, 2014. See Exhibits 1 and 9.
269.

In response to interrogatory numb er 2 which asked PHH to state how the note was

transferred from Chase, PHH states "the assignment of the deed of trust and note were properly
completed in writing and the assignment was recorded as noted in the complaint.,, This statement

has the following problems:
a.

The assignment referenced in the complaint is 207590 which is the assignment
from Coldwell to Chase (Exhibit 11). This assignment is fraudulent because at the
time of this assignment Coldwell had already assigned interest to Fannie Mae, so
Coldwell had nothing to assign to Chase.
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b. The assignment attached to the complaint is the assignment from Chase to PHH
(Exhibit 8). This contradicts PHH' s answer to interrogatory number 1 where PHH
claims Fannie Mae transferred the Note directly to PHH. In addition, this
assignment is fraud because as stated above Chase claims ownership of the Note
from December 3, 2009 to the present.
270.

In response to interrogatory number 4, PHH states, "the assignment of the deed of

trust was performed in writing and the promissory note was assigned as indicated on the allonges
to that note." However, 1) there are no attachments or allonges, to the note. 2) one cannot be sure
which assignment PHH is referring to but both assignments state they are assigning interest in
the note and deed of trust which contradicts PHH' s statement that the note \.Vas assigned via an
allonge.
271.

In response to interrogatory number 8 which asked why PHH immediately started

foreclosure proceedings in February of 2010, PHH states, "You were several months in default."
Several months has been an ever changing figure since February 2010. For example, PHH
originally claimed the Nickersons were 14 months in default and almost three years later PHH
changed its mind and has just recently sworn the Nickersons were 9 months in default. In

February of 2010, when the Nickersons asked PHH to validate the existence of any default, PHH
claimed they did not have any account records. As of July 3, 2012, PHH stated they were not
even aware of any payments made or not made to Chase. PHH could not state, imply, assert or
suggest the Nickersons were several months in default when they did not have any account
records and were not aware of payments made or not made to Chase. Further, it is presumed
PHH is still relying on the same inaccurate, invalid, untmstworthy and unreliable records
presented thus far in these proceedings to make these statements.
272.

Interrogatory number 9 asks PHH to describe/list the information provided to

PHH regarding the transfer/sale of the note. PHH claims it is the same account information as
Exhibil l
Page 5 of22

117

Chase provided in their response to discovery. PHH is claiming the first account information
they received regarding the Nickersons account was the information provided by Chase on
August 21, 2012. How can PHH claim a default in February of20IO when they do not get the
account information until August of 2012'1!
273.

Interrogatory number 10 asks PHH to describe any agreements in place between

PHH and Chase regarding the transfers and sales of notes. PHH states, "There was no agreement
between PHH and Chase. The assignment of the note was directed by Fannie Mae due to your
default and PHH' s responsibility as originating lender to foreclose." There are several problems
with this answer:
a.

PHH claims the assignment of the Note was directed by Fannie Mae. However,
Fannie Mae terminated interest in the note on December 3, 2009, which is the
same day Chase purchased the note (Exhibits 9 and 10), and the assignment from
Chase to PHH did not allegedly occur until June 9, 2010 which is four months
after PHH initiated foreclosure. (Exhibits 2 and 3).

b. PHH claims the assignment was directed by Fannie Mae due to default. There is
no record of default. The account history provided by Chase which is what PHH
claims to be relying upon for default shows the principal balance on the account
was $0 in November of 2009 and had a negative principal balance, $-1,186.90, on
January 21, 2010.
c.

The assignment from Chase to PHH, in contradiction to PHH's response, clearly
indicates there was some type of agreement regarding the assignment "KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT FOR V ALOE RECEIVED. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank ... does hereby, without recourse, sell, assign, endorse, and
transfer unto, PHH ... all of its right, title and interest in ... That certain Deed of
Trust Note ... " (Exhibit 8).
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d. PHH was not the originating lender. Coldwell Banker Mortgage was the
originating lender.

274.

Request for production number 3 asks PHH to produce all documents related to

the transaction and or servicing the Nickersons note between Chase, Coldwell, Fannie Mae, and
PHH. PJffi responded by stating, «loans are processed in 'batches' and as such there are no
documents specific to this note between any of the above named entities. PHH does not have in
its possession documents pertaining to service of the note between Fannie Mae and Chase."
Below are the contradictions to these statements:

a. Exhibit L1 is an assignment document in which Coldwell assigns all of the
interest it does not have in the Note and Mortgage to Chase.
b. Exhibit 8 is an assignment document in which Chase purportedly assigned all its
interest in the Note and Mortgage to PHH. However, Chase apparently was not
consulted about this assignment because they claim they did not transfer
ownership of the Note and Mortgage to PHH as is evidenced by Exhibits 1 and 9.
c.

There is no document in which Fannie ~ae assigns servicing to Chase because
Coldwell assigned servicing to Chase not Fannie Mae.

d. It is very disturbing to think there is no documentation associated with the
transfers ofloans to Fannie Mae from PHH and Coldwell. :-To wonder there is so
much fraud in the mortgage industry. See Amid New Reports of Continued Robo--

Signing, Brown Calls for End to Risky Practices Undermining Housing lvfarket Exhibit 17.

275.

PHH provides the same response to request for production number 4. The same

contradictions apply as presented in the above paragraph.
276.

Request for production number 7 asks Pllli to provide any agreements between

Chase and PHH related to the transfers and sales of notes. PHH states they do not have any
Exhibit 1
Page 7 of22

119

agreements with Chase related to the transfer and sales of notes. As detailed above, Chase, in the
assignment submitted to the Court, claims to have received some value for the assignment to
PHH so some kind of agreement must have been in place for that to have occurred. Well, maybe
not, it has already been demonstrated that assignment was false, fraudulent and fabricated.
277.

In response to nine (9) of the fourteen (14) requests for production and fifteen

(15) of the twenty-one (21) interrogatories PHH gives the following objection in order to either

avoid the request all together or to provide a partial and incomplete answer. "Object. The
information requested is not reasonably designed to lead to discoverable information. Rather, the
request appe.ars designed to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation, and is unreasonable or unduly burdensome or e~pensive, given the needs of the
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the imponance of the
issues at stake in the litigation."

a.

This appears to be PHH' s way of saying the evidence will incriminate me so I
better not provide it.

b. "unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case"

Perhaps this is why the U.S. Congress enacted 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38 which details
record keeping requirements for mortgage servicers. Too expensive given the
needs of the case. Tlle needs of the case are about taking someone's home and
robbing, killing and destroying their life. How can providing documented
evidence be too expensive?

c. "the discovery already had in the case" - PHH had yet to provide discovery in this
case even though the Nickersons repeatedly asked for the discovery and
understood from their counsel a motion to compel Pl-Il-I for the discovery was
before the court.
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d. "the amount in controversy" - When you are taking someone's home the
monetary ramifications go fur beyond the amount in controversy and the amount
in controversy represents an oppressive seizure of investment, value and equity
from the Nickersons.
e. "the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation" -Apparently, PHH has

very little regard of the importance of home ownership and the constitutional
rights and passion of the American homeowner.
278.

In an affidavit, Ron Casperite, a Complex Litigation Liaison (an account analyst)

for PHH, claimed the Nickersons had missed at least ten (10) monthly payments and in the same
affidavit he claimed the Nickersons had missed thirteen (13) monthly payments.
279.

In the same affidavit, Ron Casperite states, ''By February 2010 Chase had

returned the Nickersons' loan to PHH."
a. Chase did not return the Nickersons loan to PHH in February 2010.

b. Chase allegedly transferred servicing of the loan to Mortgage Service Center not
PHH (Exhibit 4).
c.
280.

Chase could not "return" the Joan to PHH because PHH never had it.
In PHH's memorandum in support of summary judgment, PHH claimed the

Nickersons missed (11) monthly payments which contradicts Ron Casperite's claims often (10)
or thirteen (13) missed payments.
281.

In PHH' s memorandum in support of summary judgment, PHH states, "In

accordance with the terms of the note in paragraphs 6 and 7, Chase sent written notices to the
Nickersons stating the default." First, the default notices sent by Chase were sent in January and
February of2009 and had conflicting default amounts. February's default amount was less than
January's default amount when there were allegedly no payments made. When found and
questioned by the Nickersons, Chase informed and assured the Nickersons it was an error and
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instructed the Nickersons to disregard the notices because they were being randomly, incorrectly,
inaccurately and independently generated by their system, so since the Nickersons knew they
were no1 in default, they ignored them as instructed. Second, the terms of the note are very
specific about who is supposed to send the notice of default. Paragraph 6 of the Note states, "(C)

Notice of Default lfl am in d~fault, the Note Holder may

send me a written notice tel1ing me

that ifl do not pay the overdue amount by a certain date, the Note Holder. .. " Paragraph 1 of the
Note defines "Note Holder" as "The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who
is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the 'Note Holder.'" Chase was not the
Note Holder at the time they sent these default letters. Fannie Mae was. See Exhibit 10.

282.

PHH then states, "Consequently, the facts demonstrate PHH did not breach the

note by failing to send notice of default." Contradictorily, these facts demonstrate l) the notices
were sent by Chase, 2) the notices present contradictory amounts of default, 3) th.e notices were
sent in January and February of2009 long before PHH had anything to do with this account, 4)
Chase was not the Note Holder and by contract not the rightful entity to send the default notice,
5) PHH did not send these notices of default, 6) the Nickersons were told to disregard the
notices, 7) PHH was not the Note Holder, and 8) PHH was in breach by failing to send notice of
default.
283.

In PHH's memorandum in support of summary judgment, PHH claims RESP A

does not apply to the Nickersons mortgage. However, according to RESPA and Caldwell's
actions, the Nickersons mortgage is a "federally related mortgage loan" because the loan was
given as security on residential real property and was intentionally created by the lender for the
purpose of selling to Fannie Mae and was apparently sold to Fannie Mae (Exhibit 10). 12 U.S.C.
§ 2602(1).

284.

In PHH's conclusion section of the memorandum in support of summary

judgment, PHH states the deadline& for producing factual information to support claims have
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long passed. It must be noted that the date of this memorandum for summary judgment is
October 12, 2012 and that PHH did not submit their discovery responses to the Nickersons until
October 18, 2012 which was 5 months after PHH received the discovery requests and 48 days
after the discovery cutoff It is also important to note many of the contradictions noted in this
section of the Nickersons answer have come from the discovery documents.
285.

In PHH's reply brief dated November 1, 2012, PI-ffi once again defends its claim

that the Nickersons received notice of default from Chase which as has already been discussed
was not valid according to the terms of the contract. However, PHH now adds the claim that as
the discovery shows, PHH also sent a notice of default to the Nickersons. As noted above, PHH
had not yet provided the discovery at the time PHH filed their Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment. However, between the time of that memorandum and this reply PHH did
file their discovery, but as PHH has stated the deadlines for producing factual support has long
passed. Therefore, to present the claim that discovery shows PHH also sent a notice of default is
more than contradictory. Also, the notice of default PHH provided with discovery does not

qualify as a notice of default as defined by the Note because PHH was not the "Note Holder" as
defined in the Note (contract) and PHH knew it was inaccurate and in dispute. Therefore, PHH's
claim they were not in breach does not hold up under careful and lawful scrutiny.
286.

PHH has never provided the Nickersons with proper notice of default.

287.

PHH did not provide the Nickersons with proper notice of default prior to these

wrongful foreclosure proceedings as required by law and the contract.

288.

In PHH's trial brief PHH states, "the Nickersons granted a deed of trust naming

PHH as beneficiary." The Nickersons granted a Mortgage to Coldwell not PHH. Also, PHH
cannot claim beneficiary status in the original Mortgage. The record indicates beneficial interest
in the Nickersons Mortgage was allegedly transferred to Chase (Exhibit 11) and then from Chase
to PHH {Exhibit 8). Perhaps PHH is admitting what the Nickersons have stated all along that
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both of those assignments are fraud and neither of those assignments transferred any beneficial
interest.

289.

In the trial brief PHH states "an employee of Chase, not PHH, may have stated

the Nickersons' loan was current. However, the Nickersons have never identified that
employee." In paragraph 20 of the Nickersons amended answer they identified Kim as the Chase
employee who told them they were in good standing.
290.

Noticeably absent from the trial brief is any claim by PHH that they hold the

Nickersons Note. PHH quotes I.C. § 6-101(2) but totally misconstrues the point of that law. The
point is the secured creditor can realize upon collateral for a debt. To be the secured creditor
you must hold the debt (Note) and the security (Mortgage).

291.

In PHH's memorandum in support of plaintiff's second motion for summary

judgment PHH again claims, "the Nickersons granted a deed of trust naming PHH as
beneficiary." The Nickersons granted a Mortgage to Coldwell not PHH. Also, PHH cannot claim
beneficiary status to the original Mortgage. The record indicates beneficial interest in the
Nickersons Mortgage was allegedly transferred to Chase (Exhibit 11) and then allegedly from
Chase to PHH (Exhibit 8). Perhaps PHH knows and is admitting those assignments are fraud, to
conspiring to commit fraud, and that neither of those assignments can or did transfer any
beneficial interest.
292.

In PHH's memorandum in support of plaintiffs second motion for summary

judgment, PHH claims they should get summary judgment of foreclosure on their deed of trust.
The deed of trust they are claiming as theirs is the recorded deed of trust in which Coldwell is the
beneficiary. Again PHH is skipping all of the assignments and going back to the original
recorded deed of trust which is a false and misleading record of what has occurred and what the
Nickersons were told was executed and recorded.
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293.

In PHH's memorandum in support of the plaintiffs second motion for summary

judgment, PHH states, "PHH received the loan from Chase on February

10, 2010. When PHH

received the loan from Chase in February 20 l O... "
a. PHH did not receive the loan from Chase. Chase allegedly transferred servicing
rights to Mortgage Service Center (Exhibit 4). There is nothing in the record
indicating Chase transferred the loan or servicing rights for that matter to PHH in
February of 2010.
b. The alleged transfer of servicing occurred on February 5, 2010, not February 10,
2010 (Exhibit 4).
294.

In PHH's memorandum in support of the plaintiff's second motion for summary

judgment, PHH states, "PHH refused to accept any further payments from the Nickersons until
the total amount in default was paid. (Second Affidavit ofRonald Casperite)." Mr Casperite did
not make that statement in said affidavit.
295.

Noticeably missing from PHH's memorandum in support of Plaintiffs second

motion for summary judgment is any claim by PHH to be the Note holder PHH quotes l.C. § 6-

101(2) but totally misconstrues the point of that law The point is the secured creditor can
realize upon collateral for a debt. To be the secured creditor you must hold the debt (Note) and
the security (Mortgage).
296.

In paragraph 9 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite states, "the

Nickersons' loan during the time Chase serviced the loan and since February 20 l O the time PHH

had the loan.,,
a. Ron Casperite is stating PHH had the loan in February 2010. PHH did not have
the loan and there is nothing in the record from PHH indicating PHH had the loan
in February 2010.
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b. The record demonstrates Chase allegedly transferred servicing to Mortgage
Service Center, a separate legal entity, in February 2010 (Exhibit 4).

297.

In paragraph 11 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite states,

"Just prior to Chase returning the Nickersons' Joan ... " Chase did not return the Nickersons' loan.
Chase allegedly transferred servicing (Exhibit 4). Chase could not "return" the loan to PHH
because PHH never had it.
298.

In paragraph 10 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite states,

"From November 2007 through December 2009 the Nickersons were obligated to pay 26
monthly payments. During that time period the Nickersons only made 17 monthly payments. The
Nickersons failed to make 9 monthly payments causing their loan to go into default." As of
December 2009, the total amount for 9 missed payments is $20,960.91. However, in the affidavit
of Chase employee in suppo11 of summary judgment, Brandie S. Watkins presents, in letters
dated December 7, 2009, a conflicting amount of$28,368.84 of which $27,514.84 was due to
missed payments. This contradictory evidence, at a minimum, clearly and deeply demonstrates
the total lack of integrity, credibility and reliability of Chase's and PHH' s account records and
history.
299.

In paragraph l3 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite states,

"Upon PHH's receipt from Chase of the Nickersons' loan ... " Chase did not transfer the
Nickersons' loan. Chase allegedly transferred servicing (Exhibit 4).
300.

In paragraph 14 of the second affidavit of Ron Casperite, Mr. Casperite states,

"Since February 2010 the Nickersons have not made any further payments on the loan, nor have
the Nickersons cured their default." However, in Mr. Casperite's first affidavit he stated PHH
declined to accept any further payments. There is a big difference in stating the Nickersons have
not made payments and stating PHH declined to accept payments.
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301.

A careful comparison of Mr. Casperite' s illustrative loan history (Second Affidavit

of Ronald E Casperite, Exhibit C) and Chase's detailed transaction history (Exhibit 18) reveals
the following contradictions:

a. The illustrative loan history Principal Balance column Transaction Dates
7/21/2009 thru the second entry on 10/3/2009 are blank. There is nothing there.
However, a careful review of the detailed transaction history for these dates show
a Principal Balance of $391. 52.

b. The next entry on the illustrative loan history Transaction Date J0/3/2009 has a
Principal Balance of $261,170.62 and on the detailed transaction history it is
$0.00.
c. The next entry on the illustrative loan history that has an entry for a Principal
Balance is Transaction Date l l/11/2009 with a balance of$261, 170.62. Even
though a payment was credited on that date with a principal amount of $391. 52
which would normally reduce the Principal Balance, Mr. Casperite did not credit
the $391.52 against his Principal Balance of $261,170.62. The detailed transaction
history also shows a payment was credited on 11/11/2009 with a principal amount
of $391.52 which brought the Principal Balance to $0.00.
d. The next entry on the illustrative loan history that has an entry for a Principal
Balance is Transaction Date 12/11/2009 with a balance of $260,777.05. The
detailed transaction history Principal Balance is $-393.57.

e. The next entry on the illustrative loan history that has an entry for a Principal
Balance is Transaction Date 1/13/2010 with a balance of $260,381.42. The
detailed transaction history Principal Balance is $-789 .20.
f

The last entry on the illustrative loan history that has an entry for a Principal
Balance prior to the alleged transfer of servicing the loan to Mortgage Service
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Center is Transaction Date 1/21/2010 with a balance of S259,983.72. The detailed
transaction history Principal Balance is $-1, J 86. 90

302.

The second affidavit of Ron Casperite is not notarized. This is a violation of the

law and is an affront to the judicial process. The notary stamped the affidavit but did not sign it.
"A signed notarization is the ultimate assurance upon which the whole world is entitled to rely
that the proper person signed a document on the stated day and place. Local, interstate 1 and
international transactions involving individuals, banks, and corporations proceed smoothly
because all may rely upon the sanctity of the notary's seal. .. 'The proper functioning of the legal
system depends on the honesty of notaries who are entrusted to verify the signing of legally
significant documents! ... a false notarization is a crime and undermines the integrity of our
institutions upon which all must rely upon the faithful fulfillment of the notary's oath." Klem v.

Washington lviut. Bank, 176 Wash. 2d 771,295 P.3d 1179 (2013).
303.

PHH starts off their motion to take judicial notice by stating "the Harrises request

the Idaho Supreme Court to take judicial notice." The motion was filed on behalf of PHH in the
Second Judicial District, not on behalf of the Harrises for the Idaho Supreme Court.

304.

[n PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

Pllll states, "Failure to properly preserve fraud as an affirmative defense in an answer is fatal to
a party's ability to rely on that defense at summary judgment, McKee Bros., Ltd v. Mesa

Equipment, Inc., l 02 fdaho 202, 628 P.2d 103 6 ( 1981 )" This is a total contradiction and
misinterpretation of what the Court ruled in McKee Bros., Ltd v. Mesa. What the Court actually

stated is quoted below.
'"In response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the defendant filed an affidavit
alleging fraud on the part of the plaintiff The court below concluded that the defendant
might be able to establish the necessary elements of fraud and therefore ordered that "if
Defendant files an amended answer properly setting up such defense within ten days, and
]eave is hereby granted therefor, then the motion for summary judgment must
accordingly be denied.'"
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305.

In PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "At the time PHH filed this action, there is no question it was the beneficiary under
the deed of trust and had standing to foreclose."
a.

Alleged beneficial interest in a deed of trust does not prove standing in a judicial

foreclosure action. In a judicial foreclosure action the Plaintiff must own, prove
ownership and hold both the Note and Mortgage.

b. PHH did not have beneficial interest in the Note or M01tgage at the time PHH
filed this action. Chase allegedly purchased the Note on December 3, 2009,
(Exhibit 9) and still claims to be the investor and holder of the Note (Exhibit I).

c. The J'\ickersons had clearly questioned, adamantly denied and challenged PHH' s

interest and standing and PHH has failed and refused to legitimately and legally
prove they have standing.
d. The Nickersons did not knowingly or willingly execute a Deed of Trust.

306.

In PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "PHH is the beneficiary under the deed of trust." Again PHH could not be and is not
the beneficiary under the deed of trust because Chase did not and has not transferred, assigned,
or sold the Nickersons Note and Mortgage to PHH. See Exhibits 1 and 9. Further, the Nickerson
did not execute a deed of trust.
307.

In PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "Tn the event a deed of trust is recorded against real property exceeding 40 acres, the
remedy is to treat the deed of trust as a mortgage because by statute the trustee is not authorized
to exercise power of sale in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Frazier v. Neilsen & Co , 115
Idaho 739, 769 P. 2d 1111, 1114 (1989). Exceeding the statutorily authorized acreage amount
does not render a deed of trust invalid; rather, it prevents nonjudicial foreclosure by a trustee
with power of sale. As a matter oflaw, the Nickersons' argument has no merit."
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a.

As a matter of law, "Because the legislature has created a separate scheme for
deeds of trust, the rationale for Brown v. Bryan, that mongages and deeds of trust
are functional equivalents, is undercut. The legislature obviously intended
separate treatment; therefore, they are not functionally the same. A mortgage and

a deed of trust are also separately defined. Compare I.C. § 45-901 with LC. § 451502(3). " Frazier v. Neilsen & Co, Id. Exceeding the statutorily authorized
acreage amount is not lawful.
b. As a matter of law, a deed of trust was illegally used and can have no binding on
the Nickersons or their property and therefore, the use thereof is fraudulent.
c. Just Law, on their own website, states; "Action on a deed of trust is governed by
I.C. §§ 45-1502 through 45-1515. A deed of trust may be used to secure a Joan
when the trust property consists of 40 acres or less, or is real propeny located
within an incorporated city or village at the time of transfer." Just Law in
providing Idaho law summary is admitting a deed of trust could not be used on
the Nickersons' fifty (50) acre property.
d. Just Law, knowing it was illegal to non-judicially foreclose on the Nickerson' s
property, attempted a non-judicial foreclosure anyway. Just Law only stopped the
non-judicial because the Nickersons counsel threatened legal action and pointed
out their civil and criminal liability and exposure, if they proceeded.
e. Coldwell's representations and assurances at closing was the Nickersons were

getting a mortgage.
308.

In PI-Il-I's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "There are no genuine issues of material fact regarding PHH's position as ~ate
Holder." The material fact is PHH was not and is not the Note Holder. Chase claims to have

purchased the Nickersons Note in December of 2009 and maintains they are in possession of the
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note and are the investor on the loan as of January 10, 2014. See Exhibits 1 and 9. Further,
simply stating, implying or making other such conclusory statements to show one has position as
Note Holder does not meet the standing requirements in a judicial foreclosure. PHH has
systematically and categorically failed to demonstrate and unequivocally not presented any
factual evidence proving their position as is necessary to prove standing, o\vnershi p and their
Note Holder status. affirm anti non neganti iticumhit prohatio - the burden of proof is upon him
who affirms, not upon him who denies
309.

In PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

Plill states, "Using language from a recorded assignm·ent of the deed of trust, the Nickersons
contend Coldwell Banker did not have any interest in the note or deed as of the date of the
assignment. Although the Nickersons reference a paragraph from their memorandum as
supporting the alleged fact, there are no facts before the court sustaining the Nickersons'

argument."
a. The first fact before the court was the assignment from Coldwell to Chase ·which
was first referenced by PHH in their complaint
b. The second fact before the court was introduced in evidence by PHH in their
responses to interrogatories in which they claim Co]dwell transferred the loan to
Fannie Mae and is evidenced by Exhibit 10 in which Fannie Mae claims
ownership from December 2002 to December 2009.
c. Based on these facts Coldwell could not transfer ownership and beneficial interest

in the Note and Mortgage to Chase because Fannie Mae had ownership and
beneficial interest at the time of the assignment.
310.

In PHH' s response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "Regardless of whether PHH held beneficial interest at the time Just Law, Inc, was
appointed successor trustee, it is irrelevant to this judicial foreclosure action." PHH and Just Law
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are showing a very flippant attitude toward breaking the law and insuring everything filed in the
county land records is accurate. These are felony offenses. The Nickersons assert PHH breaking
the law is not irrelevant. The Nickersons request the Court take notice of the seriousness and
severity of PHH's statements and take appropriate action to insure justice is served.

311.

In PHH's response in opposition to Nickersons' motion for summary judgment,

PHH states, "In part the Nickersons assert fraud because of the a11eged absence of a letter from
PHH constituting notice of new creditor. The Nickersons contend the absence of such letter
violates the Truth in Lending Act. All of the Nickersons' claims in their counterclaim were
dismissed by summary judgment. They cannot now resurrect those claims."
a.

PHH does not claim to have se11t a notice of new creditor nor defend the violation.

b. The Nickersons counsel did net allege a violation of the Truth in Lending Act in
the original counterclaim so they were not resurrecting any claim. The 1\ickersons
were simply presenting a fact to the court. However, it would be proper and
appropriate for this court to revisit the decision to discuss the Nickersons claims
in light of the fraudulent representations PHH and Chase used to manipulate that

decisiott
c. Further, PHH, Just Law and their attorneys of record concealed evidence, refused
to provide discovery, submitted fraudulent documents and instruments, obstructed
justice, oppressed the Nickersons and their counsel, conspired against the
Nickersons, prohibited justice being served, and committed other such acts as to

get the Nickersons counterclaim dismissed.
312.

PHH, in their objection to supplemental evidence states, "The Nickersons attempt

to present supplemental evidence without affidavit." However, page 4 of the Nickersons notice
of supplemental evidence is an affidavit of Charles Nickerson introducing the supplemental
evidence into the record.
Exhibit 1
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313.

The Nickersons have identified over one hundred (100) discrepancies,

contradictions and falsehoods made by PHH in the record. The above list is not comprehensive
and every instance identified is documented by the evidence. Therefore, since alfegans contrllri11

non e.{,t audiendus - one making contradictory statements is not to be heard,frustra legis

auxi/ium quaerit qui in legem comittit - he who offends against the law vainly seeks the help of
the law, andfraus omnia vitiat- fraud vitiates everything, PHH's complaint should and must be
dismissed.

314.

In light of the overwhelming amount of contradictions, discrepancies and

falsehoods presented above, the Nickersons would like to point the Court's and Just Law's

attention to I.C. § 3-201. Duties of Attorneys. "In addition to such duties as the Supreme Court
may by rule prescribe, it is the duty of the attorney and counselor:
1. To support the constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
3. To cow1sel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as appear to him
legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.

4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means
only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by an artifice or

false statement of fact or law.
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his clients.
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged.
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding from any motive of passion or interest.
Exhibit l
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8. Never to reject for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless
or the oppressed."

315.

"Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he

also reap." Galatians 6:7
316.

"Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin."

James 4:17

Exhibit I
Page 22 of22
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6

7
8

PHH MORTGAGE,

9

Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-I{espondent,

10
11

Supreme Court Docket No. 42163-2014
Cleanvater County No. 2011-28

V.
12
13

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON

14

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,

15

16
17
18
19

20

and
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE and JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, NA,
Third Party Defendants-Respondenls.

21

22

COMES

Charles and Donna Nickerson, Appellants, in accordance with J.A.R. 40,

41 and 1 l.2(a) submit this Objection to Costs and fees and Motion for Sanctions.
24
25

We, the Nickersons, contend Chase, Jon Stenquist and his firm should not be awarded

26

fees, but rather, should be sanctioned in accordance \Vith I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(l) and I.A.R. l 1.2(a) for

27

signing and certifying documents to the Court "that to the best of the signer's knowledge,

28

information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact. The admissions,

29

interrogatories. briefs and affidavits of Chase presented to the Supreme Comi in the record

30

contain st~tements that are false, not supported by any evidence and conflict with the facts the

31

Court deemed to be undisputed and relied upon to rule against us.
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are

statements
2

The Nickersons missed 11 payments while Chase ·was servicing the note.

3

Freddie Mac purchased the Nickersons' note from Coldwell Banker.

4

PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac.

5

Chase never mvned the Nickersons' note.

6
7

The Nickersons missed l

8

Freddie Mac purchased the Nickersons' note from Coldwell Banker.

9

PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac.
Chase never owned the Nickersons' note.

10

lI

payments while Chase was servicing the note.

statements

A

12

The Nickersons missed 11 payments \Vhile Chase was servicing the note.

13

Freddie Mac purchased the Nickersons' note from Coldwell Banker.

]4

o

PHH repurchased the note from Freddie Mac.

l.5

Chase denied receiving the note in November 2007.

16

Chase never owned the Nickersons' note.

17

Chase and Mr. Stenquist' s continual and persistent presentation of false information to

18

the District Court and now this Court has needlessly increased the cost of this litigation by

19

forcing it to continue and their actions should bar them from any awards of fees or costs. Their

20

deliberate obstruction of evidence by blocking all access to our account records and creating

21

circumstantial impossibilities in conducting discovery laid the foundation for the judgments

22

rendered and forced this appeal. This level of blatant legal and procedural chicanery,
manipulation of the legal system, and intentionally abusive debt collection practices reek of

24

organized fraud, violates any claimed integrity of the banking industry and invalidates the

1.5

constitutional protections of the Idaho judicial system.

- He who offends against the law

26
27

28

vainly seeks the help of the law.
Allowing them to prevail and be rewarded codifies their ability to destroy not only the

29

Nickersons, but sets precedents that grants them access to the life savings and financial pmifolios

30

of all Idaho homeowners. In fact, it creates authority that can be pointed to tlu·oughout the

3l

Circuit and across the United States of America.

9th

32

Objection to Cos\s and Fees and Motion for Sanctions
Page 1. of1.7

137

In Respondent Chase's brief under the statement of facts section, p. 3. (Exhibit 1) Chase
2

states falsely without any supporting or admissible evidence, ''the Nickersons were at least 11

3

months behind in their scheduled payments on the Note. R. 330, 44 J

4

repurchased the Note from Freddie Mac and began servicing the Note. This Court affirmed the

5

District Court's belief (based on PHH's <:valuation of Chase account records) that we had

6

allegedly only missed 9 payments thus impeaching Chase's testimony. Page 330 of the Record is

7

Mr. Stenquist's affidavit in vv'hich he states,

. In February 2010, PHH

have access to my client's files in this matter and

make this affidavit based upon personal knowledge ... " and introduces a "true and correct copy
9

of the Nickersons' paymem history provided to the Nickersons on May 13, 2010, detailing all

10

payments made to Chase on the Note from 2008 through 2010.'' Exhibit 2 (R. 330, 331 ). On a

11

side note, the final principal balance on this account record is $-1,186.90. Exhibit 3 (R. 443).

12

Additional moneys were also held in cscro\N and suspense accounts. True discovery will prove

]3

any claims the Nickersons were behind in their scheduled payments in February 20 IO to be

14

irrefutably false. In addition, there was and is no evidence present that PHH acquired our Note

15

from Freddie Mac. There is no evidence that Freddie Mac ever had any involvement with our

16

loan even though Chase has repeated this clairn in multiple documents. Freddie Mac denied

17

involvement upon inquiry by the Nickersons. This claim is only a bald assenion from Mr.

18

Stenquist with no foundation or factual basis in the undisputed material facts section of his

19

memorandum in support of summary judgment. Exhibit 4 (R. 53 7). Further, this assertion does

20

not correspond with the facts presented by this Court. "In December of 2002, the note \vas

21

assigned to Fannie Mae, and J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the note in November of 2007, at

22

which point Chase Home Financial began servicing the loan. In February of 2010, Mortgage
Service Center resumed responsibility for loan servicing, and in June of 2010, Chase assigned

24

the note to PHH." Opinion, p. 2. This Court specifically states Chase acquired the note in 2007

25

and assigned it to PHH in June 2010. I-Imvever, not only did Mr. Stenquist claim PHH

26

n;purchased the loan from Freddie Mac. Mr. Stenquist specifically denied Chase acquired the

27

note in 2007, Exhibit 5 (R. p. 109, L. 11 and p. 128, L. 2-5), and stated 8 times in response to our

28

interrogatories and requests for production that Chase did not own our note, they were a servicer

29

only. Exhibit 7 (R. 747-751, 759, 760). l\llr. Stenquist, knowing the facts presented by this Court

30

because they are the same facts presented in the District Court's judgment, still persisted in

31

presenting f,'11se, contrary and conflicting information cloaked as facts to this Court.

32

Objection to Cos1s and Fees and Motion for Sanctions

Page 3 of 27

138

It is axiomatic to point out to this Court a genuine issue of material fact exists when the
2

two parties opposing the Nickersons present contrary and conflicting material facts that impeach

3

each other's testimony especially when neither of their facts are supported by any foundational,

4

circumstantial or inferential evidence that is rooted in truth whatsoever.
More examples of bow Mr. Stenquist who has sworn to have access and personal

5
6

knowledge of Chase's files and has the complete record in this case, has persisted in presenting

7

statements that are false, misleading, contradictory and not grounded in tru!h or fact at all were

8

included in our appellate brief- p. 21

9

should be held in violation of these rules as well because he signed Chase's brief which

and pp. 47-48. In addition, Mr. Kirk J. Houston

lo

contained the knmvn to be false statements of fact regarding missing payments and Freddie Mac.

ll

Chase's brief, p. 3. In accordance with the civil and appellate rules, we move the Court sanction,

l:Z

not pay Mr. Stenquist, Mr. Houston and their firm for knO\vingly presenting statements that arc

13

1101

14

comprehensively false. As attorneys, their oaths and licensures obligate them to behave in

15

manners that support and uphold laws, not manipulate and break them. Therefore to him that

16

knowe!h to do good, and doeth if not, to him if is sin. These maliciously false statements create

17

extreme prejudice, substantial damages and significant injuries toward the Nickersons and have

18

resulted in judgments not based on the merits or true facts of the case.

19

grounded in fact, and are indeed, as the record demonstrates, collectively and

Further, please consider the evidence withheld by Mr. Stenquist and Chase in this case.

20

Tvir. Stenquist claims to have personal knowledge of Chase's files, yet when in discovery we

21

requested Chase and

22

purposefully, based on reasonable inference, failed to provide the notice of new creditor letter

23

dated December

24

Exhibit 9 (R. 1139, 1140). This federally mandated notice of new creditor refutes Mr. Stenquist's

25

claims that Chase never owned our note and contradicts the "facts" cited in the Opinion. This

26

admission would have required Chase produce witness testimony, account notations and taped

27

conversations that vwulcl not only defeat Summary Judgment in their favor but establish extreme

28

negligence in record keeping, demonstrate the intent to defraud the Nickersons, and implicate

29

Chase in criminal wrongdoing, not only with the Nickerson account, but other accounts as well.

30

Even more glaring is Mr. Stenquist' s and Chase's omission that Chase is the real party in interest

31

- owner, holder and investor - on our note. In Chase's federally mandated response dated

32

January 10, 201

. Stenquist provide all correspondence from Chase to us, Mr. Stenquist

2009, in which Chase states they purchased our loan on December

2009.

to our qualified written request, Chase states "We are not required to produce
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the original note which 'vVill remain in our possession ... The investor for this loan is JPMorgan
2

Chase Bank, National Association. Exhibit 10 (R. 1232). By withholding and concealing this

3

evidence necessary to defeat Summary Judgment and prove our claims, Mr. Stenquist and Chase

4

have committed fraud against us and the Court. This is further compounded when Mr. Stenquist

5

not only denied producing discovery by concealing the truths regarding the ownership of our

6

note but also restricted us from further discovery and access to Chase as guaranteed by federal

7

lending laws and regulations. 12 C.F.R.

8

\Vith accurate and timely information and documents in response to the borrower's requests for

9

information with respect to the borrower·s mortgage loan." Because Chase refused to provide

!i l 024.38 requires servicers to "(iii) Provide a borrov11er

10

needed discovery regarding our records and our attempts to circumvent the fallout of their

11

fraudulent actions, we reached out to Chase to verify IVIoffatt Thomas was in fact representing

12

Chase and to secure our personal records. Jon Stenquist not only failed to provide the

13

information, but he put us on notice that Moffatt Thomas is our only authorized contact for

14

Chase and demanded we cease and desist from contacting Chase directly. Since Moffatt Thomas

15

refused to provide information on our account by hiding under the cloak they do not have access

16

to the records because they \Vere only the Servicer and we were threatened not to contact Chase

17

directly, hmv can this Court or the District Court require us to present direct evidence that we are

I {)()

unable to attain due to the unlawful actions of opposing counsel? Extensive witness testimony,

19

detailed account notations, taped conversations with Chase employees and other third parties

20

confirm \\:e were victims of abusive debt collection, prevented from performance and that our

21

account records spent enormous amounts of time in research and correction trying to maintain
the truthful and factual status of the account solely due to Chase's incompetent record keeping
practices and fraudulent attempts to steal the equity in our ranch. See two letters from us and a

24

letter from Jon Stenquist. Exhibits 11-13.

25

Therefore, Chase must not be av,rarded attorney fees. Rather, Chase and their

26

representation in this case should be sanctioned and criminally punished for presenting false

27

evidence, for omitting evidence that proves all our claims, and for using their false statements to

28

withhold and conceal discovery. The deliberate lies and willful concealment of evidence by

29

Chase and those acting on their behalf created impossibility and hardship for us in defending

30

against their conflicting stories. prevented us from securing justice, and maliciously blocked our

31

finding appropriate or timely relief. In addition, their actions created prejudice in our

32

presentation because of being forced to defend additional issues rather than keeping to the main

Objection lo Cos,s and Fees and Motion for Sanctions
Page 5 of27

140

points: PHH does not

O\Vn

our loan: ,ve did not default; PHH and Chase intentionally prevented

2

and sabotaged our performance. Evidence, witness testimony, account records, account notations

3

and taped conversations in Chase's possession irrefutably prove it. Justice Horton, Chase and

4

Mr. Stenquist arc responsible for needlessly increasing the costs of this litigation. V../e are

s

pleading with you and the rest of the Court to see this and act appropriately. No attorney fees or

6

costs should be awarded to Chase, but rather, Mr. Stenquist and the other attorneys of his firm

7

should be sanctioned for presenting false information as fact. We have reached out to Moffatt

8

Thomas, their managing partners, directors and others asking them to come forward with the

9

truths of this matter. See Exhibit 14. Their silence implicates them as accomplices defrauding om

10
11

family and committing fraud on 1his Court and the State ofidaho.
The recognized and undeniable shenanigans of Chase have contributed to the necessity
and costs of this appeal. We did not escalate this case to you frivolously and therefore attorney

13

fees in favor of Chase should not be awarded. Rather, we came to you pleading for help, relief

14

and justice v,1ith the evidence we have been allO\vecl to enter in the record, but without the benefit

15

of all the evidence provided to our attorney that \vould support claims of fraud being properly in

16

the record. Nonetheless, the evidence in the record and even the findings of this Court and the

17

District Court are enough to create genuine issues of material fact and circumstantial evidence

!8

that any person could use to make reasonable inferences. The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled

19

"[ c Jircumstantial evidence is competent 10 establish negligence and proximate cause." KRINITT

20

v. Idaho Dept. of'Fish and Gome, 357 P.3d 850, 159 Idaho 125 (2015). Whether or not we have

21

successfully overcome the procedural web created by the negligence of our former attorney or
surmounted the legal system manipulation and fraud of opposing counsels, the circumstantial
evidence and conflicting evidence surrounding this case creates genuine issues of material fact

24

that deserve and require summary judgment in favor of Chase be defeated, the opinion we have

25

brought this case before the Supreme Court frivolously be reversed, and any attorney fees in

26

favor of Chase be denied. The basis for these attorney fees is because the Supreme Court found

27

we brought this case frivolously. We cannot be required to produce direct evidence that has been

28

unlawfully but systematically withheld from us and hidden from the Court or that the Court bas

29

refused to look at. We contend it might be easier for us to get a camel through a needle's eye

30

than for us to have compelled Clearwater County Judge Michael Griffin to look at our evidence

3l

impartially when the true status of this case was revealed to us. Judge Griffin repeatedly denied
motions or ignored them so they became deemed denied \Vithout providing legal authority or
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basis. Non-existent reasons and unprovided legal basis cannot be cited or properly refuted by a
2

prose litigant or a licensed attorney. Directing this Court's attention to specific citations in the

3

record or adverse rulings is impossible when the District Court failed to provide memorandums

4

or legal basis in support of his adverse rulings. It is unjust to punish us for the failure of an Idaho

5

District Court Judge failing to properly fulfill his responsibilities. Therefore, the Nickersons

6

request this Court reverse their opinion this case was brought frivolously and instead sanction

7

Chase and their representatives for thwarting justice and sabotaging the proceedings at the

8

District Court and Supreme Court levels.

9

Io

The Nickersons allege and reallege, state and restate, each and every allegation, statement

lI

and argument above as if set forth in its entirety in this statement and incorporate this statement

12

in the above Statement In Support of Motion for Sanctions.

13

1. Chase's only involvement \vith this appeal should be in regards to the Summary

l4

Judgment rendered in their favor on 1 1/16/12. This Summary Judgment occurred and is due to

l5 '

the admitted misconduct and negligence of our former counsel, John Mitchell. All further

16

proceedings were prejudiced by the condition he left our case in when he secretly withdrevv from

17

our case. As Mr. Mitchell stated in his affidavit (Exhibit 8, SAR. 69-70), vve had no idea

18

summary judgment on our counterclaims and third-party complaint had been sought by Chase

19

and PHH, heard by the District Court and awarded by the District Court. Mr. Mitchell's

20

negligence, by his actions and inactions. in presenting and nol properly presenting our claims

21

against Chase and successfully compelling discovery from Chase resulted in summary judgment

22

against us. We were not requested or permitted to present any affidavits or other evidence to
prosecute our claims. No meaningful discovery was allowed to be pursued by us. Further, Mr.

24

Mitchell told us a motion to compel Chase and PHH to provide the requested discovery was

25

denied by the Court so our case had been moved to the Appeal Courts. Additionally, we were

26

deprived of the opportunity to depose any representatives from Chase or PHH regarding our

27

account records, communication records and account notations. Mr. Mitchell's negligence,

28

deception and inability to navigate the malicious prejudice created by opposing counsels he ,vas

29

fighting in Judge Griffin's courtroom prevented us from participating in, developing and

30

pn~senting our case properly. Mr. Mitchell stated in his affidavit, "The Nickersons' case ,.vas not

31

clecidecl on the merits and really no meaningful discovery was ever answered by the Plaintiffs.

32

There is no prejudice to the Plaintiffs in allowing the Nickersons to have discovery done

Objection to Costs and Fees and 1Vlotion for Sanctions
Page 7 of 27

142

properly and have the underlying case and their counterclaims decided on the facts of the case
2

and not have the case decided because of an incompetent mentally unfit at the time attorney who

3

did not know hmv to handle the mess that he created." This Court has held, "It is said that,

4

where it appears that a judgment was taken against appellant through the negligence of an

5

attorney \Vho had been employed by such party, nothing is left to the discretion of the cowi, and

6

the judgment must be set aside." Pierce

7

addition, this Court clearly recognizes the importance of a case being properly set up from the

8

begi1u1i11g.

9

adequately presented in district court. .. they may have come out substantially better.'' Hilliard v.

Vialpando. 78 Idaho 274, 301 P.2d 1099 (1956). In

stated by J. Jones in a recent special concurrence: "Had the ... case been

10

1Hwphy Lone! Company. LLC. No. 42093-2014 (May 21, 2015). Therefore, because Chase's

Il

continued involvement in this case and the appeal is solely due to the negligence of our attorney,

11

Chase's attorney fees cannot be ascribed to us. Also. according to the law, the summary

13

judgments dismissing our counterclaims and third-party complaint must be set aside. We will

14

expound more on this poin1 in our Briefln Support of Petition For Rehearing.

2. As detailed in the Statement In Support Of Sanctions above, the Nickersons' appeal of

15

16

the prejudicial and conflicting memorandums, interlocutory orders and judgments rendered by

17

Judge Michael Griffin in an attempt to secure justice cannot be rightfully or truthfully judged

18

frivolous. Thus, no claim for attorney fees by Chase can be awarded. We contend seeking to

19

protect and enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness cannot be deemed frivolous,

20

unreasonable or vvithout foundation in any setting or environment. The Nickersons have filed a

11

Petition For Rehearing in \Vhich we \viii further demonstrate the merits of the appeal and the
truthful fact that our appeal for justice was not and is not frivolous. Therefore, before any award
of fees occurs, we request the Petition For Rehearing and its supporting brief be reviewed in their

24

entirety.
3. \V c should not be required to pay the fees of more than one attorney nor for any fees

25

26

that do not directly relate to the appeal nor for any fees that cannot be ascertained as to 1.vhat they

27

specifically are for. It is axiomatic that it is not our responsibility to bring additional lawyers up

28

to speed in order to write a brie( attend hearings or represent their client. H is not our

29

responsibility or the Court's to guess what has been redacted. If they want to ascribe a fee to the

30

appeal, then we and the Court must be able to determine it v.,ras a legitimate expense toward the

31

appeal.
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2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10

1l
12

13
14

the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award
accordingly ... Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good foith effort to exclude
from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or othervvise unnecessary ... The
applicant should exercise "billing judgment" with respect to hours worked, see supra, at
43 and should maintain billing tin1e records in a manner that vvill enable a reviewing
103 S. Ct. 1933,
court to identity distinct claims.'' Hensley v. Eckerharf, 461 U
76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (l 983)
"many of the submitted time records lack sufficient detail to permit the Court to ascertain
if the time expended was reasonably necessary, redundant, or excessive. The records are
replete with vague entries such as "[g]ather information and respond to client's request,"
"[i]dentify and prepare documen1s," "appeal communications," "correspondence,"
"review memos," "review documents and issues," "revievv background materials,"
"maintenance of pleading documents for electronic clip," "document research," etc. It is
appropriate to reduce the compensable number of hours on this basis. See Miller v.
Woodharbor Molding & IVIillworks, Inc., 174 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that
inadequate documentation may result in a reduced fee). Similarly, Dominos' counsel has
heavily redacted the time sheets submitted with the Motion, and those redactions
generally leave the Court in the dark as to the precise nature of the work performed.
Courts routinely reduce fee requests where redactions leave it impossible to discern the
appropriateness of counsel's vmrk.

15

16
17

18
19

20
21
22

24
25

16
27
28
29
30
31

Dominos has nowhere explained why it required the services of so many different
lawyers. And, the involvement of so many "cooks in the kitchen" has resulted in a
significant amount of redundancy and overlapping billing. As the Gorman court noted,
"[i]t may be reasonable to expect a client to pay the cost of having several lawyers ... ,
and of course a client can elect to pay an unreasonable sum for his or her representation.
However, the issue deserves scrutiny \;vhen the prevailing party asks the losing party to
assume that extra financial burden." Bores v. Domino's Pizza LLC Civ. No. 05-2498
(RHK/JSM) (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2008).
"Ideal is entitled to discover the information it requires to appraise the reasonableness of
the amount of fees requested by IFIC, including the nature and extent of the work done
by IFIC's counsel on various phases of the case, so that it may present to the court any
legitimate challenges to IFIC's claim. See National Ass'n of'Concemed Veterans v.
S'ecretwy qfDe/ense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1329 (D.C.Cir.1982). IFIC may opt to withhold
billing statements under a claim of attorney client privilege; however, where IFIC's
assertion of a privilege results in the \vithholcling of information necessary to Ideal's
defense to IFIC's claim against it, the privilege must give way to Ideal's right to mount a
defense. Under the common law doctrine of implied waiver, the attorney client privilege
is waived when the client places otherwise privileged matters in controversy. See 6
JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., l'v100RE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 26.49[5] (3d
ecl.1997).
By claiming indemnification of attorney's fees from Ideal and offering the billing
statements as evidence of the same, IFIC waived its attorney client privilege with respect
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2

4

5
G

7
8
9

lO
11

12
13

14
15

16

17
18
19

10
21

to the redacted portions of the billing statements and any other communications going to
the reasonableness of the amount of the fee award." lcleal Electronic Sec. Co. v. Intern.
Fidelity ins., 129 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Based upon the findings in Ideal, the Nickersons move this Court compel Chase provide
the REDACTED billing information in

Memorandum of Costs and Fees and resubrnit this

document to the Court accordingly in order for the Nickersons to mount a defense to those
charges. The Nickersons must have this information in order to overcome this obstacle to
investigation and there is no way for the Court to correctly ascertain or determine if the fees
requested are reasonable and necessary unless the REDACTED information is disclosed. Chase
bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the time and effort claimed
was necessary and justified. This cannot be done with vague, unclear or REDACTED entries.

By making this request for attorney fees, and voluntarily submitting the Memorandum of
Costs and Fees as a whole, Chase has placed the entire contents at issue, and thereby waives any
claim of la,vyer-client privilege regarding specific REDACTED entries. UNITED HERITAGE
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY C01\1PANYv. FARlvfERS ALLIANCE J\!JUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, No. CIV. 1: 10-456 WBS (D. Idaho July 26, 2011)

The Nickersons right to a fair trial, the circumstantial evidence surrounding this case and
the intentional and unintentional actions and inactions of Chase in preventing discovery, and the
Nickerson's access to federally mandated records that should have been provided to the
Nickersons in the normal course of business but were not, compels the REDACTED information
be provided in the interest of justice. A suppression of truth is equivalent to an expression of
falsehood. Chase, nor their attorneys, have the lawful right to conceal discovery in order to

7'

_.)

defraud the Nickersons so Chase and their accomplices can secure unjust gain, evade civil
14
25

16

liability, and escape criminal prosecution. The Nickersons believe Chase is concealing the
REDACTED identity and information in their memorandum to further evade discovery.
In addition, the lawyer-client privilege has been waived in accordance with I.R.E. 502.

27

28
19
30

502 (cl) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lavvyer were sought or obtained
to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud;

3l

Objection to Cos1_s and Fees and Motion for Sanctions
Page l O of27

145

Chase has specifically retained the services of Moffatt Thomas and Jon Stenquist in order
2

to aid them in wrongfully foreclosing on the Nickersons and evading any civil liability or

3

exposure they have created for themselves in their treatment of the Nickersons and their account.

4

According to Mr. Benjamin Ritchie in a recent webinar, "The party asserting the

5

[attorney-client] privilege bears the burden of proving each element." Fee entries must

6

specifically relate to legal advice given, not communication regarding factual matters or business

7

advice. He pointed out that in T3 Enterprises, Inc v. Safeguard Business Systems the Court

8

conducted a revie,v, and "found that a number of ... [the email comnrnnications] concerned

9

factual matters and business advice, not legal advice.''

10

The statements and arguments presented in regards to specific entries throughout this

II

objection should not in any way convey we are acknowledging, conceding or agreeing to the

12

veracity, authenticity or legitimacy of the fees submitted. In addition to the fact we believe we

13

are not responsible for any of Chase's attorney fees, based upon the case law presented above

14

and common sense, we specifically contest the following:

15

08/01/14 BCR 0.80 132.80 Research Idaho Appellate Rules and Idaho Rules of

16

Civil Procedure - Note: Maintaining competency in the rules is a cost of doing

17

business and should not be charged.

18

08/01/14 JAS 0.40 77.20 Correspondence with client regarding REDACTED

19

REDACTED - Note: No way to lmmv if this was specifically regarding the

20

appeal. See request above.

21

10/24/14 BCR 1.10 182.60 Review and analyze issues and strategies relating to
pending appeal in Idaho Supreme Court and pending motions in the District Court
- Note: Pending motions in District Court vlere not regarding the appeal and any

24

time spent on those motions are not fees related to the appeal. Review and analyze

25

issues and straLegics is too vague.

26

I0/28/J 4 JAS 0.10 19.30 Revie\v Court's Order regarding Nickerson recent

27

motion and briefing schedule

28

Court's order regarding the Nickersons' 60(b) motions and is not related to the

29

appeal.

30

0

Note: This entry can only refer to the District

11/18/14 JAS 0.30 57.90 Review Motion for Clarification filed by Nickersons in

31

response to Court's Order

32

not related to the appeal nor did this motion have anything whatsoever to do \>s'ith

Note: This is regarding District Court matters and is
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Chase. We should not be billed for Chase's obsession with pushing this
2

foreclosure through in their feeble attempt to cover their very exposed backsides.

3

The first question asked by Chase upon bulldogging their way into being a party

4

in this case was "\\/hat do we want? I know my client has a lot of exposure here."

5

11

Ci

district court's denial of post judgment motions - Note: Settlement proceedings

7

initiated by Chase regarding District Comt's denial is not a part of the appeal.

8

12/10/14BCR 1.40

9

researching rules is a cost of doing business not a cost of appeal. How much of

4 BCR 0.90 149.40 Review and analyze settlement strategies in wake of

Research Idaho Appellate Rules ... - Note: Time spent

10

this time was spent on researching rules?

11

01 /28/15 BCR 1.10 182.60 Review and analyze the Nickersons' third notice of

12

appeal and issues related thereto - Note: We should not be required to pay two

!3

attorneys to perform the same task. See next entry.

14

01 /28/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Review Third Amended Notice of Appeal - Note: Sarne

15

task performed by BCR.

I Ci

03/04/15 JAS 0.50 96.50 Further develop strategy and conference with original

17

PHH counsel in case regarding crnTent representation -Note: What does PHH's

18

representation and this strategy meeting/conference specifically have to do with

19

Chase or the appeal? We should not be billed for a scheming session with Jason

20

Rammel and Jon Stenqui~;t, especially about Amelia Sheets.

21

04/29/15 JAS 0.10 19.30 Fonvard REDACTED to client REDACTED - Note: No
way to knO\v if this was specifically regarding the appeal. REDACTED
information must be released.

24

05/20/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Prepare research and correspondence to PHH's attorney

25

regarding moving forward ,,.rith writ of possession in light of questions and

26

request for same by PHH's attorney - Note: This is not related to the appeal.

27

Further, regarding this and other entries dealing with the execution of judgment

28

against our property, Chase claims to have no current beneficial interest in the

29

prope1ty. Actually, Chase has claimed to have never had any beneficial interest in

30

the property. Therefore their involvement is purely voluntary and malicious in

31

nature and reality, and cannot be billed to us in any forum. \Ve move this Comt

32

recognize their involvement and qualify it as circumstantial evidence that creates
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a genuine issue of material foc1 and an admission they do in fact possess an
2

interest in the foreclosure of our property.

3

05/26/15 JAS 0.60 115.80 Review client request and analyze options for dealing

4

with PHH' s lack of involvement per request - Note: PHH' s lack of involvement

5

is not our problem so the cost for Chase dealing with their accomplice's lack of

6

involvement or sensible fear of continued involvement cannot be assigned to us.

7

05/26/15 BCR 1.10 1

8

We are not responsible for two attorneys performing the same task. See next

9

entry. Nor should we have to pay for Chase attorney's to train, educate or mentor

Review and analyze PHH's brief on appeal - Note:

10

Pl-Ill in the illegal field of rn011gage fraud.

11

05/26/15 JAS 1.00 193.00 Review and analyze PHH's appellate brief.

12

05/27/15 KJH 0.70 116.20 Analyze issues presented by FedEx's difficulty

]3

delivering our response brief to the appellants~- Note: We are not responsible for

14

FedEx's delivery difficulties and mailing issues are clerical tasks wfoch are not to

15

be awarded as attorney fe,~s. Also in regards to this entry, Kirk Houston

16

apparently had Jon Stenquist help him with navigating the difficulties of FedEx

17

mailing. We should not be billed 1.1 hours for mailing procedure mentoring. See

18

5/28/15 J AS entry below.

19

05/27/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Coordinate filing deadlines and shepardizing of cases -

20

Note: \Vhat does this have to do with our appeal? Shepardizing what cases? There

21

is only one case on appeal.

n

0

above.

05/28/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Review and analyze issues relating to problems with

7~
~_)

delivery of brief by FedEx - Note: We are not responsible for FedEx's delivery

24

difficulties and mailing issues are clerical tasks which are not to be awarded as

25

attorney fees. Sec 5/2 7 /15 KJH entry above.

26

06/05/15 BCR 0.80 132.80 Review and analyze issues and strategies for oral

27

argument on appeal - Nole: BCR did not pmiicipate in oral argument. Simply

28

stating issues and strategies is too vague to allow a determination of whether this

29

effort was duplicaled by J

30

06/25/15 IOH 0.20 33.20 Review and analyze Nickersons' reply brief- Note:

31

This task was charged by JAS and BCR on 6/22/15. Both JAS and BCR charged

32

for additional ·work on preparation for oral argument. however, KJH performed no

or other attorneys working on this case.
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additional work on this case in preparation for oral argument so we should not be
2

charged for his review of our reply brief.

3

06/30/15 BCR 0.50 83 .00 Review and analyze notice of assignment to Court of

4

Appeals from Supreme Court -

5

JAS entry below.

6

06/30/15 BCR 0.90 149.40 Review and analyze issues and strategies arising from

7

assignment of appeal from Supreme Court to Court of appeals - Note: Duplicate

8

effort performed by? JAS.

9

06/30/15 JAS 1.10 21

Duplicate effort performed by

next entry.
Revie,v notice of assignment, review and analyze

10

options in light of same, and draft correspondence to client with recommendations

11

moving forward in light of assignment to Court of Appeals. Note: Duplicate

12

effort. See previous entries. Entry too vague.

13

06/30/15 IOH 0.30 49.80 Review and analyze the Idaho Appellate Rules 116 and

14

118 regarding assignment of cases to the Idaho Court of Appeals and petitions for

l5

rehearing - Note: Knowing the rules is a cost of doing business and that cost

16

should not be assigned to us.

17

07 /02/15 BCR 0.50 83 .00 Revie\V and analyze issues and strategies regarding

[8

Supreme Court's reassignment of case to itsel:f: oral argument strategies, and

19

potential foreclosure of Nickerson property - Note: Review and analyze issues

20

and strategies too vague to determine if effort not duplicated by another attorney.

21

Unless Chase is foreclosing on our property through PHH and has a personal
beneficial interest or still retains ownership in this property but are concealing it
from the Com1, this entry is beyond the scope of their involvement. Either way,

24

foreclosure efforts are not a part of1he appeal.

25

07/15/15 JAS 0.20 38.60 Conference with counsel for PHH regarding status of

26

substitution and eviction -- Note: Substitution and eviction are not a part of the

27

appeal and has nothing to do with Chase unless Chase is in fact still the owner but
is foreclosing through P_H H to avert discovery and liability.

29

08/03/15 JAS 0.30 57 .90 Review writ of application for foreclosure and sale filed

30

by PHH counsel - Note: Foreclosure and sale not related to appeal and has

31

nothing to do \Nith Chase.

32
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09/30/15 JAS 0.30 57.90 Revicv.1 status in light of hearing on eviction - Note: As
2

far as the Nickersons are aware, a hearing on eviction never took place. There \Vas

3

a hearing on the Nickersons' motion to stay execution that occurred on 09/29/15

4

in ·which PHff s counsel did not appear and the hearing had to be rescheduled to

5

10/06/15.

6

PHH had significant issues on appeal so it granted the Nickersons motion to stay

7

execution. This hearing \Vas not a part of the appeal and would have had nothing

8

to do ·with Chase unless Chase admitted to being the real party of interest in this

9

supposed hearing. However, if this hearing took place, the Nickersons move this

a result of the hearing on 10/06/15, the District Court determined

10

Court to immediately require Chase provide the details of this hearing so the

ll

Nickersons can contact the appropriate Court and protect their interests regarding

12

it. No hearing on this date took place according to the Cleanvater County docket.

)3

11 /05/ 15 BCR 1.10 J82.60 Review and analyze issues and strategies for oral

14

argument on appeal - Note: Review and analyze issues and strategies too vague to

15

determine if effort not duplicated by another attorney or if this would qualify as a

I

billable charge.

16
11

17

11/09/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 RevieYv and analyze issues and strategies regarding

18

pending motion to stay foreclosure - Note: Stay of foreclosure was an issue

19

before the District Cami in \vhich we prevailed. This is not an appellate issue and

20

Chase had no reason for involvement in this motion. Further. the order was

2l

granted 10/15/15 so it was no longer a "pendirn:z" motion on 11/09/15.

22

0

11/10/15 J

0.10 19 .30 Review rules regarding time limitations for oral

,~
__

argument - Note: Knowing the rules is a cost of doing business and cannot be

24

assignee! to us.

25

12/01 /15 BCR 0. 90 J 49 .40 Review and analyze issues and strategies for oral

26

argument on appeal -

27

determine if effort not duplicated by another attorney and too broad to determine

28

if time spent was excessive.

29

12/07/15 JAS 0.80 154.40 Review Supreme Court rules and procedures in

30

preparation for oral argument - Note: Knowing the rules is a cost of doing

31

business and cannot be assigned to us.

)

Review and analyze issues and strategies too vague to

32
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12/07 /15 BCR 0.90 149.40 RevieYv and analyze issues and strategies for oral
2

argumen1 on appeal

Note: Review and analyze issues and strategies too vague to

3

determine if effort not duplicated by another attorney and too broad to determine

4

if time spent \Vas excessi,e. Appears to be d1mlicate oftask entered on 12/01/15.

5

04/27/16 BCR 0.70 118.30 Review and analyze Supreme Court's decision on

6

appeal

7

responsible for three attorneys performing the same task. See next two entries.

8

04/27/16 JAS 1.10 216.70 Review and analyze decision from Idaho Supreme

9

Court in affirming lower court decision and awarding attorneys' fees and costs.

Note: BCR, JAS, and KJH all charge for this same task. We are not

10

04/27/l6 KJH 0.70 116.20 Review Idaho Supreme Court's decision affirming trial

11

court.

12

4/27/16 JAS 0.60 118.20 Draft conespondence to client regarding REDACTED

13

REDACTED -- Note: No way to knmv if this was specifically regarding the

14

appeal. The Nickersons move this Court require Chase to identify this

15

REDACTED information.

16

The next block of issues deal with the fact three attorneys were performing essentially the

17

same duties in preparation of Chase's Respondent Brief. We should not be charged for duplicate

l ol)

efforts of three difterent attorneys. If Chase wants to pay for more attorneys than the attorney of

19

record that is their choice. We should not be asked to pay for it. Bores, Id. Kirk Houston claims

20

to have written the brief so duplicate tasks performed by Jon Stenquist and Ben Ritchie cannot be

21

claimed.

22

05/05/15 KJH 0.50 83.00 Prepare response brief outline.
05/06/15 JAS 0.20 3 8.00 Develop brief outline.
05/11/15 BCR 1.20 199.20 Review and analyze issues and strategies for

25

addressing the Nickersons' various issues on appeal

Note: Entry too vague to

26

lrnow which issues and strategies to determine if duplicate effort logged by other

27

t\VO

28

05/12/15 JAS 0.60 115.80 Review appellate issues and coordinate drafting of

29

resondent's brief~ Note: Entry too vague to knoYv which issues and to determine

30

if duplicate effort logged by other two attorneys.

31

05/13/15 JAS 0.80 154.40 Draft and revise appellate brief arguments and citations

attorneys.

to record and current law~ Note: Duplicate efforts preparing the brief logged by
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JAS and other two attorneys.

should not be billed for three attorneys

2

performing and redoing the same effort. We did not request Chase retain and

3

utilize multiple attorneys to defend against our prose pleadings.

4

0

05/14/15 BCR 0.90 149.40 Review and analyze appellate brief and arguments

5

made therein in preparation to drafting and revising brief and for oral argument.

6

Note: Entry too vague to determine which arguments and to determine if duplicat

7

effort logged by other two attorneys; BCR did not write brief or participate in oral

8

argument. On 5/13/15, JAS claims to draft and revise appellate brief. BCR cannot

9

prepare to draft an already drafted document. We should not be billed for BCR to

l ()

duplicate \Nork allegedly r~ompleted by JAS.

11

05/18/15 JAS 0.80 154.40 Review and revise respondents brief - Note: JAS did

12

not write respondents brief. Duplicate effort

J3

05/18/15 BCR 0.60 99.60 Review and analyze issues and strategies for appellate

14

brief regarding addressing co-defendant's arguments and standard of review

15

Note: KJH also has entry regarding standard of revie,v, and issues and strategies

]6

is too vague to determine if duplicate effort logged by himself or other two

17

attorneys. Entry too broad to determine if time spent ,vas excessive.

18

0

05/18/15 KJH 0.80 132.80 Draft and revise section of respondents' briefset1ing

19

forth the standard of review for each of appellants' claims of error. - Note: JAS

20

had already drafted and revised twice prior to this entry. Duplicate effort.

21

05/19/15 JAS 0.60 115.80 Draft and revise response brief - Note: KJH wrote the

22

brief not JAS. Duplicate effort. Duplicate entry. See 5/13/15 JAS and 5/18/15
JAS.

24

0

05/21/15 JAS 1.90 366.70 Review and revise supreme court brief for respondent

15

Chase - Note: KJH wrote the final brief not JAS. Duplicate effort. See 5/18/15

26

JAS.

17

05/23/15 .T AS O.40 77 .20 Draft and revise brief

28

JAS. Duplicate effort and entry. See 5/13/15 JAS and 5/19/15 JAS. JAS is

29

claiming to draft a brief that has already been created and revised.

30

05/26/15 KJH 0.60 99 .60 Review Idaho Supreme Court rules for formatting and

31

serving response briefs

Note: KJH signed the brief not

Note: Knowing the rules is a cost of doing business and

should not be assigned to us.
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5 BCR 1.10 182.00 Edit, revise, and citecheck respondent's brief on
2

appeal - Note: KJI-I wrote the brief not BCR. Duplication of effort.

3

Above, ,ve have noted the additional fees Chase is claiming on appeal that relate to

4

additional attorneys performing duplicate tasks, that do not relate to the appeal, and that do not

5

specifically state what they are. In the case of duplicate tasks, only Mr. Stenquist's charges

6

should be considered as being relevant since he is the attorney of record. In entries dealing with

7

preparing the Respondent's brief,

8

considered or only

9

a brief for

. Houston signed the brief so either only his fees should be

. Stenquist' s. \Ve did not request Chase hire an additonal attorney to write

. Stenquist. No fees specifically excluded by Mr. Stenquist should be included

10

because he has already admitted those fees are not appropriate in regards lo the mvard of attorney

11

fees on appeal.

12

In addition, ]\!Ir. Stenquist has wasted time and resources by submitting a list of all fees h

13

charged his client when, for the purpose of fees on appeal, he should have only included those

14

fees specifically related to the appeal. However, with that being said, it is interesting to note

15

some of the tasks he and his firm are performing. Perhaps their inclusion of these fees is the

16

ansvver to our prayers that Chase's ov-m words would ultimately bring their destruction and

17

demise. PHI-I is supposedly the entity foreclosing, yet Chase is the entity aggressively pushing

18

and compelling PHI I to execute judgment, and attempting to bypass the Nickersons one year of

19

redemption by forcing a premature eviction and possession. Emphasis added to below entries:

20

0 l /28/15 BCR 0.20 33 .20 Phone call to counsel for co-defendant PHH Mortgage

21

relating to whether PHH intends on proceeding with foreclosure.
02/03/15 .TAS 0.20 38.60 Review correspondence and issues relating to PHH
foreclosure and contact and respond to same.

24

02/11115 BCR 0.40 66.40 Correspondence to counsel for co-defendant====

25

status of repossession and appeal issues.

26

lawful beneficial interest in our property. Possession of this property was

Note: PHH has never had possession or

transferred directly to us from the previous owner. Colcl,vell Banker sold our
28

property to Fannie Iviae prior to PHH allegedly establishing any relationship with

29

Coldwell Banker and after we were previously told the property was ineligible to

30

be sold to Fannie Mae.

31

02/12/15 JAS 0.20 38.60 Review status of case and discuss foreclosure pending

32

appeal.
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02/18/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Review and analyze status of appeal and==='-='-"-'~
2

="'-=="~~==-'=~ of real property.

3

02/27/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Draft correspondence to counsel for co-defendant

4

ec.=:====-'-===-"'= of property and appellate issues.

5

03/11 /15 JAS 0.20 38.00 Field call from PHH's counsel ~garding frweclosure.

6

03/31/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Review and analyze status of negotiations with PHH

7

"'-'-'-'~="' and appellate briefing issues. - Note: Why is Chase in negotiations with

8

PHH?

9

05/07/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Review and analyze issues and strategies regarding

10

compelllng PHH to foreclose on real prope1iy

11

05/08/15 BCR 0.90 149.40 Correspondence to counsel for co-defendant =-=="-'=oi

12

foreclosure of real property.

13

o

05/08/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Review and analyze additional issues regarding

14

foreclosure of real property by co-defendants.

15

05/11/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Draft correspondence to counsel for PHH regarding

]6

propertv seizure request.

17

05/20/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Prepare research and correspondence to PHH's attorney

18

regarding moving fonvarcl with writ of possession in light of questions and

]9

request for same by PHI-I's attorney.

20

05/26/15 JAS 0.60 115.80 Revievv client request and analyze options for dealing

21

\;\/ith PHH's lack of involvement per request.
07/01/15 JAS 0.30

.00 Draft and revise correspondence to PHH counsel

requesting action on possession of proRerty.
24

o

07/01/15 JAS 0.20 38.00 Field call from A. Sheets regarding being fired by PHH

25

for the appeal. - Note: PIIH firing counsel has nothing to do with Chase nor their

26

involvement regarding our case. Why was Amelia Sheets fired and what was

27

discussed ·with Chase regarding her firing that compelled JAS to record this entry?

28

Further, \vhy were Jason Rammell and Kipp Manwarring also removed from the

29

Nickerson· s case without the Nickersons or the Court being properly notified of

30

the change of attorney of record or substitutions being filed? In the interest of

31

justice, the Nickersons move this Court to remand this case to the District Court

32
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and allO\v the Nickersons to conduct discovery and validate all the genuine issues
2

of material fact and fraud that sunound this case.

3

07/01/15 JAS 0.20 38.00 Draft correspondence to PHH counsel with linkJQ

4

Nickersons' website. --

This entry is too vague for us to determine if it is

relevant to the appeal. Did

. Stenquist refer PHH to \;,,rww.mountn.org or to

6

www.ithappenedtous.com? Further, .20 minutes feels excessive to simply direct a

7

person to a vvebsite.

8

07/02/15 BCR 0.50

9

Supreme Court's reassignment of case to itself, oral argument strategies, and

.00 Review and analyze issues and strategies regarding

10

potential foreclosure of Nickerson property.

11

07/06/15 BCR 0.60 99.00 Review and analyze status of foreclosure of

12

Nickersons' real property and eviction of Nickersons.

13

o

07/15/15 JAS 0.20 38.00 Conference ,vith counsel for PHH regarding status of

14

substitution and eviction.

l5

07/16/15 JAS 0.10 19.30 Review quiet title issues and case law regarding_ eviction

16

issues to assist in acceleration of process. - Note: Why is Chase involved in the

17

acceleration of process? This demonstrates and corroborates the ongoing abusive

18

debt collection \Ve suffered with Chase. Their irrational and aggressive demands

19

that we sign the title of our Idaho Ranch over to them without cause or right

20

amidst threats to taking everything else we owned if we refused is insane. Chase

2]

employees, notations and taped recordings validate our story. Reasonable

22

inference from their ongoing actions supports and substantiates it. Please! Stop

their abuse!
24

08/03/15 BCR 1.10 l 82.60 Review and analvze PHI-I's foreclosure documents

25

and analyze effect foreclosure will have on pending appeal.

26

08/03/l S JAS 0.30 57. 90 Review \\Tit of application for foreclosure and sale filed

27

by PHH counsel.

28

08/21/15 BCR 0.40 66.40 Research and analyze status of foreclosure action

29

agai1_1st Niekersons.

30
3!

o

09/08/15 BCR 1.10 182.60 Review and analyze briefing by counsel for PHH
Mortgage in

SUQQQLt

of motion to proceed with foreclosur~.
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09/08/15 JAS 0.60 115.80 Review and analyze PHH Iv1ortgage's memorandum in
2

opposition to stav of execution.

3

09/21/15 JAS 0.40 77.20 Revie,.v and analyze issues in connection with

4

foreclosure proceedings and hearing notice.

5

09/21/15 JAS 0.20 38.00 Dran correspondence to client regarding attendance at

6

hearing on property seizure. - Note: To the Nickcrsons knowledge, there was no

7

hearing regarding a writ of ejection of the Nickersons nor a writ of ejection. If this

8

is not the case, the Nickersons request this Court move Chase to provide

9

additional information regarding this hearing such as time, place, and Comi.

10

There is no record of this hearing on the Clearwater County docket.

ll

09/29/15 BCR 0.40 66.40 Review and analyze issues regarding_pending eviction

12

and foreclosure.

13

o

10/06/15 BCR 0.80 132.80 Attend hearing on Nickersons' motion to stav. - Note:

14

This was not an appellant issue that involved Chase. Judge even asked Chase

15

,vhat their dog in this fight was at the hearing on this motion.

16

l 0/06/15 JAS 1.00 193.00 Prepare for hearing on borrower's \vrit of ejection and

17

appear at oral argument via telephone.

18

there \Vas no hearing regarding a writ of ejection of the Nickersons nor a vvrit of

]9

ejection. If this is not the case, the Nickersons request this Court move Chase to

20

provide additional information regarding this hearing such as time, place, and

21

Comi. There is no record of this hearing on the Clearwater County docket
o

Note: To the Nickersons knmvledge,

11/09/15 BCR 0.50 83.00 Review and analyze issues and strategies regarding
pending motion to stav foreclosure.

24

District Court Judge Gregory FitzMaurice asked Mr. Stenquist during oral argument on

25

the Nickersons' motion to stay, what is your dog in this fight? The question Why is Chase so

26

interested in PHH pushingfonvard 11 ithforeclosure demands an answer. What is in it for Chase

27

if they have no beneficial interest in the prope11y? According to Mr. Stenquist, Chase has no

28

interest in the Nickersons' prope11y so why the intense interest and involvement in the

29

foreclosure and eviction of the Nickersons? Perhaps, as Chase's correspondence to the

30

Nickersons states, Chase is the real paity in interest and they have committed Fraud on the Court

31

in an attempt to defraud the Nickersons and avoid extreme exposure caused by their actions.

1

Chase's obsession with execution of judgment creates reasonable inference and establishes
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circumstantial evidence that requires further discovery to expose the real party of interest in this
2

case. PHH cannot foreclose, their complaint must be dismissed with prejudice, and they should

3

ansvver for their fraud on the Court and defrauding of the Nickersons if they do not own the

4

Nickersons property.

5

note Judge FitzMaurice granted the Nickersons' motion to

6

had significant issues on appeal. No appeal would have ever been necessary if Judge Michael

7

Griffin would have allowed the Nickersons equal access to justice. The Nickersons were never

8

even granted a Status Hearing after they found out their attorney had secretly vvithdrawn. The

9

requested Status Hearing to set forth discovery deadlines and establish the true status of the case

10

,vas turned into a Motion For Summary Judgment Hearing by PHH. The Nickersons were denied

II

the opportunity to properly review the true status of the case, adequately prepare their claims and

12

defenses, conduct discovery and prepare or pursue any reasonable presentation of their case.

13

contend and the evidence demonstrates they do not. It is interesting to
execution because he found

Another alarming entry is: 08/05/14 TZM 0.50 45.00 Download new discovery records

]4

from the client's secure file server. Wha1 did that new discovery show? It ,vas never presented to

15

the Nickersons or the District Court. The Nickersons move this Court require Chase to present

16

this new evidence along '-'Vith the other discovery requested as it may contain information that

17

corroborates with our story and validates our claims.

18

4. Since Mr. Stenquist disclosed to the Court, via his exhibit in support of his declaration

19

of costs and fees, that settlement talks had occurred allegedly to fulfill expectations of the Court

20

or create the illusion attempts were made, we would like the Court to be aware no good faith

21

settlement has ever been offered to us at any time by either party. Mr. Stenquist simply used the

22

settlement platform to continue in his practice of presenting false information to us. For the
record, Mr. Stenquist and Mr. Ritchie approached us regarding settlement after we faxed a letter

24

25

26

28
29
30

3!
32

to Mr. Stenquist on September

2014. Exhibit 14. The letter states the following:

In your recent affidavit in support of your Motion to Augment the record you testify, "I

have personal access to my cliem 's files in this matter and make this affidavit based upon
personal knowledge ... " Since you claim to have personal knowledge of your client's
files, then you are taking and accepting personal responsibility for the fraud you and your
client have perpetrated against the Nickersons and the Court. You have made and are
making a personal choice to hide_ conceal and/or destroy evidence that validates all the
Nickersons' claims and defenses. You have made and are making a personal choice to
allow PHH to fraudulently and wrongfully foreclose on the Nickersons property. You
have made and are making a personal choice to catastrophically damage and
comprehensively destroy all aspects of the Nickersons' life and way of life emotionally,
physically and financially.
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3

4
5
(i

8
9
10

11

12
13
14

15

16
17
0

l0

19

20
21

n
__
7"J

24

25

26
27

28

29
30

3!
32

You kno\v
are personally av.me that Chase claims to be in possession of the
Nickersons Note and Ivlortgage_ that Chase claims to be the investor on the Nickersons
loan, and that the account history provided by Chase is inaccurate which means PHH has
no legal, ethical or moral right or authority to foreclose and you and your firm are
accomplices to PHH's \Vrongful foreclosure. As an officer of the Court, you have taken
an oath to uphold the law and it is not only your lawful duty but your ethical and moral
responsibility to inform the Court PHH has wrongfully foreclosed upon the Nickersons.
. Stenquist, among other violations to be expounded upon under separate cover, you
have violated I.C. § 3-201.

or
statement
Specifically, you have imentionally sought to mislead the judge by making false
statements including stating Chase never mvned the Nickerson Note or Mortgage and that
they were only the servicer (You made this false statement eight times in order to thwart
the discovery process and deny the Nickersons their equal access to justice.). Further, you
used this artifice to mislead the judge into determining there was no contract betvveen
Chase and the Nickersons. In addition, by your omission and concealing the fact that
Chase claims to own the Nickersons loan and to never have sold nor assigned it to PHH
you have violated the Lav,ryer's oath and are judged by the following maxim:
- a suppression of truth is equivalent to an expression of falsehood.
(Other violations to be expounded upon under separate cover.)
Mr. Stenquist, it is time for you and your client to come clean. The comprehensive
damages suffered by the Nickersons family, my family, and those adversely affected by
the nightmare caused by your ongoing actions is severe, significant and substantial. Your
exposure and the inescapable exposure you have created for your firm and client civilly,
criminally and morally is enormous and ever increasing. You have purposefully and
maliciously misled and committed fraud on the Court by both what you have stated and
by your ongoing silence regarding the truths that surround this case. You have
purposefully and maliciously performed these actions in order to gain unjust enrichment
for you, your firm and your accomplices and destroy the Nickersons emotionally,
physically and financially. Your testimony that you have access to Chase's files and
personal knowledge of the information condemns you and indicts you and your firm for
all responsibility and liability for the intentional fraud perpetrated upon the Nickersons

and the Court. It is your sworn duty as an officer of the Court and the duty of your firm
under the agreements of their incorporation to make it right. It is clearly within your
power and responsibility to stop making excuses for the willful assault on this family and
to make it right. Therefore, \Ve require you immediately file whatever motion, ailidavit or
other document that is appropriate or required to halt this case, stop the ongoing abuse
being suffered by our family, and prevent PHH from wrongfully foreclosing.
Mr. Stenquis1, you are on notice that we, the Nickersons, the Nickersons' heirs, the
Nickersons' relatives and the Nickersons' friends are resolved to pursue whatever steps
necessary to avail ourselves of all legal remedies available civilly, criminally and
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publically to ensure justice is served upon you, your firm, your client and your

accomplices for the individual, joint and conspiring roles and parts you have played, are
2

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
ll
12

13

playing and may continue to play in destroying our life, liberty, financial security, and
pursuit of happiness. Our allegations of bad faith, predatory lending, wrongful
foreclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, unjust enrichment, reckless record keeping, negligence, breach of duty
of care, libel and slander of credit, civil conspiracy, offering false and forged instruments
for the record, unfair methods and practices, and violations of the lawyer's oath are all
true, well documented and will be proven. Your successful thwarting of our story being
told this far will not continue.
. Stenquist you, your alleged client and now your firm
and your client have it \Nitbin your pO\ver to end this assauh and makes this right. No
more excuses. No more legal chicanery. No more payoffs or deals. No more abuse. Do
the right thing and do it now.
On behalf of the entire Nickerson family and others adversely impacted by this unlawful
action,
Charles Nickerson
cc. Moffatt Thomas Board of Directors, Ivfanaging Partners, Others

14

l5

Not only did Mr. Stenquist have a clear opportunity to stop this litigation, encl mounting

16

attorney costs, and grant us relief, but Moffatt Thomas's Managing Partners, Directors and other,

l7

of interest received copies of this letter, and bad opportunity as well. In response to this letter,

18

Mr. Stenquist and Mr. Ritchie offered a settlement conforence call. Prior to this call the

19

Nickersons sent them another letter in an attempt to gage the sincerity of Mr. Stenquist in vvhich

20

the Nickersons stated in part:

21

24

Mr. Ritchie, ,ve are trusting the meeting you and Jon Stenquist are initiating is a genuine
demonstration of good faith and represents a true desire to take full responsibility for the
wrongs committed and is not another gesture of legal chicanery to abuse us further. We
trust Chase and Moffatt Thomas are prepared to make things right so that we will all be
able to put this behind us and move forward with our lives after our meeting on

25

Thursday. Certainly, this is in the best interest of all parties involved.

26

In response to this letter, Mr. Ritchie cancelled the settlement conference. About three

27

months later, Mr. Stenquist sent us a lengthy discourse disguised as a settlement attempt that was

28

clearly nothing more than an attempt to intimidate us into giving up our search for justice by

29

detailing all the legal reasons we could not prevail against Chase, restating Chase was only a

30

witness in this case and not a lender and was not in a position to pursue or halt any foreclosure

31

action, stating that we missed lQ payments while Chase was servicing our loan, and propagating
other such lies. (Note: In Chase's brief on appeal and during Oral Argument they stated we

Objection to Cosis and Fe,::s am\ Motion for Sanctions
Page 24 of 27

159

responded with the follmving letter stating their offer to discuss

missed 1 J payments.).
2
3

settlement \Vas denied. Also included as Exhibit 15.
Dear Mr. Stenquist

4

5

6
7

8
9

10

II
12

Your offer is denied. You need not wait until December 5 to automatically \Nithdraw it.
Your fax and review of the case clearly indicate you have severely underestimated and
grotesquely limited the resolve, intentions, and comprehensive lengths the Nickerson
Family intends to pursue to find justice in this case. You have also fa.tally tailed to
acknowledge and properly defer to your greatest enemy and most undefeatable opponent
this case, the truth. Mr. Stenquist you and your accomplices can twist it, warp it, hide
it, try to change it all you want.. but the truth is the truth, and truth is going to set us free.
You may have somewhat successfully prevented the truth from being told, presented and
proven thus far. However, time, persistence and different audiences will ultimately
prevail against your legal chicanery and categorically hold you accountable for your
criminal thievery and unlawful involvement in this case.

25

Do not nauseate or offend us by ~;aying you do not want to take the Idaho Ranch from us
or those we serve. You know we made
payment we were obligated to make and
have heroically honored every obligation \Ve had or have ever bad regarding this
property. It is ,vell documented in the Chase communication records that Chase refosed
to send statements, give us receipts, provide us with records, etc. It is well documented
our payments were misapplied, then applied correctly, that all payments were made and
that we were on time and in good standing. It is well documented Chase embezzled
thousands of dollars from our escrow surplus. It is well documented criminal acts have
been committed and not just with our loan. It is well documented Chase had and still has
a contract with Nickersons and that you have lied and continue to lie about it. It is well
documented Chase breached the contract by inaccurate accounting and that you
maliciously presented a fabricated account transaction and payment history, which has
been contested and proven inaccurate, to cover your and/or their illegal activity. It is \:Vell
documented you have purposefully thwarted our discovery efforts by not providing the
plethora of notes, conversations and documentation regarding the countless calls and
hours of conversations between Chase and our family. There is a lot more well
documented too, and you, Chase, PHI-I and Just Lav,/ know it. A lot of other people know
it too.

26

Having said that, thank you for taking the time to share your legal strategies and theories

13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22

24

28
29

30
31

32

with us. We appreciate your neatly crafted attempt to intimidate and/or discourage us, but
it did not and it ,vilJ not \:vork. Frankly, your case overvievv is full of inaccuracies, false
claims and truth loopholes. Your gravest mistake is not realizing our opportunity to tell
our story before a just judge, law enforcement agencies and public officials is coming
soon. \Vhen that day comes, justice will demand answers from you and the evidence will
irrefutably support our claims. Whether civilly, criminally, publicly, or all of the above,
you and your accomplices will ultimately answer for what you have clone to our family.
!\fake no mistake, we will not be silent or silenced until you do. We have lived through
and survived the undeserved hell Chase and their accomplices have put us through. We
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2

5
6

7

9

10
11

12
13

15
16

17
18
19

have watched a ranch purchased as a gift to share with others atiack and steal our entire
life savings, family home, financial freedom and all other assets. Vie have fought
injustice valiantly as other have watched in disbeli and anger as they have seen us
endure it. You, nor your accomplices, can change the truth or what we have experienced.
We are the ones who were on the recorded calls. We know they exist.
spent countless
hours dealing \,Vith the incompetence of your client and their record keeping nightmares.
We sifted through their abusive credit collection practices until we found representatives
with integrity and customer service brains vvho found our payments an<l corrected the
records. Vl/e were the victims of the promised correspondence for our records that never
carne and that you and your accomplices have now used to try to discredit us. 'vVe listened
when representatives read back
they had entered into the system. \Ve undeservedly
suffered comprehensive and malicious losses, damages, and assaults. Our scars bum with
a fervent passion to see justice served and to prevent you from stealing other people's
lives and putting them through the angllish you have inflicted upon us. Therefore, you
can assume any legitimate settlement offers that might be forthcoming must include
confossions and apologies or they will be denied as wel1. The fact is we can and will
rebuild our financial portfolio. 1-fowever, your theft of our life and freedom cannot be
repaid. There is no just and fair penalty or reparation for what you and your accomplices
have done to our family. You cannot change the fact we did nothing wrong. You cannot
change the fact what you, Chase and your accomplices have done is morally, ethicaUy,
financially and legally wrong. We ,vant justice served, and we will not stop until we get
it. God and a lot of other people out there know the truth of the severe, significant and
substantial abuse we have suffered and the superhuman lengths we went to in honoring
all commitments regarding this property. Our legal strategy is simple, the truth will set us
free. Whether you or your accomplices like it or not, God will be the final Judge in this
matter. We pray God will render to each man according to his deeds.
a matter of record, no settlement conference occurred nor ,vas any valuable

20

consideration ever offered or discussed between Chase and our family. No further details are

21

being given per I.RE. 408.

22

Thank you for reviewing this Objection and Motion. We

23

\Ve do not mve Chase any attorney

2.+

pray you will make a just, fair and equitable decision in our favor regarding this matter.

25

26

DATED this

6

-day of May, 2016

---'-T-"--~

27

18
19
30
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OF SER'i/ICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ~~ st=:t:\:fay of
2016, I
caused to be served a trne and correct copy of the foregoing document
Objection to
Costs and Fees and Motion for Sanctions by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
·

2
3
4

5

( ,,) U. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
43 75 Jutland Dr. STE 200
Diego,
92177

6

7

Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

8
9

(:.)US. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
Box 51505
Idaho Falls, TD 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

10

11
12
l3
] ,~

15
16
17

18

19
20
21

21

,"

.c.)

2.i

II

25

26
27
28
29

30
31
"~

.).!...
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...

Charles and Dom1a Nickerson
3165 Neff Rd
Orofino, ID 83544

.:l

4

Appellants Pro Se

5
6

IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

7

8

PHH MORTGAGE,

AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES NICKERSON
J!N SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO COSTS AND FEES
AND
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

9

Plaintiff-Third Paity DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,

10
JI
V.

12

13

Supreme Court Docket No. 42163-2014
Clearwater COlmty No. 2011-28

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON

14

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,

15

16
17

18
19

and
COLD\VELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE and JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK, NA,

20

Third Party Defendants-Respondents.

21

22

I, CHARLES NICKERSON, deposes and states:

7"

_.,

1. I am an appellant in the above-entitled action.

24

2. I am competent to testify to these matters.

25

3.

26
27
28

I have personal knowledge of all matters discussed and detailed in the objection to costs

and motion for sanctions.
4. I have personally read and reviewed the entire record in this matter that has been
presented to me.

29

5. I have personally read and reviewed Chase's answers to our intenogatories and requests

30

for production in which Chase claims 8 times they did not own the note and they were a

31

servicer only.

"')

.)_
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6. There is no evidence in the record that supports Chase's claim that Freddie Mac
2

purchased our note or that PHH repurchased our note from Freddie Mac. In fact, I

3

submitted evidence that Fannie Mae claims to have held our Joan from December 27,

4

2002, until December 3, 2009, that Chase claims to have purchased our loan on

5

December 3, 2009, and that as of January 10, 2014, Chase still claims to be the owner

6

and holder of our note and mortgage.

7

7. I have personally reviewed the Declaration of Jon A. Stenquist and his Exhibit A.

8

8. The line items listed in our statement in support of objection to costs and fees are taken

9
10

,--~,

9. I have over 30 yeaTs experience maintaining, reading and interpreting mo1igage accounts

11

and financial accounts of all types including checking, savings, money market, auto

12

loans, lines of credit and credit card accounts. As a result, I have a thorough

13

understanding of a principal balance and hm.v to read and interpret account histories. The

14

account history provided by Chase in May of 20 l O (R. 441-453) reflects as of the

15

payment credited in November 2009 a principal balance of $0.00 and on the last record in

16

January 2010 a p1incipal balance of $-1,186.90. A negative principal balance normally

17

indicates the account is overpaid and the borrower could be due a refund.

18
19

20

10. In my experience, monthly statements, receipts of payments and personal account records
are provided in the normal course of doing business and upon request.

11. My personal knowledge, involvement as an account holder on this account, and revievv o

21

Chase's account records as submitted allows me to state Chase's claim that the

22

Nickersons missed at least 11 payments from January 2008 through December 2009 is

'Y'
~J

false and not suppmied by the account history they provided or the truthful occmrences

24

relating to the account.

25

26
27

.-~

fi:om the Declaration of Jon A. Stenquist' s Exhibit A.

12. Exhibits 2-10 referenced in our statements in support of our objection and motion are true

and correct copies taken from the record.
13. Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Fannie Mae dated Ivt:ay 2, 2013,

28

received in response to our inquiries into the involvement of Fannie Mae with regards to

29

our loan involved in this case. Famiie Mae claims to have purchased our loan on

30

December 27, 2002, and to have terminated interest in the loan on December 3, 2009.

31
32

14. Exhibit 9 is a true and con-ect copy of the Notice of New Creditor we received from
Chase dated December 22, 2009. In this letter Chase claims to have purchased the
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Nickersons loan on December 3, 2009, which is the same day Fannie Mae terminated
2

3

their interest in the loan.
15. Exhibit 10 is a true and conect copy of a letter dated January 10, 2014, that Chase sent to

4

us in response to a qualified written request. In this letter Chase states, "We are not

5

required to produce the original note which will remain in our possession ... The investor

6

for this loan is JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association."

7

16. Based upon 11! 13-15 above, reasonable inference, circumstantial evidence and fachial

8

evidence indicates as of January 10, 2014, Chase claims to be the O\vner and holder of

9

our note and mortgage.

IO

17. ,r,r 13-15 contradict Chase's claim that Freddie Mac had any involvement with our note

11

and mortgage, and contradict Chase's denial of ever having owned our note and

12

mortgage, and their claim they were a servicer only. See Exhibits 1, 4, 5 and 7.

13

[4

18. Exhibits 11-13 are true and conect copies of conespondence between the Nickersons and
Chase and Jon Stenquist.

15

19. Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of a letter we sent to Jon Stenquist and the Managing

16

partners of Moffatt Thomas informing them of their liability and our resolve to secure

17

justice in this case.

18
19

20. Exhibit 15 is a true and conect copy of our letter stating Mr. Stenquist' s offer to discuss
settlement was denied.

20
21

22

In accordance with I.R.C.P. 7(d) and LC.§ 9-1406, I certify (or declare) under penalty of
perjury pursuant to the laws of the State of Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct.

24

DATED this

.:_5:c'.~ay of May, 2016

26
27

CHARLES lNICKERSON

28
29
30
31

v,

.JL
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2

,.,
J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
6
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ::i._.r 'aay of ;J?i:.c.. i:,/
, 2016, I
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by 'the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:

4

5
6
7

8

9
10

11
12

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

( r:) U.S. Mail

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Bai.Tett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

(,t) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

13

/

/- /z.~c·

14

J'

--7

/c.z.,_1.:----

Cnar1es NickeJson

15
"~

16
17

18
19
20

21
22
'Y'
_.:,

24
25

26
27

28
29

--

30
31

31
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C

Additional Kssnes on i-1.p;peai.
Chase requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appeilate

Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code Section 12-121.

On or about October 4, 2002, the Nickersons executed a 30-year Note (the
"Note"), promising to pay PHH or the holder thereof principal and interest payments. R. 330,

333-39. The Nickersons agreed to the terms of the Note and understood the contents thereof.
R. 330, 350, Deposition of Donna Nickerson ("D. Nickerson Depo.") 36: 1-7 and R. 392-93,
Deposition of Charles Nickerson ("C. Nickerson Depo.") 9:24 - 10:9.

To secure the repayment of the Note, the Nickersons executed a Deed of Trust,
recorded as Instrument No. 190568, Cieanvater County, Idaho, on October 4, 2002. R. 330, 415-

31. In December 2007, servicing of the loan \Vas transferred to Chase. The Nickersons made
their first pay1nent to Chase on January 4, 2008, and made a totai of 10 payments to Chase in

2008. The Nickersons oniy made a few payments in the year 2009, and as of the Nickersons'
payment in December 2009, the Nickersons were at least 11 months behind in iheir scheduled
payments on the Note. R. 330, 441-53. In February 2010, PHH repurchased the Note from
Freddie Mac and began servicing the l'-Tote. PHH brought this action in January 2011, requesting

judicial foreclosure for the Nickersons' faiiure to pay the Note as required.

Client3833400.,
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STATE OF IDAfIO

)
ss.

Cotmty of Bonneville)
JON STENQUIST, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as fo1lows:

1.

I am an attorney ofrecord for third party defendant JPMorgan Chase

Bank, N.A. ("Chase") in the above-referenced matter. I have access to my client's fiks in this

matter and make this affidavit based upon personal lrnowledge and in suppmt of Chase's J\.1otion

for Summary Judgment.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and co1Tect copy of the October 4,

2002 Note executed by Dmma and Charles Nickerson in favor of Cold·well Banker Mortgage

(PHH) in the original principal amount of $285,000.00.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and con-ect copy of the Deposition

ofDom1a Nickerson taken on October 3, 2012 in Le\viston, Idaho.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Deposition

of Charles Nickerson taken on October 4, 2012

5.

u1 Lewiston, Idaho.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Deed of

Trust executed by Donna and Charles Nickerson and recorded as Instrument No. 190568 in the
office of the Cleanvater County Recorder on October 4, 2002.

6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and con-ect redacted copy of the

Customer Account Activity Statement :from The Mortgage Service Center dated December 14,

2011 which provides a history of all the Nickersons' payments made to PHH M011gage
Corporation during the years PHH serviced the loan which included the years 2002 through 2007
and then 2010 through 2011.

AJFFIDAVIT OF .JfON A. STENQUIST IN SUPPORT OF
CHASE'S MOTION FOR SUl\'Th1lARY JUDGIVi'...ENT - 1

- \,\'I
Ex
. \i )iT 2
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7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit ''F" is a true and correct copy of the

Nickersons' payment history provided to the 1,Tickersons on lVfay 13, 2010 detailing all payments
made to Chase

011

8.

the Note from 2008 through 2010.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a tme and correct copy of the January

if,

2009 .A.cceleration ·warning letters Chase sent to Donna 1,Tickerson arid Charles Nickerson.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "H" is vinious correspondence from Chase to

the Nickersons in an attempt to modify the Nickersons payments including a January 17, 2009

letter Chase sent to the Nickersons detailing a Repayment Plan. Also included are true and
correct copies of correspondence Chase sent to the Nickersons dated February 7, 2009 and
March 25, 2009.

10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and c01Tect copy of Nickerson' s

A_11s,vers to Third Pmiy Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank's First Set oflntenogarnries, Requests
for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions to Third Party Plaintiffs Chades and
Donna Nickerson, dated June l, 2012.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
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CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC
Detailed Transaction Hisiory

Loan#

Date:

0920

DONNA NICl<ERSOJ\J
CHARLES R NICKERSON

Interest Rate:
Payment Due Date:
Monthly Payment Arnt:
Current Escrow Balance:
Current Principal Balance:

Property Address:
3165 NEFF RD
OROFINO,ID 83544-0000

Mailing Address:
PO BO>( 3414

1 o r,

o o

D

o c a o o a o o o o a u u u o a o c.1 a u u n o o

Reference#

Tran Date
Principal Amt

·l/21/2010

tt

a uo c uooo o o

D

o u

1.1

t1

rJ u o a o o c a u o a o rJ

·112·1120·10

tJ

o u

D

o

ll

o a o rJ

1/'1/2008

-

tl tl

c a c a

ti

a n a wD n

II

n o o o o a

t1

Total Tran Amt
Fees/Oiher Arnt

Transaction Description
Suspense Amt

·1/2112010

$20.00

FASTPAY FEE ASSESSMENT

·J/21/2010

4/'1/2009

$20.00

,

a

r:,

on o c c o un u

::i

o uua o o

JJ

a

c nr

t1

1/31/2010

Effective Date Due Date
Interest Amt
Esci-ow Arnt

$0.00
$0.00
SO.DO
$20.00
...................................................................................................
9-1

6.28%

'1/1/2009
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

REDMOND,WA 98073

Activity for Period

92

!:i/13/201 o
Pg. 1 of ·11

Principal Bal

Escrow Bal

$0.00 , .. , ... , ............................................................
$-1, 186.90
$0.00
.. , .. .,, ......................
.
FASTPAY FEE PAID

$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$20.00
$0.00
$-i,186.90
$0.00
.......................................................................................................................
, ............................................................................... .
90
'

1/21/2010

1/21/20·10

3/1/2009

$2,328.99

PAYMENT

$397.70
$1,362.66
$568.63
$0.00
$0.00
$-1,186.90
$0.00
................................................................................................................................................................. , ... ································
89
1/13/2010
'11'12/20'10
2/1/2009
$2,328.99
PAYMENT

$395.63
$1,364.73
$568.63
$0.00
$-2,328.99
$-789.20
$-568.63
.....................................................
, ..............................................................................................................................................
88

1/12/2010

1/12120'10

·ltl/2010

$-187.63

MORTGAGE INSURANCE

$0.00

$0.00

$-187.63

$0.00

$0.00

$-393.57

"

$-·J ,137.26

"i/ ............ 1.211·s12ooe· ..... ·1·2i1.si200·9· ...... 1.21·1-i2ooi> ....... i:fri7..63 .................... ···MoRrGA.GE.i'NsuRANcE.............................................
$0.00
$0.00 , .. ...............................................................................................................................................
$-187.63
$0.00
$0.00
$-393.57
$-949.63 ..
.................................................
,

86
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"12/'l 1/2009

i 2/11/2009

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$20.00

FASTPAY FEE ASSESSMEf\lT

$20.00

$0.00

$-393.57

$-762.00

... as.............. 1.2i1·:1i2009· ...... :i'2r·1-i.i2oci'9 ....... 2i1i2009· ........ $.20.'60 .........................FAsrPAY.FEE .PAi'o ................................................ ..
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$20.00
$0.00
S-393.57
$-762.00
................................................................................................................................................... ······ ............................................ ..
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Although Chase attempted to modify the tenns of the Note to allow the Nickersons to catch up
on their payments, the Nick:ersons did not agree to any of the modifications offered by Chase.

Stenquist AJf Ex. H; see also D. Nickerson Depo. 175:12-15 and C. NickersonDepo. 87: 17-22.
8.

The Nickersons only made a few payments in the year 2009, and as of the

Nickersons' payment in December 2009, the Nickersons were at least 11 months behind in their
scheduled payments on the Note. Stenquist Aff. Ex. F.
9.

In February 2010, PHH repurchased the Note :from Freddie Mac and

began servicing the Note.
10.

PHH brought this action ju January-2011, requesting Judicial Foreclosure

for the Nickersons' failure to pay the Note as required.
11.

The Nickersons filed their Amended Complaint their counterclaim against

PHH and later added Chase as a third party defendant in their Amended Complaint, a11eging that
all payments under the Note were paid cmTent through January 2010, at wluch time they allege
PHH refused to accept payments. Based on this claim, the Nick:ersons contend that Chase and

PHH have falsely reported a payment delinquency and have destroyed the Nickersons' credit.
The Nickersons also contend that the destruction of their credit served to deprive lVfr. Nickerson

of employment in the telccom and IT fields. See generally, A.mended Complaint.
12.

On or about April 2, 2012, Chase served upon the l'.Yickersons its First Set

of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions to Tlurd

Party Plaintiffs Charles and Donna Nickerson. The Nickersons did not serve their answers to
Chase's Requests for Admissions within thirty (30) days as required by the rules.

1V1EMORANDUM IN SUJPPORT OJF ClILt\SE'S
MOTION FOR SUMM.ARY JUDGMENT 3
Q
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1
2

3
4

5

4.

Third-Party Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A. 01ereafter "Chase) is a foreign

corporation.

5.

On or about October 4, 2002, Nickersons executed a Note and a Deed of Trust with

Coldwell as the beneficiary. The real property seeming this transaction is located in Clearwater
County, Idaho, and is more particularly described as follow-s:
Township 36 North, Range 2 East, Boise Ivleridian

6
7
8

9

~

Section 22: SE1/4 NWl/4, SE 1/4 SW 1/4 NW 1/4

A copy of said Note is attached as Exhibit C to the PIIB' s Complaint in this matter. A copy of said
Deed of Trust is attached as Exhibit A to the PHH's Complaint.

6.

Said property consists of more than 50 acres and is in part agricultural property and

10

thus the Deed of Trust is legally a Mo1tgage but for ease of reference will be refened to as the Deed

11

of Trust.

l- <.
')

13
14

7.

Coldwell assigned the Note and Mortgage to Chase on or about December 20, 2007.

8.

When the Note and Mortgage was transfened to Chase the Nickersons inu11ediately

began having accounting problems with their accOlmt.

9.

Nickersons would receive notices of failure to provide insurance followed by notices

15

that Chase had made a mistake, etc. Nickersons bad contact with Chase employees who stated from

16

lhe computer records regarding Nickersons' account that it showed they were being billed twice a

17

month instead of monthly.

18
19
20

10.

Nickersons continued to make timely payments during this time when allowed.

11.

Nickersons always carried adequate insurance on the subject property.

12.

Nickcrsons made numerous requests for infom1ation about their account, including

but not limited to statements but never received anything.
21
22
7~

-

,J

24
~,

13.

During this time the Chase employees that Nickersons had contact with \:vere rude,

offensive, and threatening.
14.

On or about September of 2009, Nickersons began '"wrking with a Chase empioyee

I

named Kim.

II

25
A:VIENDED ANSWER, COUNTERCLAIM, THIRD PARTY

26

C0I\1PLA1NT AND DEM.AND FOR TtJRY TRIAL
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Paragraph 6 require a legal conclusion and therefore require no re~ponse.

6.

Respondi71gto Pardgraph 7 oft11c Complaint~ JPl\liorgan admits that the

Nic!cersnns' Nate and Mortgage were assigned by Coldwell, but lacks sufficient information to
fom1 a belief as to the parties and dates of assignrnent(s) P.nd therefor0 denies the remaining
allegations of Paragraph 7 ofthe Co!t'lpfoint.
7.

JPMorgan denies the .aUegations contained in Paragraphs 8-10 of the

8.

Responding to Paragraph 11 of t.li.e Complaint, JPMorgan. lacks sufficient

Complaint.

inforrnation and knowledge to form a belief as to i:he trut.'1· of those allegations and, therefore,
denies fue same.
9.

JPMorgm1 denie.s the allegations of Paragraphs 12-13 of the Complaint.

10.

Responding to Paragraph 14- of the Complaint JPMorgan lacks sufficient

infonnation and knowledgt7 to form. a belief as to the truth· of those dlegaticms and, t..herefore,

denies the same.
11.

Responding to P:;1.ragraph 15 of the Complaint, JPMorgan 2.dxnits ii:

received a payment on September 2, 2009, but lacks sufficient ii1formation ~md knowledge to

form a belief as t.o the truth of the remaining allegations of said paragra:ph and, therefore, dmies

the same.
12.

IP1Vforgan denies the allegations of Paragraph 16 ofihe Complaint

13.

Respondh1g to Paragraph 17 of the Compiaint, JPMorgan admits it

received. a,_ payment on Novem.bcr 11, 2009, but lacks sufficient infomw.tion a.rid knowledge to
fonn a. belief as to the truth of the rnm..aining a!legalions of said paragraph and, therefore, denies

the same.

Jl?JViiORG.A..1'.f C:lfilASE RAJ.'{lf'C. N.iL 'B
Ju_I"'ISV/1ZR TO Tli-lJiRJIT; P~T~l COfvrPL~.ThJT - 3
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lvlay 2, 2013

l'vfs. Donna Nickerson
3165 l'{EFF RD
OROFINO, ID 83544

Ref. 3165 N.tFFRD., OROFINO,TD 83544

Fax # 425-691-7926 and First Class t•.1ail
Dear Ms. Nickerson,

Thank you for contacting Fannie 1viae. You requested a writt.en response to your letter
dated 4/18/13:

Ptease be advised that Fannie IVIae does not own your loan. Our records show that the
loan was sold to Fannie Mae on 12/27/2002, and Fannie Mae's interest in the
loan terminated as of 12/3/2009. Your request for copies of your Joan file,
communications and correspondence should be directed to :your mortgage servicer, JP
Morgan Chase.
If you have further questions, please contact our Resource Center at l-800-732-664-3.

:JVfargk
Business Analyst
Fannie Mae's Resource Center
Washington D.C

Confiderrtial - Internal Distdbution

-~~--~----------------------~
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COMES NOvV Third Party Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
("JPMorgan"), by and through undersigned counsel ofrecord, and ans,.vers and responds to
defendants Charles and Donna Nickersons' first set of interrogatories and requests for production

of documents as follows:
PRELli\1INARY STATEfvIENT
JPMorgan, based upon i Ls cunent understanding and belief of the facts and the

information presently known to it, responds and objects as follows to Third Party Plaintiffs First
Set of Requests for Interrogatories and Requests for Produci:ion ("Nickersons' Requests"). The

following responses are based upon diligent exploration of JPMorgan's understanding and belief
respecting the matters about which inquiry was made. It is anticipated that further discovery,

independent investigation and consultation with expe1ts may supply additional facts, add
meaning to lmmvn facts, and establish entirely new factual conclusions and legal contentions, all
of ,vhich may lead to substantial additions to, modifications of, and variations from the responses
herein set forth. The following responses are, therefore, made without prejudice to JPMorgan's
1ight to produce evidence of subsequently discovered documents or facts.

INTERROGATOR.JES
Il'l"TERROGATORY NO. l: Please identify who ovmed the Kickersons' note
prior to Chase purchasing it and on what date was said note purchased?

Al'\TSWER NO. 1: JPMorgan objects to this inte1Togat01y on the grounds that the

matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan fmther objects to this
interrogatory as it mischaracterizes the facts, contending that JPiVIorgan purchased the
Nickersons' note, whereas, JPJVIorgan ·was a servicer of the note and not a purchaser.

I-

''\'

I ,

,TlP']V[ORGAI'<T CHASE BANI-('§ A.1'1"SVVJERS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS C x·h \ l:) Ir I
CHARLES AND DONfsTA 1'TJCKERS0N'§ FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES
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INTERROGATORY NO. ·J: Please identify all the federally mandated
procedures followed when Chase purchased the note, including but 11ot limited to the transfer

details and documentation.
ANS'V{ER NO. 2: JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that the
tem1 "all the federally mandated procedures followed" is vague and ambiguous. JPMorgan also

objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that the matter sought is not relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. JPMorgan objects to this inte1Togatory because it mischaracte1izes the
facts, contending JPivlorgan purchased the note, whereas JPMorgan was a servicer of the note

and not a purchaser.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please state the reason behind Chase's decision to
seil the Nickersons' note? Please include the documentation of the transaction.

Al"'TSvVER NO. 3: JPMorgan objects to this inten-ogatory on the grounds that the
matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan, as a servicer of the loan,
did not "sell" the Nickersons' note.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please state how the transaction were handled, e.g.,
electronically?

A1'\TSWER NO. 4: JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory because the tenn
"transactions were handled" is vague and ambiguous. In light of the prior interrogatories
contained herein, JPI:vforgan cJ.i<l not purchase,

O'Nn

or sell the Nickersons' note and merely acted

as servicer of the loan.

JJP'MORGA__N CHASE BANK'S 1-\NSVv'ERS AND RJESPONSES TO DEFENDAl'\TTS
CHltRLES AI•TD DON.NA NICI<ER.§OI,.PS FIRST SET OF INTERl'lOGATORIES
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INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please state why a Fannie Mae Collateral
#4002697229 is attached to the account?

ANS'\VER NO. 5: JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that the
matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably
calculated to lead ro the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan objects to this
inte1Togatory on the further grounds that the tem1 "Fannie Mae Collateral #4002697229" is
vague and ambiguous and that the interrogatory is calculated to or \Vould operate to vex, aTu1oy,
harass, oppress, embarrass, or unduly burden JPMorgan.
JNTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please state whether Chase is licensed to provide
mo11gages or service mortgages on 50 acre prope1ties? If affirmative, please give the month, day
and year of said license.
Ai'\ISWER NO. 6: JPMorgan objects to this Interrogatory because the tem1s
"licensed to provide mortgages or service mortgages on 50 acre properties" and "said license"
are vague and ambiguous. JP1v1organ also objects to this Interrogatory because it calls for a legal
conclusion.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please state the reasoning behind Chase's decision
to not foreclose on the Nickersons' note p1iorto transferring it to PER.
ANS\!VER NO. 7: JPMorgan objects to this intenogatory on the grounds that the

matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan further objects to this
interrogatory as it mischaracterizes the facts, contending that JPMorgan was the owner of the
note, in a position to determine to foreclose or not foreclose, when in fact, JPMorgan was a
servicer of the note.

Ex h'\ b\ t -]
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INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state the reason Chase stopped sending

monthly statements to the Nickersons after March of 2009.
ANSWER NO. 8: JPMorgan lacks insufficient infonnation to determine when

regular monthly statements ceased to the Nickersons and therefore objects to this interrogatory to
the extent it may rnischaracte1ize the facts. The documents attached hereto indicate that the
Nickersons began working ,:vith JPMorgan's loss mitigation group to avoid foreclosure and were
sent a forbearance agreement with an alternative payment plan. Because alternative payment
amounts \Vere offered to the Nickersons, regular monthly statements may have ceased in light of

the new payment plan.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please describe/list what information was provided
to PHH regarding the transfer/sale of the note.

ANS\i\TER NO. 9: JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory because the term

"regarding the transfer/sale of the note" is vague and ambiguous. As u servicer for the
Nickersons' ioan, JPMorgan is not aware of the infrmnation exchanged in the transfer/sale of the
of the note benveen buyer and seller. \.Vithom waiving this objection, please see the documents
provided herewith.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe the agreements in place between
Chase and PHH regarding transfers and sales of notes.

AI'fSWER NO. 10: To the extent this interrogatory requests infonnation
regarding matters other than the Nickersons' loans, JPMorgan objects to this intenogatory on the
grounds that the request for information is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory on the fu1iher grounds thal the inten-ogatory is overbroad

Ev\,\brt
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and is calculated to or \,vould operate to vex, annoy, harass, oppress, embanass, or unduly burden

JPMorgan and constih1tes an unreasonable invasion of the 1ight to privacy of persons not party to
this litigation. JPMorgan further objects to this interrogatory because the matter sought is not
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably calculated to lead to
lhe discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan further objects to this intenogatory as it
mischaracterizes the facts, contending that JPMorgan is in privity with PHH, when in fact,

JPlVIorgan was merely a servicer of the note. Without waiving these objections, please see the
documents provided herewith.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state/describe where the refunded insurance
money went.

ANSWER NO. 11: JPMorgan objects to this interrogatory because the tenn "the
refunded insmance money" is vague and ambiguous.

INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please list all suits relating lo foreclosure and the
results of such suits Chase has been a party of over the last four (4) years.

l\l"ISW--:ER NO. 12: JPMorgan objects to this inten-ogawry on the grounds that the
matters sought are not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan objects to this
intenogatory on the further grounds that the interrogatory is overbroad and is calculated to or

would operate to vex, annoy, harass, oppress, embanass, or unduly burden JPMorgan, and
conslitutes an unreasonable invasion of the 1ight to p1ivacy of persons not pmty to this litigation.
1NTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please list all federal sanctions or fees, requested
or' Chase to pay regarding their foreclosure practices for the past four (4) years, including for
each such sanction or fee the date, the amount and the reason for each sanction/fee.

JPMORG.A..1.'T CHASE BANK'S ANSWERS .AJ."\'D RESPONSES TO DEFEN"D.ANTS EXh'ihJ /
CHARLES AJ.'1D DOl\TNA NICKERSON'S FIRST SET OF INTEF,.ROGATORJES
751 180 5 c\- 7
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RESPONSE NO. 8: JPfvlorgan objects to this request because the term "refund of
insurance money" is vague and ambiguous. Without \Vaiving this objection, please see the
documents provided herewith, with specific reference to documents numbered JPMC0097-0112.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce copies of all documents
of whatsoever nature, desciiption or kind related to any and all sanctions or fees placed upon
Chase in the last four (4) years.

RESPONSE NO. 9: JP"tvlorgan objects to this request on the grounds that the
macter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably
caiculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan objects to this request on
the further grounds that the request is overbroad and is calculated to or would operate to vex,
annoy, harass, oppress, embarrass, or unduly burden JPMorgan, and constitutes an unreason ab le
invasion of the right to privacy of persons not party to this litigation.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of all
documents ofvvhatsoever nature, descliption or kind related to the foreclosure proceedings by
Chase against the Nickersons.

RESPONSE NO. 10: JP:Morgan objects to this request because it requests
documents that are available from the public record. Without waiving this objection, please see
the documents provided herewith.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce copies of all docmnents
of .,_:vhatsoever nature, description or kind initially received by Chase in regards to the
rransfer/sale of the Nickerson's note.

RESPONSE NO. 11: JPMorgan objects to this Request because the te1111s
"transferisale" are vague and a1nbiguous and because JP1viorgan did not purchase the Note, but

Ex'\-··n bJ1
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was merely a servicer of the Note. Without waiving these objections, please see the attached
documents.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce copies of all monthly
payment reminders, requests, notices sent to the Nickersons.

RESPONSE NO. 12: Please see the attached documents. In addition, discovery
is ongoing and JPMorgan will supplement this response in the event any additional infom1ation
becomes available.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce copies of all documents
of whatsoever nature, description or kind related to any and all federally mandated procedures

that Chase followed when it purchased the Nickersons' note from Chase.
RESPONSE NO. 13: JPMorgan objects to this request because the term "ali
federally mandated procedures" is vague and ambiguous. JPMorgan also objects to this reques1
on the grounds that the matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan
objects to this request on the further grounds that the request is ovcrbroad and is calculated to or
\vould operate to vex, annoy, harass, oppress, ernbmnss, or unduly burden JPMorgan.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce copies of all documents
of whatsoever nature, desc1iption or kind related to the process of how the transfers, sales, and
serv1cmg.
RESPONSE NO. 14: JPMorgan objects to this request on the grounds that the
matter sought is not relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action nor reasonably
caiculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. JPMorgan objects to this request on
the further grounds that the request is overbroad and is calculated to or ,vould operate lo vex,
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p.i3

Re: Chai'"le5 !mcl Domna

Ni1ke1r£0n

To i/li'11@rn it May Crmcem:\
\

My 1name Is Jo!'.lhra WHtcheRt !I wais the a.roorney of recor-d lfo:r Cfu=.nliis a !ll D<0Y1lf!a

fl!lc!-reiram-i in~ forecloom:e\suit invoo1.rfmg: fll~H anid C!:".cellw,
l

I

1 onginalliy met !£:he Nidrej,;;ins: whem just Lav"· was tr.)}ing to clo a no j\\lldiciaJ
fo?'edosure om tl3e ~Hup1:h ~"'. Afver pointing aut in e}thii;Jr a pho~e ealil or a ie'l:te:r or
i:HJf{k'ii Q:{} jil!ist Li:!W ti'i@t@ no/jIAdkfa'iK furedoiSM ro 1J1ras imt ;a fH'OJ'.'er ~rnbdly in ~Ms

matter tlt& !iliOcR jMc.HctGl forildosu~ Wci/3 w:1lii.ceUedi ar.d. I h,formecl the~ to 11;0.utact me
if they wiern goililgtiu pijf5~ ~ judi<:ial for~fo.sure. The !i'!eJ!t oonractw~!h regards (ll}
the <easfi; er.mm& from filhe f~i treu:son$ who had fo~1Hi out tihat the ?lni!Bl~iffhad fil'crd a
c,m:t!i:,,la!nt 8'l'i1~ tii}~ad 01, s,t·~m.g tll@m f@fSO!ilanlJ" or_co;ra~IG'tlng mtg E'eques\'.JSlicl 11 8d
as~ea for anQJ :racemoo p@w. 1ssmn to &s'tei;i:Ua~ s~rv1ce mi;i ~1.!'Mk.2ti 1.

ay

~

D""'ri111,15 t,iy irepa·@sewi.ta:ition . f th.s;: Nk::ke1;5ons ! was per:.ona&iy exper:le crng .so:rne
major meru'i:EJU issl!.3es im:lud~ilg sewer"$ depl\1;SSfoifl ai!iilXl!i;?cy' and comptl sive gambling.
As a fiootno~<f: f mm a reco,retlilg ,e1koholic l'1Fi!W aDmo~ 16 yealfs' Bf ~b ·e-t;y how.;;~mr I

·w·as ri.:lt!Je or refused tCJ r;e
destiw,ctive beha.,,vior.

!

gnize that imy .:id.diction rela.p~@d mto a d fferen!:
·

tf

uurtn~ my r'~fl!i"esenratiofE ~lw !Nic!~ersons imy depresskmi ciil'lci com, tJASiV~
.
gsx11 b!mg hau me
tm g sulieid@ ii1Jl.l!i"',fl4?f01)]$ times <lajJy aThd! w1·hout q_~estion
f <w-«s rnEn1@Uy, emotionall and phylsi<i:aUJ wniit. ! have sar1..::e rn~eiv · impatient

com:r,mpr·

Etea~eut fo'i:° gambHlflg an while my depression is friiett:er i:o a g,:eat e;;;d;ent Xstill!
eirr~rfanice perlorls olf ©lt;'p,""ssimi. fli1l (krolber rnf 2013 K r~!gF!.~d
it,e bar lira !bell
of g;uspe-nsion arni l rm~e
the li?nEi iu!m: tr3_n111g ttl si!ilrmwe. i r€c~m\tly have gotten
@

s~Im

:trod

seasomal job tln·ougil ate ri porary ernpkiyment agef!cy l.nspecting o!fons of behalf
·1 ·

of tfue Staite,

l s~ruggle eve.ry d@y oo ii::Om? to grilJJS wlili :th~ dlisaste:r rthat is my Hie~··d v,wnt to
emr>hasiie- tilat XreaHze 'th9t I anl ~sponsilbile for my actions anci ChWi es. In
h!t.ftdsngh'i: 1 dearr&y «:oukl. nof r~wdlle the_ saes,;; o!l~li'acticiag :a;I'' ,,uid l i st it men~Hy.
Lllllfu~"iJlnate!y g did moll: tG:!cfgnize ~,at rnct soon el:'loY1P1 ae112t 01~rtn~ ID.//
repr[isentatlrnn ofl!he Nkliejrson::. i <lad 11011: f@OW'lfv'hat to llo and noK li~owirigw]1at
to clo iecl my oo be~r,1g &isho~est 1,.,,!th my-self ~ind others, niota\b iy 'i:he N]dcersons,

I did iriot keep the Nickerso~is informied abr:n:ii tb1: sitarus of t,\eir ease - fulw their
cle?OOith,~s W'fJF:ey taken, d.i~ not rel~ them abol!t ~ su~mary juirlgm:mt ~otio?, the
summary 1udgment declst];' toid 1t11~m an appe<.11 hM been fil.g~ ,;11.,h.en it_ haOl_ not ;;m.~
1.1vft1:hdrew from. the case wi l'lD!llt tel!mg them. ! camiot ir~merntieir eitEjctly wtui;r;t i cHo
or did not do o.r say l(J, did. • m: say hut 1am !mre the Nick~rsons are [nf het\jgf
positio» 00 imfOlml <lte Cou
'Jl/hile my opinion is p,ol>ably 01e•nin~l m. l do tbin~

I

I
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tlu!t the Nkkersonis ar
fi!itt

.ih1;1bly the most li!'.i'inest mncl i;t1dmg peo~ · 'hat l ha V<; ever

i

~~he_ Nidte~~ns d~:2r"<& ~~r1 E1ave P.he, t~n. de~lyritmg co~p_i?fat an~ '1:~~ir. dolilTI!i:@1~!a~JT!$
'6!ec:,cl~cl oli'il ~.e mer'i.1i:.s ohr e case em& ,mfr !l1~ve ~\eaf· IR'li? ~!8rre1::fl:e~ l\Jec~use llh.iP,y µlli\:
1
!1.l'i!e>ir faith ir. am. al:c()rne:y · ho ulid r}O'i: have the rneil!U"ll and ernetf[trf!,at r.ap;;;b1l!ties ·w

give them .adequcil!i'.i& r@pr@ ef!t.ai:tuin.

1I

1l'jc:;' Nicket"SlllflS t%Hl® i:.1xH:o~&r.i:d countle:IB irregularities anci. f@lsi'ij::;s i11 'bfl11:ir ~se
whiidi ff puesented tproper'y to a Cot,ttshould be a irlefo!r!~e t£l the for< doSi!re dagm
anri su1opm"c for (dheil" cmu1 -ercfa1ims,
Dulrir&g my ii'"J[?1~se1utation "f the l\Hd~TSOi1S i ~Rked 'IP.fith several g,o. t?"rr11mumt:BI

agenci@S about wrongful f redosurrt?s in general a Ted tl1e 1\31ckersoliils' cas@ in Sp@G!f!G,
I talked i'iflth the FBI agen~ h, t,ewistou. al!ld the Auomey.fien@ira!'s ~ice l:n Bo[se. t
gave th.cg 'FBH ai fah-iy ~~1.tdi lliilrlde!" id~ntifyiiag s~€dfk undd<i!iirl:fi of m!Joflciuct on t!l'l~
part oftlte piainli.Hf1. ifJttll ~lJ)pomng dorumE!i7!@tiom that this t:,~e o~ colrilduct lha?.:l
b~€;r! idoine exR:ensiwely bC;:f, :re. Offt~1e wp of my head~ C21~~6t IT'-ametc;:;ber the
S§ll:Cifks 0lJll!: I !,leem 00 'I"~~ ll Mt'.a!J1V fraud\. TD ltfie he.st !JJf my lrl;?!;O!ieteo,~ l
remembe.r lnrerestt and mymking th~t oi·w olfthese ag<,H'iic!es woukll ~!-i:e th~ ease <fl,l'J
and itwestigate irnt uitimaf@ly thes6' agencies dedinee1. I @ism filed
com;plaiints
with one ar t'i,'l/Cl federal a111tcies but do not remem~er lirth.ey ro~k a y action.

orh1e

I

I
1
The Nickersons' c&se wa.s~ iit d1;:ckledl i;;;n i~ me1ri\W at:1td re.aUy no mel,;,llilin)#--Yl
discovery ~J!J<ilS ~ve'r al!l!swe ecl by i:Jhj;,- Psah1.1r.iffs. There js no ~rejmilk oo tt"!e
Ptai\liltiffs ili'i a1lovJiBg me- · ickeusoni; to have 6Hscmrerry dorm projper\3 and '!.!1&ve the
i:m1d1Grlyi[1g cas1; a'l.'.!d ~h~ir younterd~ims decided on the facts of the ~e and not
ha~?e the ieaS!!: d~eidlerl bee¥~;;& of ~Hil i!'.lcomµetemt meTI1\laUy- mi\flt @l: til@ ~m® ,;;tiorney
vvho d.ld not know how to ~em.dl@ th'0 mess that be crel!ltrrl. l heii~"~ aU U'!e
MckelfS\tiltilS Wclil'l\: ts ~frie Cf!'::nce to puit Oil thefr defense .,ir1d flheir prOOrfor tfieia
weaITT.te?daims.
I.

!n ac:co:rdm1{:'G' with UtC.P r(d) aficl LC. ~-1401!ii l certify or d12d;:1r1;;1.ur,der (Ple:mi1H;y of
9 erj,m]i' fflY!i'stla(it to ~~10 la :'IJS of me s11;.are of KdaRio that the foiregotng s t1ru@ $lnt:i
col:'roct vat@cil 11:lr.e i®1.11 deyofSeirmm'\ber, l014.

I
Si.rat!:~:rely,

.d'z· ,

-"

/

/
~~==-;t:J:r-:;= =: •
l/---.
!-~~/~
lQ:i'm ~./hi«:lh.eil
I
~

I

I
.Ci.(,1cl il
/t!';.fi-£:. l
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Chase Horne Finance LLC
OH4-7382
3415 Vision Dnve
eorumbus, OH 432i9-6009

· December 22, 2009

DONNA NICKERSON
CHARLES R :N1CKERSON
POBOX3414

REDMOND WA 98073

_A_ccount Ending In:

0920

Date of Loan:
Original Amount of Loan:
Mortgage Property Address:

$285.000.0C:

October 4, 2002

3165NEFFRD
OROFD..:rO, ID 83544

SliIBJECT: NOTICE OF N°"EW CREDITOR
V/e a.re sending you this Notice in accordance with the requirements oftbe "Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009_' Your mortgage loan (referenced above)
has been sold o:r transferred to JPMorgan Chase Banlc, N.A. ("Chase'
Chase is the
Ne\V Creditor of your loan.
0

0

).

Thjs Notice is pro•,ided for rnf-0rmational purposes only.
Y.:ou are not_ Teqµire<l to take any_ acti.on as a resul! 9fthis_ Notice.

_

I1..1is Notice does not a..-Ffect the servicing of yoUT mortgage loan or change your
sec-vjcer.. Please conth,ue to make payments on your mortgage loan to your current

servicer at the S3.Jue address to ·which you were instructed by your SeIYicer to

make payments (unless or until you are advised differently by your servicer). Any
mongage payments that are not sent ti.mel y to your servicer may result :in late fees
and otber d1a:rges

T.he term. "we" means Chase. The terrr,s "you" and "your" mean lhe nzortgage

bor,mver(s) identified above.

LC--CHEN-0809B
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NOTICE OF NE\V CREDITOR

?lease note the following tnfern..,.ation regarding the t-ar,,sfer ofyour mortp;age loan:

The identity (namet address and telephone number of the Neiv Creditor is:
JPlVIorgan Chase Bank, N ..,-"L
111 Polaris Par.«:\•:ay

Columbus, OH 43240-2050
1-800-848-913 6

2. The .date of.the sale _Qf yourmon:gage lo~_to fu~_l'.'.T~w. Creditor_w.~~- .D.ecemb~r 3,
2009.
.
3. Chase Home Finance, LLC is acting as the agent for the creditor. If you have any
questions rega,.-ding this l'tfotice, piease contact Chase Home Finance, LLC at the
address and phone number below:
Chase Home Finance, LLC
3415 Vision Drive
Columbus, OH 43219
1-800-848-9136
4. Evidence of transfer of o\1mcrshlp of your mortgage loan o:r fue :instrument securing
your mortgage loan is recorded in tbe Jand record.5 oftbe coTu-rty :in vihlch the
mor..gaged property is located.

5. }\ny mvestor or creditor that purchases your Joan is required under federaJ law to give
you v1,Titten notice. Rfyo~ have 2iny questions corrcernfogthls Noti.ce, pfoase feel
free

to contact us toll-free all::

LC-CHEN-0809B
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:00111,Ui

Nickerson and ,Churl es :R.. Nickerson

Po Box34J4
Redmond, \VA 98073

VeMficafion oi' debt for IDC11:tgage 1mm *'"'i,,;'**0920

.Borrower(s}:

Donna Nick ".I'Son
Charles R. l'• ickerson

D~rDonna Nic:lierSOn and ::harles R. Nickerson:
This letter fu in respon&e to ti ,e C'o:;;espondence we .,ei:;(}iYed on I){.';cemlwr 16. 2013 ilioui th~ account

above.

Encfosed ,1.re cop1es of the foi!owing documents:
- J..,Qrul

Trnnsaction I.fato1 :c:

-Note
- S'ecuriw Jrn::t.un:i;ent
~ Assigu;rn;m of MorrgRg; •:

Ic it on1r position rhat Chase h,1s addres~d your oorrtSJ)Oi'ldence fr\ a ruaruier !mt ooroplles willl the Reai
S:State $<;ttli;,r.1ent t'ro::cdureS Act und Rcgulatton X. Wt.. are- not l'~Uired to p:ror;l.uce the origfrml note
wtkh wiH .remain in our pos, ,bSSion .in accordance with U!Jplicable record retention reqni:rornents.
Pk~\se note, thm: the account :v·ag tr,msfa.,~d

t;:,

a

ue\.T

serviC{l.r on Si;ptemb~r 20, 2-012.

lnformatfon regarding the; Ivfo,tgage Electronic Registtgtion Systi;.ms (M.ERS} can he lo;:;ated on the lvffiRS
website at http'./h.:v-1vw.mersiv ::.org/. However, this is :not a ME.RS loan.
Any infonnu.tion or docu..-ri?n. reqE;,sl(;d but not inc[uc:)ed ,,riid)

Olli' _prior respoos<;

is unavailable o.r

considered confidential, .and w1m01 be (:lrovide<l. A re~onse to all quostions related LO Joan trans.actions

can be found in t.1e loan transnction hlstnty.

Slru:erely,
ChMe
(800) 848-9136
(800) 582-0542 TDD/ Text T:)lephiope

vrorw .cbase-.com
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Charles and Donna Nicl<erson
3165 Neff Rd.

Orofino. !D 83544
425-691-7926
Fax# 425-691-7926
Cl,ase
P.O. Box 183166
Columbus, OH 43218-3166
Chase loan #19162 !0920
June 12. 2014
To Whom it May Concern,
We are writing to request a copy of all notations made on our account by Chase employees from Januan; 1,

2009 to present.
We are also requesting a copy of the tapes for all conversations that occurred between January 1, 2009 to
presenL Davion Thomas, a Chase Mortgage specialist, instructed us to send this request to you to ol)tain the

informaiion we need.
Additionally, we are trying to piece together vvhat has occurred with our loan from origination to present so we
can see the chain of ownership and transfers associated with our loan. Therefore, please provide details
regarding the chain of ownership of our property from origination to present. This should include all investors,
dates ownership or transfers occurred, and specifically state who Chase received our loan from.
Due to the urgency of this request, please send tile requested information to the physical property address,
3165 Neff Road. Orofino, ldal10 83544. Thank you for your prompt attention in filling this request.

:·.f:, ..lji{i?'.--~;tJ:./...-:;~-----· -

Charles j,Jicl<erson
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Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Rd.
Orofino. ID 83544
,J'.25-691-7926
Fax# 425-691-7926
Chase
Legal Department
Attention: Cheryl Wolf
1 Q4 Wood Ave. S
lselin, f\JJ 08830

Re: Chase loan #1916210920
June i 2, 2014

Dear Cheryl,

,,.--.

iVlv dauQhter spol<e with Katie Holland with my authorization who directed us to contact you regarding our
loan with Chase. Specifically, we are inquiring about Chase's involvemeni. in any litigation dealing with our
property currently or at any time since January 2010. We are concerned a firm may be unlavvfully
"representing" Chase without proper authorization from Chase on issues regarding our loan. Ti1e
unnecessary and inconceivable ramifications for all parties is substantial so we request your immediate
investigation and involvement in this matter. Our family has suffered greatly as a result of this firm's
actions and we are asl<ing you to please assist us in learning the truth and determining Chase's true
involvement.
If Cl1ase has authorized or initiated litigation regarding our loan, please send us a proof of authority that
includes the fi1m and attorney representing Chase, the date they were retained and the issues C!1ase
retained the firm for. If Chase is not aware they are being represented, or misrepresented as the case
may be, please send us a letter stating this fact as soon as possible. Due to the seriousness and urgency
of this issue, we request you fax your response to the number you have on file, 1-425-691-7926, and also
mail a copy to the property address, 3165 Neff Road, Orofino, Idaho 83544. Again, this issue affects botl,
our interests and yours in the property so we thank you in advance to your prompt attention to this matter.

Charles Nickerson
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L1rr\' C. Hunter
R:indall ,\. Peccrrnan
11fark S. Prusvnski
Scephrn IC Thomas
Gc:-.1ld T. Hu,ch
Scorr L. C:1mpbcll
Patricio. i\f. Olsson
Christine E. Nichol:!S
I3radlcv J \'\.'illiams
Lee Ra~\tord

Michael 0. Roe
David S. Jensen
lames L. Marcin
C. Clayrnn Gill
Mich:iel \\?. McGrc-alw.rn.
David P. Gardner
Julian E. Gabiola
Kimberl;• D. Evans Ross
jon A. Stenquist
Mark C. Peterson

Tvler !. Anderson
A°ndr~<'-' J. \\';nldcm
C. Edward Cnrhcr Ill
Benjamin C. Ricchie
i\fa[chew J. McGee
Mindv ]I[. \"\?ill man
Jerra Harch !lb.chews
An<lrc,1 J. Ros hole
1'faria 0. Hare
Kirk J. Houston

O(Counscl:
John S. Simko
John C. \\lard
b:1vid B. Lincoln
Gary T. Dancc
Norman iv[. Semanko

iittorneys at X.. au·
HJ\l1.f1':G 1\DDRESS:
P[-[YS!C1\L i\DDRES:::
PO Box 5 l 505
900 Pier Vie"· Dr STE 206
Idaho L1Hs ID S3405-l 505 Idaho Falls ID 83402-,i972
r.-

208.522.6700 MAIN
S00.422.2889 TOLL-FREE
20S.521.5 l ! l F1\X

n.rnrw·.n1orJil[f.COnJ

July 14, 2014

Charles and D01rna Nicl<:erson
3165 Neff Road

Orofino, ID 83544
PPl-K Iviortgage Y~ ~ficl~erson 9 et aL
MTBR&F File No. 23161.0016
Re:

Dear Ivir. and l\iirs. Nickerson:

I am writing you at the request of my client. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"). Chase has
provided me ,vith your attached letter, dated June 12, 2014, wherein you inquire as to whether
my firm is legitimately representing Chase.
Rest assured that my firm has been engaged by Chase to defend it from your claims. My
receipt of the attached date-stamped letter and certified envelope evidences our engagement.
You are on notice that this firm is your only authorized contact for Chase, and accordingly,
cease and desist from contacting Chase directly.
Sincerely,

Jon A. Stenquist
.f AS/rnrs

cc:

Kipp L Manwaring

BOISE

O

POCATELLO

n

IDAHO FALLS

E

V .\ '~-.

_L

l) \)

_1\ \ \ ,J\ \
.,) h\
Client:3475178.'. ··J

190

i .. J

'),

!1~ \ '~

Charles and Donna Nickerson
3 i 65 Neff Rd_
Orofino. ID 83544

i25-69'!-7926
1=-ax # 425-691-7925
Cl1ase
Legal Department
,0,itention: Cheryl Wolf
·194 \flood Ave. S
lselin. NJ 03830
Re: Chase \oan #'19'16210820

June 12, 2014
Dear Cheryl,

:Vly daugl,ter spoke with Katie Holland with my authorization 1Nho directed us to contc1ct you ragarding our
loan with Chase. Specifically, we are inquiring about Chase's involvement in any litigation dealing witl1 our
property currently or at any time since January 201 O_We are concerned a firm may be unlavvfully
"represeniing" Ci1ase without proper· authorization from Chase on issues regarding our loan. The
unnecessary ancJ inconceivable ramifications for ail partfes is substantial so we request your immediate
investigation and involvement in this matter. Our fsmiiy has suffered greatly as a resuli of this fim1's
actions and we 2re asking you to please assist us in iearn1ng the truih and determining Chase's true
1nvolvement.
!t Cr1ase 11as authorized or initiated litigation reg2rding our !oan, please send us a proof of authority tha1

includes the firm and attorney representing Chase, the date they were retained and t11e issues Chase
retained the fim1 for. If Ct,ase is not aware they are being represented, or misrepresented as the case
may be, please send us a !etter stating this fact as soon as possible. Due to the seriousness and urgency
of U1is issue, we request you fax your response to the nurnl)er you have on fiie, ·\-425-69i-7926. and a\so
mail a copy to the propeiii' address, 3165 Neff Road. Orofino, Idaho 83544. Again, ihis issue affects botr:
our interests and yours in U1e property so we than!\ you in advance to your prompt attention to this rn2tter_

·. '-------~·~··
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Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 NeffRd
Orofino. ID 83 544

September 2, 2014

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Attornevs at Lmv
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls. ID 83405-150:C:
Fax# (208)522-5111

RE: PBI-:I v. Nickerson, eta!, Clearwater County Case No. CV-2011-28
Dear Mr. Stenquist,
ln your recent affidavit in support of your Motion to Augment the record you testify, "1 have
access to mv client's files in this mm:ter and make this affidavit based upon personai
kno,:vledge ... " Since you claim to have personal knowledge of your client's files, then you are
taking and accepting personal responsibility for the fraud you and your client have perpetrated
against the Nickersons and the Cornt. You have made and are making a personal choice to hide,
conceal and/or destroy evidence that validates all the Nickersons' claims and defenses. You have
made and are making a personal choice to allm:v PHJ-I 1.o fraudulently and ,:vrongfolly foreclose
on the Nickerson property. You have made and are making a personal choice to catastrophically
damage and comprehensively destroy all aspects of the 1',Jickersons' life and way of life
emotionally, physically and financially.
~:{ou know and are personally mvare that Chase claims to be in possession of the Nickerson Note
and Mortgage, that Chase claims to be the investor on the Nickerson loan, and that the account
history provided by Chase is inaccurate \vhich means PHH has no legal, ethical or moral right or
authority to foreclose and you and your firm are accomplices to PHH's ,vrongful foreclosure. As
an officer of the Comi, you have taken an oath to uphold the lav1, and it is not only your la\vful
duty but your ethical and moral responsibility to inform the Corni PHH has wrongfolly
foreclosed upon the Nickersons.
lvir. Stenquist, ainong other violations to be expounded upon uncle1· separate cover, you have

vioiated LC. § 3-201. D2.Bties of i'-1.rtorneys. ,t To employ, for the purpose of 1Irn.Rntaillllin1g the
<..
•Lil
f-)
e21.11ses conxsdecl to 111n1., sucln rraenns Ot!i(V as are consistent vv1t.KE Itna-11 7 rsna ;never seeli{ ro
misiead the judges by an .!fftifire o,r fafoe 5i:ateme~t of fa.ct oR· hrvv. Specifically, you have
intentionally sought to mislead the judge by making false statements including stating Chase
never m-vned the Nickerson Note or ·Mortgage and that they were only the servicer (You made
this false statement eight times in order to tlnivart the discovery process and deny the Nickersons
their equal access to justice.). Further, you used this artifice to mislead the judge into
determininoV there \Vas no contract bet,veen Chase and the Nickersons. In addition. by vour
~·
omission and concealing the fact that Chase claims to own the Nickersons loan and to never have
sold nor assigned it to PHH you have violated the Lmvyer' s oath and are judged by the following
(H
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maxim: suppressio veri e.xpressiofalsi - a suppression of truth is equivalent to an expression of
falsehood. (Other violations to be expounded upon under separate cover.}

\'fr. Stenquist, it is time for you and your client to come clean. The comprehensive damages
suffered by the Nickerson family, my family, and those adversely affected by the nighrrnare
caused by your ongoing actions is severe, significant and substantial. Your exposure and the
inescapable exposure you have caused for your firm and client civilly, criminally and morally is

enormous and ever increasing. You have purposefolly and maliciously misled and committed
fraud on the Corn1 by both Yvhat you have stated and by your ongoing silence regarding the truths
that surround this case. \Tou have purposefully and maiiciously performed these actions in order
to gain u1~just enrichment for you, your firm and your accomplices and destroy the Nickersons
emotionally, physically and financial Iy. Your testimony that you have access to Chase's files and
personal knowledge of that information condemns you and indicts you and your firm for all
responsibility and liability for the intentional fraud perpetrated upon the Nickersons and the
Court. It is your s,:s.'orn duty as an officer of the Court and the duty of your firm under the
agreements of their incorporation to make it right. It is your moral and ethical obligation as a
human being to make it right. It is clearly ,vithin your power and responsibility to stop making
excuses for the ,,villful assault on this family and to make it right. Therefore, ,ve require you
immediately file whatever motion, affidavit or other document that is appropriate or required to
halt this case, stop the ongoing abuse being suffered by our family, and prevent PHH from
wrongfolly foreclosing.

;vJr. Stenquist, you are on notice that vJe, the Nickersons, the Nickersons' heirs, the Nickersons'
relatives and the Nickersons' friends are resolved to pursue whatever steps necessary to avail
ourselves of all legal remedies available civilly, criminally and publicly to ensure justice is
served upon you, your firm, your client and your accomplices for the individual, joint and
conspiring roles and parts you have played, are playing and may continue to play in destroying
our life, liberty, financial security, and pursuit of happiness. Our allegations of bad faith,
predatory lending, wrongfol foreclosure, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, reckless record keeping,
negligence, breach of duty of care, libel and slander of credit, civil conspiracy, offering false and
forged instruments for the record, unfair methods and practices_ and violations of the lav11yer's
oath are all trne_ ,vell documented and will be proven. Your successful thwarting of our story
being told thus far ·will not continue. l\fr. Stenquist, you, your alleged client and nmv your firm
knmv the truth of,vhat you have clone TO the Nickerson family. You, the leadership of your firm
and vour client have it \,vithin vour pmver to end this assault and make this right. No more
excuses. No more legal chicanery. No more payoffs or deals. No more abuse. Do the right thing
and do it nm:v.
..,

..J

~

-

On behalf of the entire Nickerson f~w1ily and others adversely impacted by this unlawful action,
-.::\

•. ,::: - i_.•

~

u:,.;_'.......-------·-- ...... .
.

Charles Nickerson
cc: Ivfoffat Thomas Board ofDirectors, r\tfanaging Partners, Others
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Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 NeffRd
Orofino. ID 83544
December 2. 201.c
Jon A. Stenquist
IvJoffatt Thomas Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls. ID 83405-1505
Fax# (208)522-51 l l

RE: PfIH v. Nickerson. eta!. Cleanvater Countv Case No. CV-2011-28
·'

)

•'

Settlement Offer dated December 1. 2014
Dear Mr. Stenquist.
Your offer is denied. You need not wait until December 5 to automaticall_v withdraw it. Your fa>:
and your review· of the case clearly indicate you have severely underestimated and grotesquely
Iimited the resolve. intentions, and comprehensive lengths the Nickerson Family intends to
~ursue 1:0 find justice in this case. You have also fataily failed to acknowledge and properly defer
to your greatest enemy and most undefeatable opponent in this case, the truth. Mr. Stenquist, you
and your accompiices can twist it, warp it, hide it, try to change it all you \-Vant, but the trnth is
the truth. and the truth is going to set us free. You may have somewhat successfolly prevented
the truth from being told, presented and proven thus far. However, time, persistence and different
audiences will ultimately prevail against your legal chicanery and categorically hold you
accountable for your criminal thievery and unlmvful involvement in this case.
Do not nauseate or oftend us by saying you do not ,vant to take the Tdaho Ranch from us or those
·we serve. You know we made every payment v.'e were obligated to make and have heroically
honored every obligation we had or have ever had regarding this property. It is ,.veil documented
in the Chase communication records that Chase refused to send statements, give us receipts,
provide us ,vith records, etc. It is well documented our payments ,vere misapplied, then applied
coITectly, that all payments were made and that we ,vere on time and in good standing. It is well
documented Chase embezzled thousands of dollars from our escrow· surplus. It is ,veil
docun1ented cr·iminal acts have been comrnitted and not just '-Vith our loan. It is ,veil docu1nentecl

Chase had and still has a contract ,:vith the Nickersons and that you have lied and continue to lie

about it. It is well documented Chase breached the contract by inaccurate accounting and that
you maliciously presented a fabricated account transaction and payment history, which has been
contested and proven inaccurate, to cover your and/or their illegai activity. It is well documented
you have purposefolly thwarted our discovery efforts by not providing the plethora of notes.
conversations and documentation regarding the countless calls and hours of conversations
bet\.veen Chase and our family. There is a lot more \;vell documented too, and you, Chase, PHH.
and Just Law know it. A lot of other people know it too.
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Having said that, thank you for taking the time to share your legal strategies and theories with us.
We appreciate your neatly crafted attempt to intimidate and/or discourage us, but it clicl not and it
will not \VOrk. Frankly, your case overview is full of inaccuracies, false claims and truth
loopholes. Your gravest mistake is not realizing our opportunity to tell our story before a just
judge, law· enforcement agencies and public officials is coming soon. When that day comes,
justice ,.vill demand answers from you and the evidence will i1Tefotably support our claims.
Whether civilly, criminally, publicly, or all of the above, you and your accomplices will
ultimately ans,ver for v-rhat you have done to our family. lVIake no mistake, ,ve will not be silent
or silenced until you do. \Ve have lived through and survived the undeserved hell Chase and their
accomplices have put us through. Vve have ,.vatched a ranch purchased as a gift to share \:vith
others attack and steal our entire life savings, family home, financial freedom and all other
assets. We have fought i1\justice valiantly as others have watched in disbelief and anger as they
have seen us endure it. You, nor your accomplices, can change the trnth or what we have
experienced. We are the ones who ,vere on the recorded calls. \Ve know they exist. 1.,7,./e spent
countless hours dealing 1.vith the incompetence of your client and their record keeping
nightmares. \Ve sifted through their abusive credit collection practices until we found
representatives with integrity and customer service brains 1vho fuuncl our payments and corrected
rhe records. 'IVe ,~.1ere the victims of the promised coITespondence for our records that never came
and that you and your accomplices have nmv used to try to discredit us. \Xie listened when
representatives read back ,,vhat they had entered into the system. \Ve undeservedly suffered
comprehensive and malicious losses, damages, and assaults. Our scars burn with a fervent
passion to see justice served and to prevent you from stealing other people's lives and putting
them through the anguish you have inflicted upon us. Therefore, you can assume any legitimare
settlement offers that might be fo1ihcoming must include confessions and apologies or they will
be denied as well. The fact is we can and will rebuild our financial po1tfolio. However, your then
~
dom cannot be repa1'd . =·
.
.
'
,. •
!
.
"
o±'our J'L'
11e an d tree.
H1ere 1s
no JWE
anu,..'I rnnperrn,ty
or reparai!orl
rnr
·;11h21t you and ym.nr accomµ~ice3 have done to our
You cannot change the fact \Ve did
noi:hing wrong. You cannot change the fact ,vbat you, Chase and your accomplices have done is
rnoraily, ethically, financially and legally ,vrong. We want justice served, and we Viill not stop
until \Ve get it. God and a lot of other people out there kno,v the truth of the severe, significant
and substantial abuse we have suffered and the superhuman lengths we ,vent to in honoring all
commitments regarding this prope11y. Our legal strategy is simple, the truth will set us free.
Whether you or your accomplices like it or not, God ,vill be the final Judge in this matter. \Ve
pray God ,vill render to each man according to his deeds.
Sincerely,

cc: Benjamin C. Ritchie, I'vioffat Thomas - Managing Partners
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Orofino, ID 83544

AT

3
4

I

I(,

Defendants Pro Se

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECON.D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

8
9

Case No.: CV 2011-28

PHH MORTGAGE,

10

Plaintif£1Counter-Defendant,

11

MOTION TO QUASH EXECUTION
AND JUDGMENT

vs.
l2

13
14
15

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
KNOWLTON & l\1ILES PLLC; WELLS
FARGO BANK, KA., AND JOHN DOES I
thru X

16
17

Defendant,

18

COLD\VELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a/d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN

19

CHASE BANK, N.A.

20

Third Party-Defendants.

21

22

COMES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, to defend our interests in our

23

property from an action that has arisen from fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, fraudulent

24

suppression of material facts, bad faith, breach of trust, breach of contract, abusive debt

25

collection practices, and other such criminal and malicious intent. We hereby move this Court to

26

quash execution and judgment. As detailed throughout the record and in our Response in

21

Opposition to Set Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ and Order of Sale and our Motion for

28

Sanctions, Chase and PHH have obtained their summary judgments based upon contradictory

29

and intentionally fraudulent and misleading statements. They have purposefully and maliciously

30

misled the District Court, and Judge Griffin prejudicially manipulated the proceed1ngs and 1ssued

31

judgment in their favor. They have created irregularities which render the underlying judgment

32

Motion lo Quash Execution and Judgment
Page 1 of '.l
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void. Therefore, we call on this Court to use its inherent authority to quash execution and
2

judgment.

AUTHORITY

3

4
5

(N. Y.) Execution will be stayed by order of court to prevent fraud or great injustice,
either perpetually or for a definite time - Lansing v. Orcott, 16 Johns 4.

6

10

Every court has power to watch over the execution of its judgments, and, where its
process has been irregularly or fraudulently executed, to quash it. (Ala. 1880) Rhodes v.
Smith. 66Ala 174; (Md 1875) Schultze v. State, 43.Md. 295; (Vi. 1837)Mattocksv.
Judson, 9 Vt. 343; (Va. 1795) Hendricks v. Dunda.ss, 2 Wash. 50.
1
American Digest 1658 - Present (Century Edition, Volume 21 l st Decennial - 11 h
Decennial) Part 447. Grounds and Part 467. Grounds.

11

This Court not only has the inherent power and authority to quash execution and

7
8

9

12

judgment, in the interest of justice, it is its duty to quash it.
CONCLUSION

13
14

As we have demonstrated in our Response in Opposition to Set Aside Stay and Issuance

15

of Writ and Order ofSale and our Motion for Sanctions, and numerous other pleadings before

16

this Court, Chase and PHH have obtained judgments through concealment, deception, and fraud.

17

Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court must quash execution and judgment.

18
19

20

Wherefore, we request execution and judgment be quashed, and that we be allowed to
pursue all of our claims against Chase and PHH.
Oral argument requested.

21
22

DATED this

1/ .f<.. day of_;7.,.,.~+'-#-1:_/\o=-J("'--·-----' 2017

23
24
25

26
27
28
29

30

31

Mmion to Quas11 Execution and Judgn1cnt
Page 2 of3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on th:J;/k day of ~,~ l (
, 2017, J
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the OTION TO~ H EXECUTION AND
JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

(") C:.S. Mail

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Fax(619)590-1385

8
9

10

11

(~,) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Fal1s, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

12

--

13
14
15
16
17

18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25

26
27

28
29
30
31

32

Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment
Page 3 of'.l
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FILED
/ BY
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~/1

AT

t:l: 2- 7 l " • ~OllOFINO, IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.
vs.
CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC; WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., and JOHN DOES
I through X,

)
)

CASE NO. CV 2011 -28

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
QUASH EXECUTION AND
JUDGMENT and MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS

)

Defendants,

)
)
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a )
d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE, and
)
)
J P MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
)
Third Party Defendants.
)

Defendants Charles Nickerson and Donna Nickerson have file Motions to Quash
Execution and Judgment and for Sanctions. Nickersons allege that the appeal of this
matter is not yet fully resolved. However, The Idaho Supreme Court, in an opinion
issued April 27, 2016 affirmed the judgment of the district court and the district court's
denial of the Nickersons' Rule 60(b) motions to set aside the judgment. PHH Mortg. v.
Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 400, 374 P.3d 551, 563 (2016), reh'g denied (July 19, 2016).

A remittitur was issued on July 22, 2016.
The Appeal is fully resolved and Nickersons are merely attempting to relitigate a
matter that has been through the litigation process. Nickersons have not provided any
factual or legal basis for relief from the Judgment. The Supreme Court has made the
Order Denying Motions-1

200

(

(

final determination and nothing can be accomplished by this Court hearing oral
argument on either motion. Sanctions obviously are not warranted against PHH , the
prevailing party and Plaintiff is entitled to proceed with execution of its Judgment of
Foreclosure.
Defendant's Motions to Quash Execution and Judgment and Motion for
Sanctions are denied.
DATED this

J'~ day of April,

2017.

Order Denying Motions-2
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(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on this

/3-f:!t day of April, 2017,

served a true and correct copy of the Order Denying

Motion to Quash Execution and Motion for Sanctions by mail or fax to:

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
13125 W. Persimmon Ln. Ste 150
Boise, ID 83713

Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544

v"

Mail
- - -Fax

/

Mail
Fax
-----'----

Carrie Bird, Clerk of Court

By: t ~

Deputy Clerk

Order Denying Motions-3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2011-28
ORDER LIFTING STAY

)
)
CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA )
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
)
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC; WELLS )
FARGO BANK, N.A., and JOHN DOES )
I through X,
)
)
)
Defendants,
vs.

)
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a )
)
d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE, and
J P MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
)
)
Third Party Defendants.
)

A stay of execution pending appeal of an Amended Judgment, entered on June
24, 2014 was issued by this Court on October 15, 2015.
The appeal process has been completed, with the Supreme Court affirming the
Judgment by opinion issued April 27, 2016, rehearing was denied, and

a remittitur was

issued on July 22, 2016. There is no further reason to stay the execution of the
Judgment of Foreclosure.
A Writ of Execution on the Judgment of Foreclosure and Order of Sale on
Foreclosure shall be issued.
DATED this / ~ day of April, 2017.

~C}l~
G r e g ~ ~ bistrict Judge

7

Order Lifting Stay-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on this

/

~

day of April, 2017, served a true and correct copy of the Order Lifting

Stay by mail or fax to:

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
13125 W. Persimmon Ln. Ste 150
Boise, ID 83713

Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544

,/

Mail
- - -Fax

I

Mail
- - - Fax

Carrie Bird, Clerk of Court

By: f ~
Deputy Clerk

Order Lifting Stay-2
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. PETER J . .SALMON (ISB #6659)
ELISA SUE MAGNUSON (!SB #8085).
ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr., Ste. 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Telephone: (858) 750~7600
Facsimile: (619) 590-1385
E-mail : emagnuson@aldridgepite.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
~

/

s

;

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C::OUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff,

v.

l

t
I
1

Case No.: CV-2011-0000028

l

ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF
FORECLOSURE

!

CHARLES NICKERSON, DONNA
NICKERSON; COLDWELL BANKER
MORTGAGE; J.P. MORGAN CHASE
BANK, N.A.; KNOWLTON & MILES PLLC;
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

!
l1
l

;

"t

i

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff PHH Mortgage ("Plaintiff'), through its attorney of record; the
Court having rendered judgment for foreclosure in this matter;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

That Plaintiff in accordance with the Judgment rendered in this matter have a

decree of foreclosure against the interests of Defendants in the real property at issue, and against
the real property at issue as legally described herein and commonly known as 3165 Neff Road,

ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
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Orofino, ID 83544 ("Subject Property"), in regard to the Deed of Trust recorded as instrument
190568 on October 4, 2002, in the official records of Clearwater County, Idaho; and Note executed
by the borrowers Donna Nickerson and Charles R. Nickerson on October 4, 2002 ("collectively
referred to herein as the Subject Loan"), in an amount as follows:
•
•
•
•

Judgment Amount ....................................................................... $385,276.45
Interest from 4/4/14 to 6/23/14 at the rate of 5 .25% ..................... $ 3,964.95
Interest from 6/24/14 to present at the rate of 5 .25% ................... $53,969.34
TOTAL JUDGEMENT AMOUNT through 7/22/17 ............ $443,210.74

Additionally interest accrues from the date of judgment at the rate set forth by Idaho Code Section
28-22-104 and the Idaho State Treasurer's Office which currently is 5.25% or $55.41 daily from
February 23, 2017. The repayment of the aggregate sums described herein is secured by a valid
Deed of Trust and lien on the Subject Property in favor of Plaintiff.
2.

Plaintiff has a first priority lien subject to the Deed of Trust on the Subject Property

which is prior in time and superior in right to any right, title, claim, or interest that all Defendants,
and all persons claiming under them, may have in the Subject Property, either as encumbrancers,
purchasers, or otherwise; said first priority mortgage lien being evidenced by the Deed of Trust
recorded as instrument 190568 on October 4, 2002, in the official records of Clearwater County,
Idaho.

3.

The interests of Defendants are junior and subordinate to those of Plaintiffs, and

that Defendants and all persons claiming under Defendants, either as encumbrancers, purchasers
or otherwise, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title and interest and equity of
redemption they may have in and to the Subject Property, when the time for redemption has
elapsed under Idaho Law.

ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
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TO THE CLEARWATER COUNTY, IDAHO SHERIFF:
4.

The following described mortgage real property shall be sold at public auction in

the County of Cleaiwater, State of Idaho, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Clearwater
County, Idaho, subject to the statutory right of said Defendants to redeem the same in accordance
with the laws of the State ofldaho, to-wit:

SITUATE IN THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO.
TOWNSIDP 36 NORTH, RANGE 2 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN
~ECTION 22: SEl/4 NWl/4, SEl/4 SWl/4 NW 1/4
Which may no.w be known as: 3165 Neff Road, Orofino, ID 83544.

5.

The Sheriff shall give notice of such sale in the manner provided by law.

6.

Plaintiff shall be permitted to credit bid at such sale any amount up to and including

the total· amount of the Judgment as set forth herein.

7.

Plaintiff or any party to the suit may become a purchaser at the sale and the Sheriff

of Clearwater County, Idaho be directed to execute a certificate of sale and, subsequently, a deed
to the purchaser of the Subject Property.

8.

The proceeds of the sale under foreclosure shall be applied:
a)

First, in payment of the costs of the foreclosure sale;

b)

Second, in payment of the amounts due Plaintiff described in paragraph 1

above;
c)

Third, upon completion of the foreclosure sale, if any, and after payment to

Plaintiff, any surplus funds from the foreclosure sale will be deposited with the
Clerk of the Court and distributed upon either further order of the Court or upon
Stipulation of the appearing parties in this. matter in accordance with Idaho Law.

ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
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9.

The Sheriff shall make a report of such sale and file it with the Clerk of this Court

within the time required by law.

10.

\The Sheriff will make, execute and deliver to the purchaser or purchasers a

certificate of sale and, following the expiration of the period of redemption, a Sheriffs Deed of the
premises so sold, and setting forth each tract or parcel of land so sold and the sum paid therefore.
11.

That after the confirmation of the sale of the Subject Property, the purchaser or

purchasers at such sale, or their heirs or assigns, be let into possession of the premises so sold on
production of the certificate of sale or a duly authenticated copy thereof, and that each and every
other party to this action who may be in possession of the premises, under them or either of them
shall deliver to such grantee or grantees named in such certificate of sale possession of such
portion of the premises as shall be described under the certificate of sale.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
That jurisdiction of this cause is hereby expressly reserved and retained for the purpose of
making such further orders as may be necessary in order to carry this Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure into effect and correct any mathematical error, to grant any accrued credits, or for the
purpose of making such further orders as may be necessary or desirable.

ENTERED this J¢

day of

A,n-/ ,

20

}1

ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,fl,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J3- day of ~
copy of this document to be served to:

20

t

.L1I caused a true and conect

\

f

}
[

Counsel for Plaintiff:
Elisa S. Magnuson
ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP
13125 W Persimmon Ln Ste 150
Boise, ID 83713
Fax: (858)412-2789
Attorney for Plaintiff

US Mail
Facsimile
FedEx
Other

Counsel for Defendant JP Morgan Chase:
Jon Stenquist
MOFFATT THOMAS
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax: (208)522-5111
E-mail jas@moffatt.com

US Mail
Facsimile
FedEx
Other

Defendants:
Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544

US Mail
Facsimile
FedEx
Other
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Case Nn.
Filed

CV 2D/ I- '6
·

1

at . Lf :LJ le o'clock
1
2

CHARLES NICKERSON AND DONNA NICKERSON
3165 Neff Rd
Orofino, ID 83544

M

C 111-e cnr&

3
4

Defendants Pro Se

5
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

8
9

PHH MORTGAGE,

IO

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

11

12

13
14

15

vs.

Case No.: CV 2011-28

MOTION TO VACATE OR AMEND
ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF
FORECLOSURE

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
KNOWLTON & MILES PLLC; WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., AND JOHN DOES I
tbruX

16
17

18
19

Defendant,

COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a/d/b/a
of PIDI MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A.

20

Third Party-Defendants.

21

22

COMES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, respectfully, with the

23

expectation of fairness and impartiality in the administration of and equal access to justice;

24

request this Court vacate or amend its Order for Sale and Decree of Foreclosure for the reasons

25

set forth herein.

26

In accordance with our motion to reconsider filed in conjunction with this motion and

27

facts of law that defeat any adverse judgment in favor of PHH, we request the Court vacate its

28

Order for Sale and Decree of Foreclosure.

29

lf the Colllt is W1willing to vacate in the interest of justice, then we request the Court

30

amend its order to conform with the laws and rights of redemption. According to LC.§ 6-101 ,

31

"sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to

WJ.1

32
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redemption", and according to I.C. §§ 11-310 and 11-401 -11-403 we have one year to redeem

7

the property during which time we remain in possession of the property.
A mortgage foreclosure decree, providing that the purchaser of mortgaged premises at the
foreclosure sale should be let into possession thereof, and should have possession on
production of sheriffs deed, conformed to the statute relating to redemption of realty
from mortgage foreclosure sale, and cannot be construed to mean that mortgagee or any
other purchaser at such sale was to have possession of the mortgaged property prior to
one year from the date of sale or before the issuance of the sheriff's deed. Eastern Idaho
Loan & Trust Co. v. Blomberg, 62 Idaho 497, 113 P.2d 406 (1941).

8

According to this authority, the decree granting immediate possession upon production of the

9

Sheriffs Certificate of Sale cannot be construed to mean any purchaser at the sale will be let into

2
3

4

5
6

lO

possession of our property prior to one year from the date of sale or before the issuance of the

11

Sheriffs Deed whlch is not issued until the year ofredemption has expired. Further, according to

12

I.C. § 11-403, "Ifno redemption be made witlrin one (1) year after the sale ... the purchaser or his

13

assignee is entitled to a conveyance [legal transfer of ownership]." Until the time of redemption

14

expires, the purchaser has no legal grounds for possession. Therefore, in order to avoid any

15

confusion or further liability for Clearwater County and the officials acting on its behalf

16

regarding this matter and prevent future actions and civil dispute, the order should be amended to

l7

explicitly state the purchaser will not be allowed possession until the year of redemption has

18

expired and the law allows the Sheriff to issue his deed.

19

Further, this property is a two parcel property of 50± acres that is listed as two separate

20

parcels in the County Tax Records. We purchased and were given a wet note Warranty Deed for

21

the two parcels which remains in our possession on the entire 50± acreage ranch. We only agree

22

to provide one parcel to Coldwell Banker as a security interest when the original loan was

23

negotiated. However, as the record shows, Coldwell Banker agreed verbally and in writing to be

24

bound by all over 40 acre restrictions associated with a mortgage as part of their agreement with

25

us. Therefore, if this Court fails to vacate judgment, its order must be amended to specify only

26

the one parcel is to be or can be sold to satisfy the judgment. As a matter ofrecord, LC. § l l-304

27

states when the sale is of real property consisting of several known lots or parcels they must be

28

sold separately and in the order the judgment debtor determines and the sheriff must follow their

29

directions. Thus, even if both parcels were lavv:fully able to be sold, additional directions must be

30

provided to allow us to direct the order of sale.

31

The equity in our one parcel more than covers the entire judgment amounts awarded to

32

PHH and Chase. Nonetheless, even if it did not, the property is the only security ever provided
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1

on this loan and is the only lawful recourse available to satisfy any alleged default or judgment

2

suffered in defending our right to ownership. Per any conflict associated with this property, the

3

original loan documents granted us the right to present any defenses and claims to refute them.

4

Thus, it is clearly beyond the right of the Court to abuse its discretion, judicial or legal, to create

5

an error of law in the circumstances surrounding execution of judgment to exercise the perversity

6

of its will. Therefore, any judgment must cause the sale of the property to satisfy any and all

7

judgments that have been awarded as a result of our being forced to fight and defend our

8

property rights against this wrongful foreclosure. This District Court has disallowed our

9

contractual right to offer a defense through procedural manipulation and effectually impeding

10

our access to the Court record, but it is beyond the jurisdiction or discretion of this Court to deny

11

us the right to use the property value to satisfy any resultingjudgments-1.C. § 6-108. Further,

12

this District Court has denied us right to due process and the right to be heard according to the

13

law, but it is beyond the jurisdiction or the authority of the Court to obligate us to give our

14

abusers any moneys beyond the equity from the sale of the alleged security interest to fund their

15

mortgage fraud scheme.

16

Additionally, moneys beyond the satisfaction of judgment represent equity in the

17

property that lawfully belongs to us, and must be returned to us upon sale of the property as its

18

rightful owner per 1.C. §§ 6-102 and 11-301. PHH and Chase must not be awarded for their

19

collusion to commit fraud and defraud our family with unjust gain. It is also not lawful for

20

Clearwater County to seize our moneys and hold them hostage for unjust gain without cause or

21

right. This judgment is mortgage terrorism against our property and financial portfolio. It is

22

unconscionable that after paying years of payments toward the satisfaction of a fraudulently

23

crafted loan; making significant investments and improvements to the property which

24

substantially increased its property value well beyond the original purchase price and loan

25

amount; as has been demonstrated with certified assessments and appraisals; that PHH and Chas

26

could be allowed through prevention ofperfonnance, abusive debt collection, false claims, and

27

forged assignments to now secure a judgment that is greater than the original loan amount.

28

Though this represents the unbelievable abuse of justice and democracy, it happened to us in

29

Clearwater County, Idaho, without cause or right. We submit the massiveness of this event

30

should demand the Idaho Emergency Broadcast System to immediately publish the following

31

emergency broadcast to all homeowners, business owners, and consumers in Idaho: Beware: It

32

could happen to you!
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Wherefore, we request the Court vacate the order as requested in our motion to
2

reconsider or amend the order to explicitly state the purchaser at the sale will not be let into

3

possession until the year of redemption has expired, specify the parcel that is to be sold, and

4

instruct the Sheriff to pay all moneys beyond the judgment amount to the Nickersons at the time

5

of the sale. Once again, we ask this Court to uphold the laws that are in place to save our home,

6

consider the truth that has been hidden within your chambers, and restore judicial integrity and

7

fairness to this Clearwater County District Court in regards to this matter.

8

Oral argument requested.

9

10

DATED this

~Jt'e dayof~p,..._~___,=_,.~)_l_ _ _ _ _ _,2017

11
12
13

14

15
16

17
18

19

20

21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28

29
30

31
32
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the-~.} kday of
2017, I
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the Ni5TION TO A ATE R AMEND
ORDER OF SALE AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

(•) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

(it) U.S. Mail

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile
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1/1-: - 'ZQ\ 7,

Case No.
Filed

1>
Lcl nr\e B ,vc: )

at . 4 ·Y-(R o'clock
2

CHARLES NICKERSON AND DONNA NICKERSON
3165 NeffRd
Orofino, ID 83544

3
4

By

Cierk

~j '

Depuiy

Defendants Pro Se

5

6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

8
9

Case No.: CV 2011-28

PHH MORTGAGE,

10

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

11

vs.
12
13

14

15

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO QUASH
EXECUTION M""D JUDGMENT
AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

CHARLES ~lCKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
KNOVv'L TON & MJLES PLLC; WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., AND JOHN DOES I
thruX

16

17
18
19

20

Defendant,
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a/d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A.
Third Party-Defendants.

21
22

M

COMES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, respectfully, but with all

23

rights vested and granted in us as natural born citizens of the United States and property owners

24

of a 50± deeded acreage organic farm and working ranch situated in Orofino, Idaho, to challenge

25

the orders of this Court in accordance with l.R.C.P 11 and the interest of justice. We hereby

26

request this Court procedurally, systematically, and comprehensively reconsider its Order

27

Denying Motion to Quash Execution and Motion for Sanctions and stop and forever bar the

28

targeted assault against our family and property for the reasons set forth herein. "'\Ve request this

29

motion be considered in conjunction with all evidence and filings that have been entered by us in

30

the record and that is readily available to this Court. To allow this foreclosure to proceed is not

31

only morally and ethically wrong, but doing so constitutes a wrongful foreclosure; causes our

32

family extreme, substantial and significant damages and injuries; and causes Clearwater County
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exposure and liability for wrongful foreclosure, unlawful execution, intentional infliction of
2

emotional distress, judicial malice, unwarranted economic damages, actual and consequential

3

damages, and other damages as will be detailed under separate cover.

4

In the interest of justice and judicial expediency and to avert future necessary actions

5

regarding the unlawful seizure and wrongful foreclosure of our property\ we request this Court

6

comprehensively reconsider the prejudicial and procedurally manipulated judgments that have

7

been rendered by this District Court. The summary judgment granted to PHH relies upon the

8

smnmary judgment granted to Chase. The summary judgment granted to Chase relies upon

9

deceit and attorney negligence. Both judgments rely upon contradictory testimony; fraudulently

1o

crafted documents that have been proven to violate Idaho (I.C. § 18-3203. Offering false or

11

forged instruments for record) and federal laws; fail to establish PHH has any ownership in the

12

property whatsoever (See Notice ofSupplemental Evidence); establish Chase has repeatedly lied

l3

to Idaho Courts about their true involvement in this action and have unlawfully averted discove

14

that defeats summary judgment in favor of either; and implies collusion and corruption in the

15

judicial duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.

16

Evidence exists in the record, in truth., in reality, in fact, and in law, which creates genuine issue

17

of material fact that prevents any summary judgment in favor of PHH or Chase while facts

18

remain that demand summary judgment in favor of our family. PHH, Chase, Moffat Thomas,

19

John Stenquist, Kirk Houston, Benjamin Ritchie, Just Law, Kipp Manwarring, Jason Rammel,

20

Amelia Sheets, Aldridge Pite, Elisa Sue Magnuson, Peter Salmon, their office staff and

21

accomplices, this Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and, soon to be named others, are fully aware

22

Judge Michael Griffin, has caused to be created a record based on false premises, unjust rulings,

23

malicious injustice and comprehensive fraud. Judge Griffin has granted those with long rap

24

sheets of mortgage fraud and servicing abuse in Idaho and across the United States the right to

25

obstruct our ability to undertake reasonable discovery to produce triable issues of fact and

26

repeatedly utilize legal chicanery and deceit to prevent us from being heard. Judge Griffin's

27

authority io cause damage and injury to our family is solely based on the jurisdiction and

28

authority vested in him and granted to him by Cleanvater County, Idaho.

29

For the record, the execution of Judge Michael Griffin's authority is being carried out by

30

Judge Gregory FitMaurice. This case has been litigated and these unlawful acts of judicial

31

overreach and prejudicial rulings have been committed under the supervision of previous

32

Administrative Judge John Stegner, and the current Administrative Judge JeffBrudie. They have
Motion to Reconsider Order Denying
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l

been mistakenly and wrongfully affinned by Supreme Court Justices Joel D. Horton, Justice

2

Daniel T. Eismann,. Justice Roger S. Burdick, and Justice Warren E. Jones, and Chief Justice Jim

3

Jones,

4

In our motions, we have clearly set forth the fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and

5

deceit perpetrated by PHH and Chase throughout this litigation, and have clearly demonstrated

6

Judge Griffin's manipulation of the record. We are compelling this Court to consider the facts

7

and evidence we submitted to the District Court prior to judgment being rendered. Our factual

8

basis for relief from judgment is, based on the evidence before the Court, PHH does not and did

9

not hold or ov.n our Note and Mortgage (See Notice ofSupplemental Evidence). This evidence

10

has never been addressed by the Courts nor refuted by Chase and PHH. Please carefully review

11

the Supreme Court Opinion and you "\i"\111 realize this evidence was ignored by both the District

12

Court and Supreme Court. By simply ignoring the evidence put before him, exceeding his

13

discretion, and failing to provide opinion as to why, Judge Griffin prejudiced the record and

14

created procedural impossibility for us to provide the Supreme Court \.\'1th reversible decision.

15

Obviously, any Court can rule however they choose if they are allowed to rule by will and

16

prejudice, not fact or truth. Further, the attorneys of record have acted as assistant judges in

17

participating with rulings, instructing the Court on procedure and determinations, and asserting

18

jurisdiction over this foreclosure case. Their exercise of jurisdiction has denied our fundamental

19

Constitutional rights to due process. Thus, justice and constitutional due process require you to

20

stand in the gap of error and false claims that has permeated this litigation, and give democracy

21

and justice the opportunity to prevail. Legal issues, contractual provisions, applicable law and

22

judicial responsibility require Chase and PHH be compelled to answer to this evidence; and then

23

be required to trufu:fully answer our interrogatories and requests for production. Otherwise, the

24

execution of this judgment is unlawful and constitutes judicial malice as the root and base issue

25

of standing has never been litigated or resolved.

26
27
28

29
30
31

A "Movant must show that it has an interest in the relevant note, and that it has been
injured by debtor's conduct (presumably through a default on the note). Such is necessar,
to establish constitutional standing." In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 398 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2009).

PHH has not refuted Chase's claim of possession of the Note. Therefore, PHH admits
Chase owns the Note. Thus, PHH, according to LC.§ 28-3-301 is not the person entitled to
enforce the note, because the note is not endorsed to them, nor is it in their possession.

32
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4

LC.§ 28-3-301. Person entitled to enforce instrument. "Person entitled to enforce'' an
instrwnent means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the
instrument who has the rights of a holder ...
I.C. § 28-1-201. General definitions. (21) "Holder" means: (A) The person in
possession of a negotiable instnunent that is payable either to bearer or to an identified
person that is the person in possession;

5

Therefore, our legal basis and authority for relief from judgment is the irrefutable fact

2

3

6

that PHH did not have standing to file their complaint. PHH was not and is not the Holder: and

7

according to Idaho law, they are not entitled to enforce.

8
9

Wherefore, since both the District Court and Supreme Court have ignored the fact that
Chase claimed to be in possession of our Note and the investor on our loan in January of 2014, a

IO

fact that demonstrates Pl-Il:l was not the Holder and did not have standing to file the complaint,

I1

we request this Court address this issue and vacate its Order Denying Motion to Quash

12

Execution and Judgment and Motion for Sanctions and hold in abeyance its Order of Sale and

13

Decree of Foreclosure.

14

We further request this Court revi.ew the errors made by this Court's predecessor in their

15

entirety and understand by executing judgment you are fully affirming and fully aligning

16

yourself and Clearwater County with the judgments rendered and all resulting liability and

l7

exposure incurred.

18

There are grave inconsistencies and substantial irregularities in the record created by

19

PHH and Chase. This District Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have made contradictory

20

rulings and findings that, in and of themselves, create genuine issues of material fact that defeat

21

summary judgment and challenge the integrity and sobriety of the Court. This District Court is

22

not the trier of fact in a summary judgment ruling and has not been granted the right or discretion

23

to render summary judgment in the presence of genuine issues of material fact. Regarding

24

standing, the following contradictory facts and opinions exist:

25

•

In the District Court's Memorandum Opinion RE: Chase's Motion for Summary

26

Judgment, this Court stated, "Chase initially serviced this loan. There was no

27

contract between Chase and the Nickersons that has been presented to the court."

28

However, the Court contradicts this statement, after no new evidence regarding

29

any contractual relationship between Chase and the Nickersons had been provide

30

by Chase or PHH, in its Memorandum Opinion RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for

31

Sununary Judgment and Nickerson• s Motion Summary Judgment when it stated,

32

"JP Morgan Chase Bank (Chase) owned the note and serviced the loan from the
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end of2007 until the beginning of 2010." This Court is claiming Chase ov.ned the
note and therefore, had a contract with the Nickersons.

2
3

•

In the Undisputed Facts RE: Plaintiff's Complaint section of the District Court's

4

Memorandum Opinion RE: PHH's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court

5

stated, "The note was initially serviced by JP Morgan Chase Bank (Chase), and

6

later reconveyed to PHH." However. the Court contradicted this undisputed fact

7

in its more recent Memorandum Opinion RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for

8

Summary Judgment and Nickerson's Motion Summary Judgment when it stated,

9

"The note was initially serviced by Mortgage Service Center. J P Morgan Chase

10

Bank (Chase) ovvned the note and serviced the loan from the end of 2007 until the

ll

beginning of2010." The very fact this Court disputes its own undisputed facts

12

raises genuine issues of material fact

13

•

Chase denied they were assigned the note in 2007. See JP1vforgan Chase Bank,

14

NA. 's Answer to Third Party Complaint, 1 6. Tiris contradicts the District Court's

15

finding that Chase acquired the note in 2007.

16

•

The District Court found "The note was assigned from Coldwell Banker

17

Mortgage to Fannie Mae in December of2002." However, the only evidence in

18

the record regarding Fannie Mae is a letter Fannie Mae sent to us in which Fannie

19

Mae stated they purchased the loan in December of 2002 and sold it in December

20

of 2009. The Court ruled this evidence was hearsay and did not consider it even

21

though this creates a genuine issue of material fact in the chain of title. He then

22

used this evidence to rule against us when it was in favor of the banks.

23

•

The District Court then contradicts the rest of the Fannie Mae letter by finding "J

24

P Morgan Chase Bank (Chase) owned the note and serviced the loan from the end

25

of 2007 until the beginning of 20 l 0." Chase could not have ov.,ned the note in

26

2007 because Fannie Mae claimed ownership until December of 2009.

27

•

The District Court then claims, "Chase assigned the note to PHH in 2010 (June)."

28

However, PHH contradicts the Court's findings by claiming Fannie Mae assigned

29

the note directly to them. Chase contradicts the Court's findings in its response to

30

our QWR and its Notice of New Creditor where Chase claims to have bought our

31

note in December 2009 and to still have it in its possession as of January 2014.

32

•

PHH and Chase have presenting conflicting principal balances on the account.
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•

The affidavit PHH is relying upon for their Summary Judgment is invalidly

2

notarized, constitutes Notary Fraud, violates I.C. § 55.716, and New Jersey code

3

which requires notaries affix their signature to all notarizations, and conflicts with

4

other testimony in the record regarding default.

5

•

6
7

8
9

The default amount claimed by PHH in their complaint differs by over $11,000 to
which they claimed after they were forced to examine their account statements.

•

We have provide-d affidavit testimony we did not default.

In Summary, The Courts, PHH and Chase have presented the following facts as the chain
of title to the alleged note: a) Coldwell sold the loan to Fannie Mae, however, there is no record

10

of this transfer in the Clearwater County land records, nor has any assignment been presented, b)

11

Coldwell assigned the loan to Chase, c) Fannie Mae transferred the loan to PHH, d) Chase had

12

not ever owned the loan, and e) Chase assigned the loan to PHH.

13

However, a) Coldwell could not both sell the loan to Fannie Mae, and then subsequently

14

assign the loan to Chase. b) There is no record of transfer from Fannie Mae to PHH, no allonges

15

on the Note from Fannie Mae to PHH, and Fannie Mae claims to have terminated their interest in

16

the loan on December 3, 2009. c) Chase did not and could not assign the loan to PHH because

17

Chase has claimed they did not own the loan. However, in contradiction, the evidence

18

demonstrates Chase claims to have purchased the loan on December 3, 2009, which is the same

19

date Fannie Mae terminated their interest in the loan, and Chase claims to still own the loan as of

20

January 10, 2014, which has the same result-Chase did not and has not assigned the Nickersons

21

Note and Mortgage to PHH.

22

23

Further, no accurate default or the existence of default without contradiction or issues of

fact and law has been established.

24

The contradictions of the Court, Chase and PHH demonstrate issues of fact and law exist

25

regarding PHH's standing. Thus, summary judgment in PHH's favor must be dismissed. Further,

26

the Supreme Court found Chase was an owner of the Note. Therefore, both summary judgments

27

were based on false claims and must be reversed.

28

Executing a foreclosure judgment against this property v\ith evidence in the record that

29

clearly invalidates any summary judgment in favor of PHH or Chase demonstrates extreme

30

malice and the targeted comprehensive negligence of the Idaho Judicial Branch against Charles

31

and Donna Nickerson and their property situated in Orofino, Idaho.

32

All it takes for evil to prosper is for good men to do nothing.
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No power on earth has a right to take our property from us without our consent.
2
3

4
5

6
7

John Jay, First Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
We have committed no right or act to give cause or right for our property or consent to
our property being taken from us.

This is our home. We want to keep it. We have, and have always had, the wherewithal to
keep it. We are resolved to keep it.
All instruments, evidence, testimony, motions, briefs, and notices of issue we have

8

presented to this Clearwater County District Court and the [daho Supreme Court have been filed

9

to protect the interests and ownership of two parcels of property known separately in the

Io

Cleanvater County Record originally as 3165 Neff Road and now as 13 9 Neff Road, and the

11

equity firmly established in those two parcels for the benefit and enjoyment of the entire

12

Nickerson family and other individuals, groups and denominations from within and outside the

13

State ofldaho. As such, all losses, damages and injuries being incurred have and are affecting

14

the Nickersons, their children, their heirs, those they serve, the integrity of the Clearwater

15

County records, and the wet ink Warranty Deed in the current possession of the Nickerson

16

Family which no person or entity can lawfully claim right or cause to act against. The litigation

17

of this case has not been resolved based on the true merits of the case; due process has not been

18

served; and the right to a defense has been irrefutably denied Charles and Donna Nickerson and

19

all others being comprehensively damaged and injured by these proceedings. Execution of

20

judgment against our property demonstrates this District Court has ignored, failed and refused to

21

consider evidence in the record; intentionally failed to enter or render opinions so they could be

22

pointed to, reviewed, and reversed in a higher court in violation of judicial standards; and caused

23

extreme injustice and prejudice to occur by its rulings based on false finding of fact. These

24

proceedings have violated and made a mockery of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and have

25

created a record which the Supreme Court has been unwilling to overturn because doing so

26

required it to set and establish precedents they were apparently unwilling or unable to render

27

even in the best interest of justice.

28

We have been forced to represent ourselves prose with extreme prejudice due to the

29

admitted negligence of our Idaho attorney and the record he caused to be created (See Affidavit

30

In Support of Motion of Relief, Exhibit 8, John Mitchell's Affidavit), glaringly obvious judicial

31

incompetence and prejudice of Justice Michael Griffin (See Motion For Relief From Judgment)

32

and the State ofidaho's apparent prejudice against prose litigants. It is unjust and prejudicial to
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hold prose litigants to the standards set forth for civil proceedings without latitude while
2

allowing judges and attorneys impunity in failing to meet deadlines, follow the rules, and tell the

3

truth. This violates case law from the Ninth Circuit which requires some latitude be given to pro

4

se litigants, especially on the technical side of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

5
6

7

"We recognize that the plaintiff represented himself and therefore, in evaluating his
compliance with the technical rule of civil procedure, we treat him with great leniency."
Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1986)

8
9

This demonstrates extreme prejudice and is in violation of the United States Constitution

10

and the right of states to exist. We submit we have already paid for the state and federal laws to

11

be vmtten and for the salaries of those who \.-..Tite and are supposed to enforce the laws. It is

12

unjust and unfair to then require a victim, an innocent homeowner like us whose property and

13

equity is being stolen without cause or right, to pay a private citizen (an attorney, a person whose

14

title by definition means to twist and turn) to make the rest of you do your job.

15

The fact we rely upon to defeat Summary Judgment is Truth is sovereim..

16

To allow any adverse ruling against Charles and Donna Nickerson in this matter

17

demonstrates NO person or financial portfolio can afford to own a home or do business in

18

the State of Idaho.

19

The law cannot be bent by favor, not broken by power, nor corrupted by money; for not

20

only if it be overthrown, but even if it be neglected or carelessly preserved, there is nothing

21

secure in what anyone may think he has [in Idaho], or will inherit from his father [in Idaho], or

22

yet may leave to his children [in Idaho]. Cicero, Pro CAECINA 73

23
24
25

26

I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing
armies. Thomas Jefferson
Mr. District Court Judge, do your duty. Uphold the law, protect justice, and use the
powers vested in you to defend justice and do what is right and equitable under the

27

circumstances and the law. Let reason and conscience compel you to help us save our home. We

28

have done nothing ·wrong. We did not default. PHH has no cause or right to take our home.

29

Further, any judgment in favor of Chase is negated by their blatant deception and fraud. Any

30

reasonable person would deduce this entire litigation has been a fraudulent attempt to steal our

31

equity and conceal criminal actions that expose Chase and PHH to extreme liability and exposur

32

from audit and consequence. This entire litigation is rooted in mortgage fraud, predatory lending,
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l

abusive debt collection and servicing abuse practices. Please be ajustjudge and allow

2

democracy and the judicial system to preserve its dignity and integrity. Hold PHH, Chase and

3

their accomplices accountable for their criminal actions and inactions to the fullest extent of the

4

law.

5

Oral argument requested.

6

Justice demanded.

7

, 2017

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

26
27
28

29
30
31

32
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6

7
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9

10
11
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13
14
15
16
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THE STOP THE ABUSE CERTIFICATE OF S
The oodersigned hereby certifies that on the2,?ti:day of
, 2017, I
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO
NSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO QUASH EXECUTION AND JUDGMe.l"T AND MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following;

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
43 75 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

( .i.) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

(~ U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

On behalf of my family, those I serve, and my fellow American citizens, these documents
are being served so you and your accomplices personally, and in collusion, may be without
excuse and held accountable for these and all other rules, laws and governing principles you hav
violated by your comprehensive actions and inactions. Liberty and justice for all includes our
family and we intend to present the truths of this matter not only to you and to this Court, but to
the highest Courts in this land, and ultimately to the Final Judge.

17

18

19

Thou shalt not steal.

No one should suffer for the act ofanother.
r-

20
21

lAA
~--===-=Charles N1erson

22

23
24

25

26
27

28

29
30
31

32
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(

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

)
)
)
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.
)
)
vs.
)
CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA )
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
)
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC; WELLS )
FARGO BANK, N.A., and JOHN DOES )
I through X,
)
)
)
Defendants,
)
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a )
)
d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE, and
)
J P MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
)
)
Third Party Defendants.
PHH MORTGAGE,

CASE NO. CV 2011 -28
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
VACATE OR AMEND ORDER
OF SALE AND DECREE OF
FORECLOSURE

Defendants' Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of
Foreclosure is DENIED.
DATED this

l0~
m day of May, 2017.

Order denying motion to vacate-!
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...

(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on this

1'2~

day of May, 2017, served a true and correct copy of the Order Denying

Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure by mail or fax to:

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
13125 W. Persimmon Ln. Ste 150
Boise, ID 83713

Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544
Jon Stenquist
Moffett Thomas
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

X

Mail
- - -Fax

X

Mail
Fax
---

X

Mail
- - -Fax

Carrie Bird, Clerk of Court

.. ,

_., '
< ·o
.

nr::"'o·
I~
' ,.

'

-
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(

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,

)
)
)
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.
)
)
vs.
)
CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA )
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
)
KNOWLTON & MILES, PLLC; WELLS )
FARGO BANK, N.A., and JOHN DOES )
I through X,
)
)
)
Defendants,
)
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a )
)
d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE, and
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
)
)
)
Third Party Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2011-28
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO QUASH
EXECUTION AND JUDGMENT

Defendants' Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution
and Judgment and Motion for Sanction is DENIED.
DATED this

1h

_l.b:: day of May, 2017.

Order denying motion to reconsider-1
227

(

(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, do hereby certify that
on this

lh~

day of May, 2017, served a true and correct copy of the Order Denying

Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment and
Motion for Sanctions by mail or fax to:

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
13125 W. Persimmon Ln. Ste 150
Boise, ID 83713

Charles and Donna Nickerson
3165 Neff Road
Orofino, ID 83544
Jon Stenquist
Moffett Thomas
P.O. Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

X

Mail
- - -Fax

X

Mail
- - -Fax
)(

Mail
- - -Fax

Carrie Bird, Clerk of Court.. ,
I ,...,

'2~/JQ~i

By:
Deputy Clerk

~

aa

,. _ r;rco, ir..,
\. \
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BY

1

9Y\ ,

CHARLES NICKERSO::,;f AND DONNA NICKERSON
3165 Neff Rd

l
2

Orofino, ID 83544

3

Defendants Pro Se

4

5
6
7

I IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .rrJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

1

8
9

Case No.: CV 2011-28

PHH MORTGAGE,

10

NOTICE OF ISSUES

Plain tiff/Counter-Defendant,

11
VS.

12
13

14
15

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON, husband and wife;
KNOWLTON & MILES PLLC; WELLS
FARGO BANK, N.A., AND JOHN DOES I
thruX

16

Defendant,

17
18
19

COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a/d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A.

20

Third Party-Defendants.

2]
22

C0~1ES NOW, Defendants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, provide notice to this Court

23

m1d Clearwater County of the below issues regarding the pending unlawful foreclosure and

24

seizure of our property .

25

ISSUE 1.

26

It is not lawful or just to ignore evidence that demonstrates PHH has no lawful right to

27

our Note, Mortgage or property. We have provided evidence to the Court, letters from Chase,

28

which state Chase is in possession of our note and that Chase is the investor on our loan (/1/ohce

29

ofSupplemental Evidence). However, the Court has chosen to ignore this evidence which also

30

procedurally permitted the Idaho Supreme Court to ignore it as well. This evidence has not been.

31

refuted by PHH. Therefore, PHI-I does not hold our note, and thus, by Jaw - I.C. § 45-91 l, PHH

32

cannot hold our mortgage or foreclose on our property nor can they have experienced any

Nouce of Issues
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1

alleged injury or have any alleged cause for action. PHH does not have standing. (lvfotion for

2

Relieffrom Judgment -- pp. 9-10 and Affidavit of Charles Nickerson in Support ojlvlotionfor

3

Relief.from Judgment~ Ex. 1-3)

4

ISSUE 2.

5

It is not lawful or just to ignore contradictions, fraud and perjury submitted in evidence.

6

According to the common law and common sense, one who contradicts himself is not to be

7

heard. This District Court has chosen to ignore the fact that the affidavit PHH is relying upon for

8

their summary judgment is contradictory and is the embodiment of notary fraud. The affidavit
contains the notary's seal but it is not signed by the notary. Both )Jew Jersey and Idaho law

10

require the notary's signature on the affidavit. The affidavit presented facts that contradict the

11

witness' prior testimony. Therefore, the affidavit PHH provided should not have been heard, and

12

thus, any judgment in favor of PHH is not lawful or enforceable. (Objection to Second Affidavit

13

of Ronald E. Casperite, Motion.for Relieffrom Judgment- p. 11 and Affidavit of Charles

14

Nickerson in Support (!/A101ionjor Relief/ram .Judgment- Ex. 4)

15

ISSUE 3.

16

It is not lawful or just for the District Court to fail to provide orders or memorandum

17

opinions so a decision can be properly appealed. District Court Judge Michael Griffin did not

18

provide a memorandum opinion regarding his denial of our Motion to Amend our pleadings or

19

our Motion to Suppress or our Objection to Second Affidavit of Ronald E. Casperite. Therefore,

20

the Idaho Supreme Court would not or could not consider any of our arguments regarding those

21

issues. Denying our constitutional and contractual rights by procedural manipulation is a crime

22

against our persons and our property. Denying our rights to due process in a foreclosure

23

proceeding injures our persons and contaminates the Clearwater County land records.

24

ISSUE 4.

25

It is not lawful or just to disregard a detailed account transaction history provided via an

26

affidavit by a Chase employee that shows a negative principal balance indicating the account was

27

paid off prior to when PHH alleged default. According to this account history, there was no

28

default. Additionally, numerous transactions were not reflected in this transaction history, escroJ

29

activity was not disclosed on this transaction history, nor does the escow account balance match

30

the escrow reporting, and other such accounting discrepancies. (1vlemorandum in Support of

31

Summary Judgment~ p. 12 and Affidavit ~f Charles Nickerson in Support ofMotion for

32

Summary Judgment - p. 3)

1

Notice of lssues
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ISSUE 5.
2

It was not lawful or just for PHH to prevent our perfomrnnce. PHH blatantly refused to

3

accept payments, refused to research and provide proof of the alleged default when we provided

4

proof of payments made and questioned their alleged default (PHH violated federal 1aw and

5

RESPA- 12 C.F.R § 1024.35 and ]2 C.F.R. § 1024.38), and systematically, illegally,

6

unlawfully, maliciously, and intentionally blocked al1 of our efforts and attempts to resolve the

7

disputed default. PHH has since admitted the default was wrong. \Ve were never provided

8

opportunity to cure the alleged default. (Affidavit of Charles Nickerson in Support ofAiotionfor

9

Summa1J1 Judgment - p. 2, Affidavit in Support ofJvfotions to Recons;der - p. 3, Charles

10

Nickerson 'sand Donna Nickerson 's Amended Ans.-Fer, Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint

11

and Demand for Jwy Trial - pp. 28-34)

12

ISSUE6.

13

It is prejudicial and illegal for a judgment to be awarded without a trial when the plainti

14

admits the original default amount was inaccurate by over $11,000.00, and they failed to verify

15

the default when it was disputed at the time it was originally claimed. (Response in Opposition to

16

l\.fotion to Set Aside Stay and Issue Writ - pp. 3-5)

17

J.SSUE 7.

18

It is not lawful or just for the Court to order summary judgment (determine no issue of

19

material fact exists) when the Court contradicts its own statements of undisputed fact regarding

20

the chain of title to our Note and Mortgage. (Motion for Relieffrom .Judgment - p.3 and Affidavit

21

of Charles Nickerson in Support ofMotion for ReHef.from Judgment- PP- 3-8)

22

ISSUES.

23

It is not lawful or just and is beyond the jurisdiction of this District Court for the Court to

24

deny us our right to possess our property during the one year redemption period. (Motion to

25

Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure - pp. 2-3)

26

ISSUE 9.

27

It is not lawful or just to allow a judgment to stand when the judgment is obtained

28

through the negligence of an attorney. (Brief in Support of Petition.for Rehearing- pp. 41-45)

29

"It is said that, where it appears that a judgment was taken against appellant through the

30

negligence of an attorney who had been employed by such party, nothing is left to the discretion

31

of the court, and the judgment must be set aside." F;erce v. Vialpando, 78 Idaho 274, 301 P.2d

32

l 099 (1956). The record demonstrates and our attorney has admitted a judgment was taken

Notice of1ssucs
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against us because of his negligence. (Affidavil of Charles Nickerson in Support ofMotion for
2

Reli~fjrom Judgment-· Ex. 8)

3

ISSUE 10.

4

It is not laV1rful or just to rely upon a judgment obtained through fraud, judicial

5

manipulation, admitted attorney negligence and other such unjust acts to rely upon, obtain or

6

execute a second summary judgment.

7

ISSUE 11.

8
9

It is not lawful or just to ignore the fraud PHH and Chase committed. Virtually every
filing submitted by PHH and Chase contains fraud. The extensiveness of this fraud is

10

summarized in our Motion for Relieffrom .Judgment- pp. 12-18 and detailed in Charles

11

Nickerson 's and Donna Nickerson 's Amended Answer, Counterclaim, Third Party Complaint

12

andDemandfor.Jury Trialin its entirety.

13

ISSUE 12.

14

It is not lawful or just to allow and permit all the attorneys involved in this action to

15

violate Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 - Misconduct and violate the Idaho Attorney's

16

Oath - "I will never seek to mislead a court or opposing party by false statement offact or law,

17

and will scrupulous{v honor promises and commitrnents made. "and violate I.C. § 3-201. Duties

18

of Attorneys. "4. To employ.for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided in him, such

19

means only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to misleadjudges by an artifice or false

20

statement offact or law." These vio1ations are summarized in our ]vfotionjor Relieffrom

21

Judgment-pp. 18-23 and detailed in CharlesNickerson'sandDonnaNickerson'sAmended

22

Answer, Counterclaim, Th;rdParty Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial-pp. 251-279.

23

ISSUE 13.

24

It is not lawful or just or within the jurisdiction of this Court to deny a party's contractual

25

right to provide claims or defenses.

26

ISSI,~ 14.

27

It is not lawful or just and is extremely prejudicial to award attorney fees to a party that

28

has blatantly lied, obstructed justice, thwarted discovery, intentionally misled the Court, and

29

perpetrated fraud. Further, it is unlawful and unjust to allow any attorney fee awards to not be

30

solely covered by proceeds from the foreclosure sale.

31
32

Notice oflssues
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1

ISSUE 15.
It is not lavvful or just or within the jurisdiction of this Court or any Court to participate o

2
3

order the unlawful seizure of our prope1ty. No consent, cause or right has been granted to any

4

entity to take our property from us. "No power on earth has a right to take our property fi·om us

5

wWwut our consent." John Jay, First Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court

6
7

:I

DATED th; s d-5 f< day of _

__,,ff!~-¥+----~-~' 2017

e-&~~~
CHARLESICKERSON

10

11
12
13

14
15
16

17

18
19

20

21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28

29
30
31
32
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4
5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the·J.,.Cf(.day of /11~
~ 2017, I
caused to be seived a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF ISSUESby the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
(u) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

A. Stenquist
: I Jon
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
10

11

(io) U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

PO Box 51505
Idaho Fal1s, ID 83405
Fax (208)522-5111

12
13

14

13
16
17

18
19

20
21
22

23

24
25

26

27
28

29
30
31

32
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CHARLES NICKERSON AND DONNA NICKERSON
2

3165 Neff Rd
Orofino, ID 83544

3
4

Appellants Pro Se

5

6

..,
I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY

8
9

10

13

14

V.

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON

15

Defendants-Counterclaimants-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,

16

17

v

18
]9
20
21

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Resp ondent.

11
12

Case No. : CV 2011-28

PHH MORTGAGE,

and
COLDWELL B.~R MORTGAGE, a d/b/a
PHH MORTGAGE and JP MORGAN CHASE
BANK, NA,
Third Part Defendants-Res ondents.

22

TO: THE ABOVE 'KANIED RESPONDENTS, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, AND TO THE

23

CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT

24

25
26

NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT

1. . The above named appellants, Charles and Donna Nickerson, being forced to represent

27

themselves prose against their will due to the negligence ofldaho attorneys and the Nickerson's

28

understandable lack of faith in the integrity and sobriety of the judgments of Clearwater County

29

District Court Judge Michael Griffin and now affirmed by Judge Gregory FitzMaurice, appeal

30

against the above named respondents toJhe Idaho Supreme Court from the Djstrict Courts' Orde

31

of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure, filed Apdl 13, 2017; Order Denying Motion to Quash

32

Execution and Judgment and Motion for Sanctions, filed April 13, 2017; Order Lifting Stay,

Notice of Appeal
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1

filed April 13, 2017: Order Denying Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of

2

Foreclosure, filed May 16, 20 I 7, and~ Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order Denying

3

Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment, filed May 16, 2017; Judge Gregory FitzMaurice

4

presiding.

5

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or

6

orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders pursuant to I.AR. 1 l(a) and any

7

other such applicable rules that must be applied to ensure access to justice.

8
9

10
11

3. Appellants intend to assert a number of issues on appeal, including, but not limited to
the issues set forth below.
4. The preliminary issues on appeal are as foI1ows:

a. Whether it is lawful or just for the District Court to disregard the laws of

12

redemption which grant the Nickersons the right to possess the property during

13

the redemption period.

14

b. Whether it is lawful or just for the District Court to ignore the Nickersons' request

15

and rights (contractual and I.C. § 11-304), to sell a two parcel property one parcel

16

at a time and to be allowed to direct the order of the sale.

17

c. Whether it is lawful or just for a District Court to fail to provide memorandum

l&

opinions or cite authority so decisions and renderings can be properly put before

19

the Supreme Court for reversal and whether this type of procedural manipulation

20

can be relied upon to uphold or execute judgment.

21

d. Whether it is lawful or just to foreclose on a property or execute judgment against

22

a property when a debtor was prevented from perfonnance, never given

23

opportunity to cure the alleged default amount being used to claim default, and

24

was denied their contractual right to provide claims and defenses.

25

e.

Whether it is Lawful or just to obtain or execute a judgment acquired through

26

mortgage usury and to add accruing interest to that judgment when the prevailing

27

party lied, obstructed justice, never provided an account for missing payments

28

held in suspense accounts, failed to credit substantial escrow moneys, failed to

29

explain why transactions were missing from the account records, the two banks

30

contradict their own evidence, opposing parties have admitted the claimed default!

31

is inaccurate, the debtor has provided testimony no default existed, the banks have

1

j

32

Notice of Appeal
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1

refused to provide discovery base on false ownership claims, and other such

2

record keeping errors exist.

3

f

Whether it is lawful or just to issue a summary judgment when the judgment

4

amount was never properly established, is disputed, changed multiple times duet

5

inaccurate record keeping, and conflicting claims still exist.

6

g. Whether it is lawful or just to issue sanctions against the prevailing party when it

7

is proven the prevailing party lied, presented contradictory facts and evidence,

8

and presented proven to be fraudulent affidavits and testimony to the Court and

'}

obtained their summary judgment through fraud and judicial manipulation.

IO

h. Whether it is lavvful or just to rely upon a summary judgment obtained through

11

fraud, judicial prejudice, procedural manipulation, and admitted attorney

12

negligence to uphold and execute a second summary judgment.

13

1.

Whether it is lawful or just to uphold a judgment that was fraudulently obtained.

14

J.

Whether it is lawful or just for a judgment to be executed when this Court has

15

made procedural mistakes, discrepancies of fact exist, and assignment of errors

16

are undeniably present.

17

k. Whether it is lawful or just for a judgment to be executed based solely on

l&

procedural manipulation and judicial prejudice when justice has not been served

19

and a victim has reached out to the Supreme Court to uphold laws in place to

20

protect them, save their ranch, and protect their rights and interests.

21

l.

Whether it is Lawful or just for attorney fees to be granted to PHH when they

22

illegally attempted a nonwjudicial foreclosure, purposefully presented false and

23

contradictory statements and evidence, and intentionally concealed evidence.

24

This appeal is taken upon both matters oflaw and issues of fact. This appeal is necessary

25

for justice to be properly served~ federal and Idaho laws to be upheld; and Idaho and United

26

States Constitutional rights to be protected and preserved. Appellants reserve the right to add

27

additional issues on appeal and to revise or restate the issues set forth above.

28

5. No portion of the record has been sealed.

29

6. A reporters transcript has not been ordered because no oral arguments nor hearings

30
31
32

have been conducted on these motions.
7. The appellants request the following documents in their entirety to be included in the
clerk's record:
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a. Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Stay and Issuance of Writ of
Execution and Order of Sale, filed April 11, 201 7

2

3

b. Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment, filed April 11, 2017

4

c. Motion for Sanctions, filed April 11, 2017

5

d. Supporting documents filed on April 11, 2017

6

e. Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure, filed April 13, 2017

7

f

Sanctions, filed April 13, 2017

8

g. Order Lifting Stay, filed April 13, 2017

9

h. Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of Foreclosure, filed April

10

27,2017

11

12

1.

j.

14

Order Denying Motion to Vacate or Amend Order of Sale and Decree of
Foreclosure, filed May 16, 2017

15

k. Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution

16

and Judgment, filed May 16, 2017

17

1. Notice oflssues, filed May 25, 2017

18

8. The appellants reserve the right to supplement the record as necessary for justice to b

19

21

Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment
and Motion for Sanctions, filed April 27, 2017

13

20

Order Denying Motion to Quash Execution and Judgment and Motion for

served.
9. We certify:

22

a.

23

b. The appellate filing fee has been paid.

24

c.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to I.AR.
20.

25

26

The estimated fee for preparation ofthe clerk's record has been paid.

DATED this

art-'- day of

f}(l.&y

, 2017

27
28
29

30

We, CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA NICKERSON, deposes and states: that we

31

are appellants in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this notice of appeal are true

32

and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief and, in accordance with LC. § 9-1406, ce1tify
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May 25 17 05:09p

(or declares) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the laws of the State ofidaho that the
2

foregoing is true and correct.

3

DATED t h i s ~ day of_"""kla!;-==+-~-----' 2017

4

5

cA~~db/at.-, ?jc:6/id

Charles Niokerson and Donna Nickerson

6

7
8
9
10

11
12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

26
27

28
29
30
31

32

Notice of A-ppcal

Page 5 of6
239

May 25 17 05:09p

1

2
,,
.1

p.6

CERTIFICATE OF SERV1CE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ~day of M~
, 2017, I
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF APPE
by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

4

5
6
7

8
9

IO
1I

12

Elisa Sue Magnuson
Aldridge Pite, LLP
4375 Jutland Dr. STE 200
San Diego, CA 92177
Phone (858)750-7600
Fax (619)590-1385

(-")U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Prio1ity Mail
( ) Facsimile

Jon A. Stenquist
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields
PO Box 51505
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Fax (208)522~5 l l 1

(")U.S. Mail
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight or Priority Mail
( ) Facsimile

13

14

Charles N1 kerso

15
16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23

24

25
26

27
28
29
30
31

32
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,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,

)
)
)
)

CV2011-28
SUPREME COURT NO. 45146-2017

)

V.

)
)

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON

)

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,

V.
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE,
A d/b/a of PHH MORTGAGE, and
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Third-Party DefendantsRespondents,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

_______________)
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF/'h l have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court at Orofino, Idaho this IJ,- day of September, 2017.

,
CARRIE BIRD
/
Clerk of the District Go
BY:

/

,
Deputy Clerk

. ...

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 1

Fli ~a ~ )~,?Q)J_ AT
y

.

~-p- -- OROF-INO ID/,HO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER
PHH MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 45146-2017

v.

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,
v.

COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
BANK, N .A.,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that the above foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under
my direction as, and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested
by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filep --~R -

,/'

~;

the District Court on the 25th day of May, 2017.
CARRIE BIRD,
By

,/

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER

PHH MORTGAGE,
CV2011-28
Plaintiff-Third Party DefendantCounterdefendant-Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 45146-2017

v.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CHARLES NICKERSON and DONNA
NICKERSON
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Third
Party Complainant-Appellant,

v.
COLDWELL BANKER MORTGAGE, a d/b/a
of PHH MORTGAGE, and JPMORGAN
BANK, N .A.,
Third Party DefendantsRespondents
I, Barbie Deyo, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that copies of the
Clerk's Record were placed in the United States mail and
addressed to Elisa S. Manguson, Alldridge Pite LLP, 13125 W.
Persimmon Ln., Ste. 150, Boise, ID 83713, Benjamin C. Ritchie,
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, P.O. Box 817,
Pocatello, ID 83204-0817, and Charles and Donna Nickerson, 3165
Neff Road Orofino, ID 83544 this /;1~ day of September, 2017.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

fJr

the seal of the said Court this

l_2;__ day of September, 2017.
CARR IE BIRD, Clerf
By
1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.

I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

~~~"

